Defendant's claim that the statute is unconstitutionally vague fails as well. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if 1) it is overbroad, impinging on First Amendment freedoms, or 2) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, or 3) it is so indefinite that it confers unstructured or unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether the offense has been committed. Woll v Attorney General, 409 Mich. 500, 533; 297 N.W.2d 578 (1980), On Remand, 116 Mich. App. 791; 323 N.W.2d 560 (1982). Defendant's question whether First Amendment freedoms are implicated here is without merit.
MCL 600.919; MSA 27A.919. In Woll v Attorney General (On Remand), 116 Mich. App. 791, 805-806; 323 N.W.2d 560 (1982), this Court ruled that under Michigan's criminal antisolicitation statute, MCL 750.410; MSA 28.642, the only solicitation prohibited is in-person solicitation substantially motivated by pecuniary gain. This construction was put on the criminal statute to avoid a conflict with the First Amendment.
The Greene opinion expressly limited its "ruling to third-party mailings to brokers" (54 N.Y.2d, at p 126). Although it also noted that the regulation was of "all third-party mailings, not just mailings to brokers" ( id.), that statement must be read in its context, which limits it to third-party mailings involving a conflict of interest. Thus, the regulation was held to be of manner rather than content because of the " detriment to society in the potential conflict of interest that may be generated when those in need of legal services are approached indirectly through a broker" ( id.; emphasis supplied), and the associational activity cases were distinguished on the basis of "the absence of monetary stakes for the union or other community group" ( id., at p 128), without which there would be no significant danger of conflict or overreaching ( Woll v Attorney Gen., 409 Mich. 500, 550, on remand 116 Mich. App. 791; see Matter of Primus, 436 US, supra, at pp 429-431). Unlike the statute involved in Bolger v Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. (463 US ___, 103 S Ct 2875), which prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, the regulatory provisions here in issue, as limited by our holdings in Matter of Koffler ( 51 N.Y.2d 140) and Matter of Greene ( supra), impose no general ban upon all mailings by attorneys to others than potential clients.
In defining solicitation in this manner, the statute could best prevent those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and overreaching." Woll v. Attorney General (On Remand) , 116 Mich. App. 791, 805-806, 323 N.W.2d 560 (1982). This is because there is a greater likelihood of harm to the client as a result of solicitation of personal-injury claims: