Opinion
Case No. 98 C 6610
July 27, 2001
In this disability discrimination case, I denied summary judgment because I found a question of fact existed as to whether Karen Wolz's fibromyalgia substantially limited her ability to lift, push, pull, bend and reach. Defendant moves to reconsider because plaintiff's subjective testimony ought not to be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
There was expert testimony that Wolz's fibromyalgia limited her ability to perform the enumerated tasks. Dr. Sosenko could not opine on the duration of this limitation. Wolz, however, did say that as a general matter, she could not lift her infant and could not perform household chores. I thought the combination of Wolz and Sosenko created a question — it may be that Wolz is significantly restricted as compared to the general population in her ability to lift, push, pull, bend and reach (the only major life activities at issue in this case).
Defendant says this is ridiculous. To allow vague (as I described it) medical testimony and subjective patient complaints to go to a jury would open the floodgates to trials involving emotional disabilities or chronic pain. The summary judgment record contained no expert evidence about Wolz's abilities as compared to the general population, and her own physician could not do much to bolster her claim. Defendant's arguments are persuasive, but ultimately unavailing. As I noted in my opinion, Wolz has a weak case that is highly dependent on her credibility. Plaintiff has introduced admissible evidence, her own observations about her limitations and her physician's limited opinion, that suggests that she cannot lift, push, pull, bend and reach like the average person, to a significant degree. At summary judgment, plaintiff is entitled to this reasonable inference. Defendant has much with which to attack Wolz's credibility, for example, her ability to work at clerical jobs. But, I find that a jury, if Wolz is believed, could determine that she is disabled.
The motion to reconsider [30-1] is denied.