Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1 (JMF)
July 11, 2000
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant has moved in limine to preclude plaintiff from referring to the 1994 settlement agreement. Defendant argues that because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, he is prevented from pursing his claim of breach in federal district court and that therefore, any mention of the agreement at trial is irrelevant and in fact prejudicial. The court agrees with defendant and will grant defendant's motion.
On April 11, 1994, plaintiff first complained to the Navy Equal Employment Office of workplace discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff complained that he was 1) being given the "run around" regarding potential advancement from his current grade of WG-8 to the desired grade of WG-10, and 2) being passed over for a promotion to WG-10 while another employee with less seniority than plaintiff was given the promotion. On July 29, 1994, plaintiff filed a Pre-Complaint Data Sheet with the Navy complaining that a supervisor named George Coffman treats blacks in a discriminatory fashion and asked that he be transferred to another location. On October 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a detailed complaint sheet with the Navy complaining that: 1) a white employee on light duty was allowed to sit in the shop all day watching television and listening to the radio, 2) he suffered reprisal for reporting the white employee's behavior to John Hopkins and the Equal Employment Office and filing a class action, and 3) the Public Works Center was using his back injury to justify his transfer to Bethesda. Finally, on December 14, 1994, after negotiating with the Navy, plaintiff signed a settlement agreement which stated in pertinent part as follows:
The Complainant:
Agrees to withdraw the above referred discrimination complaint effective the date of this agreement, states that no further processing of this complaint is necessary and agrees not to institute a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . based on the allegations set forth in this complaint.
In light of the Complainant's actions noted in paragraph 1, above, the Agency will, only after those actions have been taken:
The Agency will immediately detail the Complainant to Code 330 within the Public Works Center, Washington, at the Washington Navy Yard for six months light duty status.
Complainant will remain at the WG-8 grade level during the duration of this detail.
This agreement does not constitute an admission by the agency of any allegation set forth in the above referenced discrimination complaint or of a violation of any law, rule or regulation.
The complainant shall be free from any discrimination or reprisal in connection with the above referenced discrimination complaint. If the agency fails to carry out any of the terms of this agreement for reasons not attributable to the complainant's acts or conduct, he may reinstate his complaint for processing at the same point(s) in the process as they are currently, with the Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer within fifteen (15) days of the date he learns that the agency will not be taking the expected action.
Settlement Agreement dated December 14, 1994 (emphasis added).
According to the plain language of the settlement agreement, plaintiff agreed in advance to a procedure for resolving all potential claims of breach. Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff was obliged to inform the agency of any breach within fifteen days of his learning of it.
On June 8, 1995, plaintiff filed a formal statement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Manager claiming the following: "I Orlando R. Wood, do formally notify Ms. Loretta Johnson, EEO Complaint Manager, that I no longer desire nor require their assistance concerning my discrimination complaint and my compensation case against the Secretary of the Navy, John S. Dalton and PWC Management and request all records pertaining to my case." Wood Statement dated June 8, 1995. Although this statement is by no means a clear articulation of any breach allegation, courts are permissive in their interpretations of submissions filed by laypersons. "Because administrative complaints are drafted by laypersons, who are generally unaccustomed to preparing legal pleadings, administrative complaints should be read liberally for this purpose" Kilpatrick v. Riley, No. CIV.A.98-3180, 2000 WL 708391, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2000).
Although in this instance the court is not reviewing a complaint, the court is seeking to understand plaintiff's intent in submitting a document which does have legal ramifications. Under the most liberal reading of plaintiff's statement, it appears as though plaintiff was trying to terminate the administrative processing of his complaint and to obtain copies of his records. However, plaintiff failed to follow the procedure outlined in the settlement agreement. Had plaintiff acted in accordance with the settlement agreement, he would have filed a notice of breach with the Deputy Equal Employment Opportunity Officer within fifteen days, or by June 23, 1995, if one assumes that by June 8, 1995, he had concluded that the defendant had not complied with the agreement. . . Plaintiff did not do so and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and all presettlement claims are not properly before this court. Kirby v. Dole, 736 F.2d 661 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff was bound to resolve the breach of the settlement agreement according to the terms of the agreement which required plaintiff to reinstate his administrative claim before filing suit in federal court); Davis v. Secretary of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 896 F. Supp. 978 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 even when challenging an agency's compliance with the terms of a settlement agreement); Lynch v. Frank, 848 F. Supp. 1272 (S.D.Miss. 1994) (dismissing plaintiff's claims in federal court so that plaintiff could reinstate his complaint with the agency EEO pursuant to the specific terms of the settlement agreement).
By agreeing to the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties contemplated that the agreement would cover all allegations of discrimination that had been filed up to the time of the agreement. The agency agreed that plaintiff would be detailed to a certain location and that he would remain at the WG-8 level during that detail. The agency also agreed not to discriminate or retaliate against the plaintiff in connection with his filing of the EEO complaints. In return, plaintiff agreed not to pursue his Title VII claims. The agency did not admit any liability in its signing of the settlement agreement nor did it grant plaintiff any greater rights than he would have had prior to the settlement agreement. He was, after all, protected by statute from racial discrimination and retaliation. Since plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the 1994 settlement agreement, and since the issue of breach is not before the court, the agreement is not relevant to plaintiff's remaining claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 401-402. Furthermore, even if the 1994 settlement agreement was relevant, plaintiff's only purpose in seeking to introduce the settlement agreement at trial would be to permit the jury to infer liability on defendant's part from it Fed.R.Evid. 403 prohibits the introduction of a settlement agreement if offered for that purpose. Thus, defendant's current efforts to exclude any reference to the 1994 settlement agreement are correct. It is, therefore, hereby,
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from Referring to the 1994 Settlement Agreement [#38] is GRANTED. It is further, hereby,
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [#25] is GRANTED as it relates to the 1994 settlement agreement and DENIED without prejudice in all other respects. After a thorough review of the parties' submissions, I am not yet ready to rule that acts of retaliation must meet some minimal, substantive threshold before being actionable. Hence, whether plaintiff suffered racial discrimination or retaliation for complaining about such discrimination raise genuine issues of fact.
SO ORDERED.