Woiccak's Case

8 Citing cases

  1. In re Ducey

    160 B.R. 465 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993)   Cited 34 times
    Finding that the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct governing an attorney's possession of his or her client's property put the attorney-debtor on notice that he was placing himself in a fiduciary capacity

    All other retainer fees may be deposited in the attorney's general operating account. The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 50 in Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989). Although a disbarment action, the case has relevance for purposes of the present decision.

  2. In re Coddington's Case

    155 N.H. 66 (N.H. 2007)   Cited 8 times
    Finding attorney's depression to be a personal or emotional problem, rather than a disability

    Thus, for instance, in Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1, 2, 489 A.2d 571 (1985), we disbarred an attorney because, among other things, his trust account was out of trust by more than $ 70,000. Similarly, in Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 739-40, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989), we disbarred an attorney who acted deliberately and knowingly and where one client never recovered the $ 77,000 he entrusted to the firm in connection with a real estate transaction. We also disbarred the attorney in Farley's Case, 147 N.H. 476, 476-77, 794 A.2d 116 (2002), because he transferred funds, even after we enjoined him from doing so, failed to produce requisite records, which precluded any audit from occurring, and failed to pay his client $ 6,000 from a personal injury settlement.

  3. Nardi's Case

    705 A.2d 1199 (N.H. 1998)   Cited 9 times

    An attorney's misuse of funds entrusted to him "demonstrates such lack of common honesty as to clearly justify an attorney's disbarment." Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989) (quotation omitted); see Connolly's Case, 127 N.H. 786, 790, 508 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1986). In addition, because "[n]o single transgression reflects more negatively on the legal profession than a lie," attorney misconduct involving dishonesty also justifies disbarment.

  4. Tocci's Case

    663 A.2d 88 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    We are empowered either to suspend or disbar an attorney to achieve these goals. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1989). The presumptive sanction for practicing law while suspended is disbarment. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, § 8.1 comment at 47 (1991).

  5. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sperling

    459 Md. 194 (Md. 2018)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that an attorney who had "approximately 16 to 17 years’ experience" had substantial experience in the practice of law

    Attorneys, however, retain their 1.15(a) responsibilities regardless of whether other attorneys have authority to manage funds. This is illustrated in In re Woiccak's Case , 131 N.H. 735, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989). Woiccak established a firm with two other attorneys who were not admitted in New Hampshire.

  6. Doherty's Case

    142 N.H. 446 (N.H. 1997)   Cited 11 times
    Suspending an attorney for commingling and converting client funds by expending the funds before having earned them, disobeying four court orders to disgorge the funds, and placing his own financial difficulties above the needs of his clients, thus "seriously calling into question the absence of a selfish motive"

    We refuse to recognize negligent or willful blindness as a mitigating factor that would justify a more lenient sanction. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 741, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989). Moreover, we have repeatedly stated that "inexperience or unfamiliarity with the applicable laws will not mitigate attorney misconduct."

  7. Flint's Case

    133 N.H. 685 (N.H. 1990)   Cited 23 times
    Describing each party's recommendation for discipline, which included the reimbursement of expenses as an element to be imposed or not be imposed

    The power to remove attorneys from office is necessary not as a vehicle for inflicting punishment, but for the protection of the public from further acts of misconduct and to protect the integrity of the legal profession. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1989); Wehringer's Case, 130 N.H. 707, 719, 547 A.2d 252, 259 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1103 (1989); Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1, 3-4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1955); Mussman's Case, supra at 412, 286 A.2d at 620; see Barnard's Case supra (quoting Welanko's Case, 99 N.H. 413, 414, 112 A.2d 50, 51 (1955)). Every case is to be judged on its own facts and circumstances, and the warranted sanctions are imposed to accomplish the desired ends. Mussman's Case, supra at 412, 286 A.2d at 620 (quoting Donovan's Case, 108 N.H. 34, 39, 226 A.2d 779, 783 (1967)).

  8. Fitzpatrick's Case

    132 N.H. 211 (N.H. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    Finding that an attorney who attempts to mislead the PCC cannot be found to have fully cooperated

    [1-3] As we have stated previously, it is our function in reviewing the referee's findings in a bar disciplinary case to determine "`whether a reasonable [person] could have reached the same decision as the [referee] on the basis of the evidence before him.'" Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 741, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989) (quoting Edes' Case, 118 N.H. 815, 817, 395 A.2d 498, 499 (1978), itself quoting Sargent Lake Association v. Dane, 118 N.H. 720, 722, 393 A.2d 559, 561 (1978)). Furthermore, any "conflicts as might be found in the testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to testimony are for the master to resolve."