Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
D.C. No. CV-94-00138-JET
Editorial Note:This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Jack E. Tanner, District Judge, Presiding.
Before GOODWIN, LEAVY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
John Donald Womack appeals pro se from the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of Sheriff Dupnik and Pima County and a jury verdict in favor of Ray Ford in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Womack alleges defendants deprived him of his property subsequent to his arrest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's judgment as a matter of law. See Zamalloa v. Hart, 31 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir.1994). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's supervision of a trial, see United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir.1988), discovery orders, see Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1538 (9th Cir.1992), and formulation of civil jury instructions, see Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1285 (1999). We affirm.
Womack's contention that the district court erred in granting a judgment as a matter of law to defendants Pima County and Sheriff Dupnik lacks merit because a review of the record shows that the evidence, when considered as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to Womack, reasonably supports only a verdict for Pima County and Sheriff Dupnik. See Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam). There was no evidence establishing municipal liability on the part of Pima County, see id. at 1346-47, or that Sheriff Dupnik played an affirmative part in Womack's alleged constitutional deprivations, see Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1563 (9th Cir.1995).
Womack contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying him an opportunity to conduct discovery. A review of the record fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in its discovery rulings. See Sever, 978 F.2d at 1538.
Womack contends that the district court abused its discretion by inducing him into failing to call a witness on his behalf and failing to make a particular exhibit available to the jury. Womack's contention lacks merit because a review of the record does not show that the district court abused its discretion in the manner it supervised the trial. See Laurins, 857 F.2d at 537.
Womack's contention that the district court abused its discretion by improperly formulating a jury instruction lacks merit because a review of the record shows that the court's instruction correctly stated the law, fairly and adequately covered the loss of property issue, and was not misleading. See Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir.1998).
Womack's contention that the closing argument of defense counsel constitutes misconduct which warrants a new trial is rejected because Womack did not object to the closing argument at trial and, therefore, waived the issue. See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.1998).
AFFIRMED.