"We think ORS 12.220 does not help plaintiffs. As this court held in White v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co., 168 Or. 371, 123 P.2d 193 (1942), and Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 436 P.2d 554 (1968), that statute `gives additional limited time where an action is dismissed that has not been heard on its merits and its statutory limitation has expired after the initial filing.' 249 Or. at 25. ORS 12.220 does not apply to an action which has been dismissed after a trial upon the merits.

We think ORS 12.220 does not help plaintiffs. As this court held in White v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co., 168 Or. 371, 123 P.2d 193 (1942), and Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 436 P.2d 554 (1968), that statute "gives additional limited time where an action is dismissed that has not been heard on its merits and its statutory limitation has expired after the initial filing." 249 Or at 25.

* * *" 151 Or at 514. When the mandate should be entered by the clerk is indicated in Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 436 P.2d 554 (1968): "* * * As to time of entry of the judgment, the words, `upon the receipt of the mandate,' contemplate no discretion on the part of the judge or the clerk of the circuit court as to the time of entry. It is `upon the receipt of the mandate.'"

"* * * We, therefore, hold that, under this statute, where the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited for the commencement of such action has expired, the plaintiff may commence a new action within one year as provided by the statute and that it has no application to a judgment entered after trial upon the merits and that the word 'dismissed,' as used in section 1-219, O.C.L.A. [ORS 12.220], signifies a final ending of an action, not a final judgment on the controversy, but an ending of that particular proceeding. * * *" See, also, Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 25, 436 P.2d 554 (1968). We have held that a dismissal for want of prosecution and a nonsuit granted a plaintiff as a matter of right are not dismissals within the meaning of the statute as amended.

The Supreme Court has recognized that ORS 12.220 “ ‘gives additional limited time where an action is dismissed that has not been heard on its merits and its statutory limitation has expired after the initial filing.’ ” Tikka v. Martin, 271 Or. 287, 292, 532 P.2d 18 (1975) (quoting Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 25, 436 P.2d 554 (1968) ). Provided that the original complaint was filed in a court within an applicable limitation period and other conditions are met, then, upon dismissal of the original action, a new action may be filed.

Hatley supports our conclusion that the statute applies to that kind of dismissal. See also Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 25, 436 P.2d 554 (1968), holding that the statute " gives additional limited time where an action is dismissed that has not been heard on its merits and its statutory limitation has expired after the initial filing."

ORS 12.220 gives plaintiffs a year after the Ninth Circuit issues its mandate to refile the claims in the state courts. See Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 25, 436 P.2d 554 (1968). Affirmed.

The general rule is that the date of the mandate, not the date of issuance of the decision, is the effective date of an appellate court's decision, that the mandate is the order and that the court's opinion merely gives the reason supporting the order. See Wolfe Investments v. Shroyer, 249 Or. 23, 436 P.2d 554 (1968). In In Re Brown, 6 Wn.2d 215, 235-37, 101 P.2d 1003, 107 P.2d 1104 (1940), the court said: