With respect to Respondent's Rule 68 Motion, Petitioner contended that the court erred in hearing and issuing an order regarding Respondent's motion after Petitioner had filed a notice of appeal. In support of the foregoing argument, Petitioner asserted that (1) "`[w]hile a case is on appeal, the lower court lacks jurisdiction to decide any questions pertaining to attorneys [sic] fees arising out of or relating to the matter on appeal[,]'" (quoting Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai'i 475, 486, 960 P.2d 145, 156 (1998)), (2) Respondent's Rule 68 Motion was not timely filed under Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) 54(d)(2)(B), and (3) the court was wrong in determining that it had authority to hear Respondent's Rule 68 Motion pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). HRCP Rule 54(d)(2)(B) provides in relevant part that a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, . . . must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of an appealable order or judgmentf.
According to Epp v. Epp, 80 Hawai'i 79 , 905 P.2d 54 (App.1995), “[u]nder the Partnership Model, a spouse’s Category 1 and 3 NMVs are that spouse’s ‘partner’s contributions’ to the Marital Partnership Property that, assuming all relevant and valid considerations are equal, are repaid to the contributing spouse-partner. ...” 80 Hawai'i at 82 , 905 P.2d at 57 . In addition, pursuant to Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai'i 475 , 960 P.2d 145 (App.1998), “a [marital] partner who invests money into partnership accounts and/or real and/or personal property into the partnership name or the names of the partners does not thereby gift the invested money and/or real and/or personal property to his/her partners.” 87 Hawai'i at 482 , 960 P.2d at 152 (emphasis added). Therefore, as a threshold issue, in order to be categorized as Category 3 Marital Partnership Property, Marital Separate Property must be expended as a contribution to or an investment in Marital Partnership Property.
We need not address Mother's appeal on the deviation issue. See Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai'i 475, 484, 960 P.2d 145, 154 (App. 1998) (where family court deviated from partnership model division in favor of appellant, and appellee did not challenge family court's authority to deviate, deviation was not an issue in the appeal). E. Attorney's Fees
6. Under partnership law, a partner who invests money into partnership accounts and/or real and/or personal property into the partnership name or the names of the partners does not thereby gift the invested money and/or real and/or personal property to his/her partners." Wong v. Wong, 87 Haw. 475, 482, 960 P.2d 145, 152 (App. 1998). 7.
Under [the abuse of discretion] standard of review, the appellate court is not authorized to disturb the family court's decision unless (1) the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant; (2) the family court failed to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason.Wong v. Wong, 87 Haw. 475, 486 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App. 1998) (brackets in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991)). III. DISCUSSION
Husband does not cite any evidence in the record demonstrating that Wife's parents intended this money to be a gift to Husband and Wife as a couple. Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai‘i 475, 482, 960 P.2d 145, 152 (App. 1998) (explaining that a gift requires "(1) donative intent, (2) delivery, and (3) acceptance") (citation omitted). Similarly, Husband makes no showing that the $83,576.90 was delivered to him or to the parties as a couple.
(11) in FOF 101 and COL 31 , in which the Family Court imposed an "erroneous and inequitable equalization payment on [Mother] based on [Father's] undisclosed and unsubstantiated debt" for attorney's fees and a student loan "which was not supported by competent evidence;" and (12) in COLs 22 and 32 where the Court "denied spousal support to [Mother] as an offset" for the "erroneous and inequitable equalization payment set forth in COL 31 , without first calculating the amount of spousal support to which [Mother] was entitled to under [Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS )] § 580-47(a), utilizing the factors and principles set forth in Wong v. Wong," 87 Hawai‘i 475, 485, 960 P.2d 145, 155 (App. 1998), "which would have outweighed the equalization payment that the Court arrived at." In CAAP-20-0000489, Mother raises seventeen POEs of which twelve are identical to the POEs in CAAP-19-0000871.
Wife argues that the family court should have made the necessary finding that “the DOCOEPOT value was zero” and that the logical conclusion was that “therefore Husband is not entitled to a Category 1 capital contribution credit at DOM greater than its value at DOCOEPOT.” Wife's reliance on Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai‘i 475, 960 P.2d 145 (App.1998) is misplaced. The rule articulated in Wong reads:
Taking into account the payor's income, or what it should be, including the income producing capability of his or her property, what is his or her reasonable ability to meet his or her need and to pay spousal support? 87 Hawai‘i 475, 485, 960 P.2d 145, 155 (App.1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Vorfeld v. Vorfeld, 8 Haw.App. 391, 402–03, 804 P.2d 891, 897–98 (1991)). While both Wong and Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580–47 require a court to consider the payees' need when deciding whether to award alimony, they do not require a court to make an explicit finding as to the dollar amount a payee needs to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage.
Tougas, 76 Hawai`i at 27-28, 868 P.2d at 445-46. Stated otherwise, the relevant date for calculating the NMV for Category 1 property is the DOM. Generally, a family court must determine the NMV of each divorcing party's separately owned Category 1 property as of the DOM because: (1) assuming all valid and relevant considerations are equal, the Category 1 NMVs are repaid to the spouse contributing the Category 1 property to the marital partnership, Wong v. Wong, 87 Haw. 475, 483, 960 P.2d 145, 153 (App. 1998); and (2) any increase (or decrease) in the NMV of Category 1 property after the DOM becomes either Category 2 property (if the property is still owned at the DOCOEPOT) or Category 5 property (if the property is no longer owned at the DOCOEPOT), to presumably be split between the two spouses. Jackson v. Jackson, 84 Haw. 319, 336, 933 P.2d 1353, 1370 (App. 1997).