The court's exercise of that discretion is already limited by the statutory best interest factors, MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), each of which must be carefully evaluated by the trial judge. Wolfe v Howatt, 119 Mich. App. 109; 326 N.W.2d 442 (1982). Further, as noted above, a court's ultimate finding regarding a particular factor is a factual finding that can be set aside if it is against the great weight of the evidence.

Unlike the case relied upon by Janette on appeal, the trial court here did not merely mention this factor in its opinion and order. Cf. Wolfe v Howatt, 119 Mich App 109, 111; 326 NW2d 442 (1982). Rather, it plainly discussed the evidence that showed that PC was generally a good student and that KC had had difficulties. It also referred to the evidence that Janette Conner was uncooperative with school personnel, but that the school personnel had a positive experience with Keith Conner. While the trial court did not explicitly find that the children's school record favored Keith, it implicitly did so. This was sufficient to permit this Court to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding.

These findings are necessary to allow this Court to effectively carry out its appellate responsibilities. Wolfe v Howatt, 119 Mich. App. 109; 326 N.W.2d 442 (1982). Although in a child custody dispute the trial court must make a specific finding on each factor listed in MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), it need not separately evaluate all of these in a pure visitation dispute but may focus solely on the contested issues.

Both of these requirements are necessary to facilitate appellate review. People v Kelly, 122 Mich. App. 427; 333 N.W.2d 68 (1983); Wolfe v Howatt, 119 Mich. App. 109; 326 N.W.2d 442 (1982). The findings of fact in the present case did not comply with the court rule.