People ex Rel. v. Poole

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Poole

    55 A.D.3d 1289 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

    Those contentions could have been, or were, raised on direct appeal or by a motion pursuant to CPL article 440, and thus habeas corpus relief is unavailable ( see People ex rel. Smith v Burge, 11 AD3d 907, lv denied 4 NY3d 701; People ex rel. Pitts v McCoy, 11 AD3d 985, lv denied 4 NY3d 705; People ex rel. Pearson v Garvin, 211 AD2d 690). [ See 15 Misc 3d 1101(A), 2007 NY Slip Op 50446(U) (2007).]

  2. People v. Poole

    50 A.D.3d 1571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)

    It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision at Supreme Court. [See 15 Misc 3d 1101 (A), 2007 NY Slip Op 50446(U) (2007).]

  3. People v. Warden of Rikers Island Corr. Facility

    38 Misc. 3d 1208 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    In this instance, approximately seventy days transpired between the acceptance of the guilty plea at the Final Revocation Hearing (Exhibit E) and Petitioner's transfer to Willard. Our courts have on occasion ruled that a parolee who is permitted to receive treatment at Willard Drug Treatment Center should be transferred within 40 days from the day he received his final parole revocation determination absent exigent circumstances (see, People ex rel. Woelfle v. Poole, 15 Misc.3d 1101A [Sup.Ct. Seneca 2007] ) (see also, Nelson v. State of New York, 20 Misc.3d 1125A [Ct. Of Claims 2008] ). But forty days is not a bright line test and other courts approved different periods.

  4. Nelson v. State of New York

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 51622 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Nevertheless, this Court cannot agree that the mere absence of an express time limitation on defendant's purported authority to incarcerate a parolee establishes a privilege to hold claimant indefinitely as a matter of law, as defendant suggests. To accept such a position would mean that defendant's pre-Willard confinement of a parolee in a county jail for a lengthy period of time for a year, or two, or even more would be lawful when, in fact, courts presented with habeas corpus petitions from parolees subject to pre-Willard incarceration have held that the State's authority to confine such parolees is not unlimited ( see e.g.People ex rel. Woelfle v Poole , 15 Misc 3d 1101[A] [Sup Ct, Seneca County 2007]; People ex rel. Ryniec v Willard Drug Treatment Campus, 11 Misc 3d 1088[A] [Sup Ct, Seneca County 2006]; People ex rel.Davis v Superintendent of Willard Drug Treatment Campus , 11 Misc 3d 1072[A] [Sup Ct, Seneca County 2006]). Rather, the legality of an extended period of pre-Willard incarceration is determined upon the facts or lack thereof bearing upon the reasonableness of the period of incarceration in the particular case ( see e.g. People ex rel. Woelfle v Poole, supra; Ayala v Williams, supra; see also People ex rel. Angelos v Poole, 9 Misc 3d 772, 773-774 [Sup Ct, Seneca County 2005]).