All other retainer fees may be deposited in the attorney's general operating account. The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 50 in Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989). Although a disbarment action, the case has relevance for purposes of the present decision.
Thus, for instance, in Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1, 2, 489 A.2d 571 (1985), we disbarred an attorney because, among other things, his trust account was out of trust by more than $ 70,000. Similarly, in Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 739-40, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989), we disbarred an attorney who acted deliberately and knowingly and where one client never recovered the $ 77,000 he entrusted to the firm in connection with a real estate transaction. We also disbarred the attorney in Farley's Case, 147 N.H. 476, 476-77, 794 A.2d 116 (2002), because he transferred funds, even after we enjoined him from doing so, failed to produce requisite records, which precluded any audit from occurring, and failed to pay his client $ 6,000 from a personal injury settlement.
An attorney's misuse of funds entrusted to him "demonstrates such lack of common honesty as to clearly justify an attorney's disbarment." Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989) (quotation omitted); see Connolly's Case, 127 N.H. 786, 790, 508 A.2d 1054, 1057 (1986). In addition, because "[n]o single transgression reflects more negatively on the legal profession than a lie," attorney misconduct involving dishonesty also justifies disbarment.
We are empowered either to suspend or disbar an attorney to achieve these goals. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1989). The presumptive sanction for practicing law while suspended is disbarment. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, § 8.1 comment at 47 (1991).
Attorneys, however, retain their 1.15(a) responsibilities regardless of whether other attorneys have authority to manage funds. This is illustrated in In re Woiccak's Case , 131 N.H. 735, 561 A.2d 1049 (1989). Woiccak established a firm with two other attorneys who were not admitted in New Hampshire.
We refuse to recognize negligent or willful blindness as a mitigating factor that would justify a more lenient sanction. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 741, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989). Moreover, we have repeatedly stated that "inexperience or unfamiliarity with the applicable laws will not mitigate attorney misconduct."
The power to remove attorneys from office is necessary not as a vehicle for inflicting punishment, but for the protection of the public from further acts of misconduct and to protect the integrity of the legal profession. Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 740, 561 A.2d 1049, 1051 (1989); Wehringer's Case, 130 N.H. 707, 719, 547 A.2d 252, 259 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1103 (1989); Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1, 3-4, 489 A.2d 571, 572 (1955); Mussman's Case, supra at 412, 286 A.2d at 620; see Barnard's Case supra (quoting Welanko's Case, 99 N.H. 413, 414, 112 A.2d 50, 51 (1955)). Every case is to be judged on its own facts and circumstances, and the warranted sanctions are imposed to accomplish the desired ends. Mussman's Case, supra at 412, 286 A.2d at 620 (quoting Donovan's Case, 108 N.H. 34, 39, 226 A.2d 779, 783 (1967)).
[1-3] As we have stated previously, it is our function in reviewing the referee's findings in a bar disciplinary case to determine "`whether a reasonable [person] could have reached the same decision as the [referee] on the basis of the evidence before him.'" Woiccak's Case, 131 N.H. 735, 741, 561 A.2d 1049, 1052 (1989) (quoting Edes' Case, 118 N.H. 815, 817, 395 A.2d 498, 499 (1978), itself quoting Sargent Lake Association v. Dane, 118 N.H. 720, 722, 393 A.2d 559, 561 (1978)). Furthermore, any "conflicts as might be found in the testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to testimony are for the master to resolve."