Thus, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs had, at that time, sufficient facts upon which to base their current claims with respect to the investment. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Wood v. Baker, 217 Or. 279 (1959), and Mathies v. Hoeck, 284 Or. 539 (1978). In Wood, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made seven false misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a cattle and hay ranch to the plaintiffs.

Thus, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs had, at that time, sufficient facts upon which to base their current claims with respect to the investment. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Wood v. Baker , 217 Or. 279, 341 P.2d 134 (1959), and Mathies v. Hoeck , 284 Or. 539, 588 P.2d 1 (1978). In Wood , the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made seven false misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a cattle and hay ranch to the plaintiffs.

Second, if the plaintiff had such knowledge, the Court must then determine whether a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose the fraudulent or deceptive conduct. Id. (quoting Wood v. Baker, 217 Or. 279, 287 (1959)).

If plaintiff had such knowledge, it must also appear that "a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose" the fraud. Wood v. Baker, 217 Or. 279, 287, 341 P.2d 134,138 (1959). Whether the plaintiff should have known of the fraud at a particular point in time normally is a question for the jury except where only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Linebaugh v. Portland Mortgage Co., 116 Or. 1, 14, 239 P. 196 (1925). If plaintiff had such knowledge, it must also appear that "a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose" the fraud. Wood v. Baker, 217 Or. 279, 287, 341 P.2d 134 (1959). Whether or not the plaintiff should have known of the fraud at a particular point in time is normally a question for the jury except where only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

A complaining party must show that the trial court's exercising of its discretion in allowing or denying the motion was prejudicial to his case. Wood et ux v. Baker et ux, 217 Or. 279, 285, 341 P.2d 134 (1959); Fulton Ins. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Or. 206, 218, 493 P.2d 138 (1972). Our examination of the trial file reveals that defendant Coe was adequately informed of the nature of plaintiff's suit as well as the detailed transactions complained of, and we find that plaintiff Coe was not prejudiced in the trial of his case by the court's orders.

A person is charged with knowledge that "a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose" when he receives "notice enough to excite attention and put a party upon his guard or call for an inquiry . . ."Wood v. Baker, 217 Or. 279, 287, 341 P.2d 134 (1959); Huycke v. Latourette, 215 Or. 173, 175-76, 332 P.2d 606 (1958). In Salem Sand Gravel v. City of Salem, 260 Or. 630, 636-37, 492 P.2d 271 (1971), it was held: "`Discovery' means from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered through exercise of reasonable care."

This bifurcation of the insured's cause of action obviously violated the rule against the splitting of causes of action. Wood et ux v. Baker et ux, 217 Or. 279, 284, 341 P.2d 134 (1959). We need not decide, however, whether the trial court in these cases might have committed error in treating the two plaintiffs as if they were joint owners of a single cause of action.

Whether she exercised reasonable diligence to discover fraud is normally a question of fact for the jury but where, as here, only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the evidence, it becomes a question of law for the court. Wood et ux v. Baker et ux, 217 Or. 279, 288, 341 P.2d 134 (1959); Linebaugh v. Portland Mortgage Co., supra at p 8. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

"* * * Generally when the alleged fraud was discovered, or whether a reasonable diligence was exercised by plaintiff to discover the same, are ordinarily questions for the jury, and it is only when the evidence was uncontradicted and only one inference can reasonably be drawn therefrom it becomes a question for the court to determine * * *." Wood et ux v. Baker et ux, 217 Or. 279, 288, 341 P.2d 134 (1959). Where the evidence is in conflict, it is for the trier of the fact to determine when the statute of limitations commences to run.