However, as noted by the court in Gulf Contracting v. Bibb County, 795 F2d 980[, 982, n. 2] (11th Cir.1986), no similar exception has been carved out for a professional's alleged negligent failure to supervise a project.Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874, 875 (1) ( 389 SE2d 382) (1989). See also Smiley v. S J Investments, 260 Ga. App. 493, 495-496 (1) ( 580 SE2d 283) (2003); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. R. L. Brown Assoc., 2006 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 89412, at *14-20 (N.D. Ga.2006).

" As such, Kidd admits that the duty she seeks to impose upon Dentsply and DEMS with respect to the installation of the x-ray machine is itself the consequence of Dentsply's contract with the U.S. Army. As a result, Kidd's claims must be regarded as claims of nonperformance of a contract obligation and therefore fall within the ambit of OCGA § 51-1-11 (a). See Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874, 875-876 (1) ( 389 SE2d 382) (1989). Consequently, her negligence claims are barred by that statute.

Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co.Judgment affirmed. Eldridge and Barnes, JJ., concur. Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874, 876 (2) ( 389 S.E.2d 382) (1989).

Treadwell v. Treadwell, 218 Ga. App. 823, 825-826 (1) ( 463 S.E.2d 497) (1995). See also Habachy v. Ga. Health Group, 207 Ga. App. 288 ( 427 S.E.2d 808) (1993); Hadson Gas Systems v. Atlanta Airlines Terminal Corp., 200 Ga. App. 363 ( 408 S.E.2d 454) (1991); Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874, 876(2) ( 389 S.E.2d 382) (1989). In this case, it is uncontroverted that Kendrick and Kalmanson disagreed about the amount Kalmanson owed for the renovation work before Kalmanson tendered the $2,168 "Payment in Full" check.

(b) Nor was there an "independent agreement" between debtor and creditor that payment of the lesser sum satisfied the debt. Cases cited by Treadwell for his contention that mere acceptance of the check constituted accord and satisfaction were cases in which the creditor — unlike Jamie Treadwell — did not protest the payment of the smaller sum. Habachy v. Ga. Health Group, 207 Ga. App. 288 ( 427 S.E.2d 808); Wood Brothers Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874 ( 389 S.E.2d 382); Chrietzberg v. Kristopher Woods, 162 Ga. App. 517 ( 292 S.E.2d 100). In a nutshell, Treadwell's demand that Jamie Treadwell must either issue a full release or return the $10,000 check was an extortionate demand to which she was not required to accede.

" The third check was never negotiated by Dawson and was eventually returned to GSFIC at the request of GSFIC's attorney, after the attorney notice GSFIC's counterclaim in the action exceeded the amount of the check. GSFIC moved for summary judgment on Dawson's complaint based on its affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. Relying on Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Simons-Eastern Co., 193 Ga. App. 874 ( 389 S.E.2d 382) (1989), the trial court granted GSFIC summary judgment, ruling that because the March 9 and August 18 checks along with the accompanying vouchers and memoranda contained language denoting payment in full, "there appears to be no issue of material fact concerning the requisites of an accord and satisfaction being met in this case." On appeal, Dawson claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to GSFIC because genuine issues of material fact exist as to: (1) whether there was a passage of benefit, advantage or consideration to Dawson, as a result of the purported accord and satisfaction (OCGA § 13-4-102); (2) whether there as a bona fide dispute as to the amount due Dawson which was communicated to Dawson (OCGA § 13-4-103 (b) (1); (3) whether there was a meeting of the minds as to which of Dawson's claims were encompassed by the purported accord and satisfaction (see State Farm Fire c. Co. v. Fordham, 148 Ga. App. 48 (2) ( 250 S.E.2d 843) (1978)); (4) wh

In discussing the negligent misrepresentation exception to the strict privity requirement for a professional negligence claim, the Georgia Court of Appeals has refused to find a similar exception for other negligence claims where there is a lack of privity between the parties. In Wood Brothers Construction Company v. Simons-Eastern Company, 193 Ga. App. 874 (1989), the plaintiff, who was a contractor working on a construction project, sued the defendants, who were hired to design and supervise the construction of the project. Id. at 876.

In discussing the negligent misrepresentation exception to the strict privity requirement for a professional negligence claim, the Georgia Court of Appeals has refused to find a similar exception for other negligence claims where there is a lack of privity between the parties. In Wood Brothers Construction Company v. Simons-Eastern Company, 193 Ga. App. 874 (1989), the plaintiff, who was a contractor working on a construction project, sued the defendants, who were hired to design and supervise the construction of the project. Id. at 876.

" In contrast, however, the notice of the filing of the bill in equity is to be given "to . . . [the] city or town clerk"; there is no reference to the town clerk's office. We are of opinion that the delivery on the twentieth day to the town clerk at her home satisfied § 21. See Wood v. Simons, 110 Mass. 116. Bjornlund v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Marshfield, 353 Mass. 757, is distinguishable, since in that case the notice was not received until the twenty-first day. Doubtless, however, a notice seasonably filed in the clerk's office during its normal hours would be sufficient, even if the clerk was not present.

But useless and vain formalities are not essential. The word "file" as there used is equivalent to the words "give notice to the officers" or "serve notice upon the officers" in the manner prescribed. It was unnecessary for the claimant's agent handling the papers to the officers to see what indorsement if any was made thereon, or to ascertain where the papers were deposited. The claim was filed within the statutory requirement when delivered to and received by them. Wood v. Simons, 110 Mass. 116, 117. Reed v. Acton, 120 Mass. 130. The claim of Jenkins Brothers should not have been allowed.