A Rule 60(b)(1) motion asserting a mistake of law is not “filed ‘within a reasonable time' unless it was filed within the time for taking an appeal” from the judgment. Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1163-64 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Inland Concrete, 318 F.R.D. at 411, and compiling cases).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Defendant's motion to set aside on its merits and it must be dismissed. Nevitt, 886 F.2d at 1188; Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2017) ([T]he Court has no authority or discretion to exercise jurisdiction over a Rule 60(b) motion that is not filed within the time permitted by the Rule.”); Inland Concrete, 318 F.R.D. at 415
As a third, alternative basis for dismissal, the show-cause response fails to sufficiently overcome the nineteen-month gap between the alleged mailing date and the arrival of the Motion with the Clerk. Courts need “not treat a document as filed on the date it was purportedly submitted to prison staff for mailing, when the gap between that date and the postmark date is so long that the claimed submission date appears implausible.” Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2017). Numerous courts have declined to apply the prison mailbox rule when the gap between mailing and delivery was a matter of weeks or months.
Even if Yepa could cure the technical defects, “a court need not treat a document as filed on the date it was purportedly submitted to prison staff for mailing, when the gap between that date and the postmark date is so long that the claimed submission date appears implausible.” Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2017). For example, numerous courts have declined to apply the prison mailbox rule when the gap between mailing and delivery was a matter of weeks or months.
. Plaintiff signed the motion on February 22, 2021, see Doc. No. 119 at 19, and the Clerk filed the pleading on February 25, 2021. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 769 fn. 1 (9th Cir. 2010), see also Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1159 (E.D. Ca. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting courts deem the pro se prisoner's date of signature on the pleading the date of filing, absent evidence to the contrary, but court need not treat a document as filed on the date it was purportedly submitted to prison staff for mailing when the gap between the date and the postmark date is so long that the claimed submission date appears implausible).
Courts deem the pro se prisoner's date of signature on the pleading the date of filing, absent evidence to the contrary. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 769 fn. 1 (9th Cir. 2010), see also Wolff v. California, 236 F. Supp.3d 1154, 1159 (E.D. Ca. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting court need not treat a document as filed on the date it was purportedly submitted to prison staff for mailing when the gap between the date and the postmark date is so long that the claimed submission date appears implausible).
However, if there is a gap in time between the date written on the pleading and the date filed in court evidencing delay, a court can reasonably conclude that the mailbox rule doesn't apply. Wolff v. California, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (Feb. 22, 2017). Here, Plaintiff dated his motion on November 24, 2020.
If the prisoner alleges that he gave a document to staff for mailing on a certain date and the envelope was not postmarked by the Post Office until weeks later, the Court might reasonably conclude—absent evidence to the contrary beyond the prisoner's mere assertion, such as a prison outgoing-mail log—that the prisoner submitted the document for mailing later than he claimed he did." Wolff v. California, 236 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1158 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017). Here, Plaintiff's complaint is self-dated September 30, 2019; however, it was not filed in this Court until October 29, 2020.
"Rule 60(b) is not meant to be a substitute for an appeal." See Wolff v. California, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1160-61 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (citing U.S. v. N.E. Med. Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 627417, *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (citing 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1981)). In order to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, Plaintiff "must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the [judgment] was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented [him as] the losing party from fully and fairly presenting [a] defense."
Part of Plaintiff's motion is premised on the assertion that the judgment in this case is the result of what he labels "fraud." A Rule 60 motion based on fraud would fall under Rule 60(b)(3), which is subject to Rule 60(c)'s one-year time limitation. Courts in this circuit have described that one-year limitation as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Wolff v. California, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2017). If Rule 60(c)'s limitation is jurisdictional, the Court would not have power to consider this motion because that one-year deadline has long passed. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the main thrust of Plaintiff's motion is not fraud, but rather that the Court somehow engaged in misconduct by (1) permitting Defendants' counsel to file an answer to Plaintiff's complaints, and (2) choosing not to hold a hearing or trial in this case before entering final judgment.