Those reciprocal state and municipal enactments represent a legislative determination "that an appeal [to the zoning board of appeals] is the proper mechanism for challenging the decision of a zoning enforcement officer." Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 225 Conn. 691, 697 n.8, 626 A.2d 698 (1993). "It is well established that a zoning regulation ... is a municipal legislative enactment."

(Emphasis in original.) Michler v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 123 Conn.App. at 185, 1 A.3d 1116 ; see also Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 699 n. 11, 626 A.2d 698 (1993) (“[t]he hardship would not be unique to the owner's property ... and therefore could not support a grant of variance”); Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. at 207–208, 658 A.2d 559 (proof of unusual hardship “is absolutely necessary” to obtain variance); B.I.B. Associates v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 615, 617, 316 A.2d 414 (1972) (“the claimed hardship is not one unique to the property of the applicants”); 9 R. Fuller, supra, § 9.3, p. 242 (“[a] person is not entitled to a variance where the hardship claimed is not different in kind from that generally affecting property in the same zoning district, namely the hardship is not unique or unusual”). An applicant therefore bears the burden of establishing, on the record of the proceeding before the zoning board of appeals, that the claimed hardship is peculiar to its property and not one generally present in the zoning district.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 699 n. 11, 626 A.2d 698 (1993). A.

A request for a variance asserts that the ordinance in question prohibits the proposed use and seeks relief from the requirements of the ordinance. In contrast, a challenge to a zoning officer's application of an ordinance asserts instead that the ordinance does not prohibit the proposed use, Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 697. In his application for variance, the plaintiff stated that the legal hardship on which he based his application was: "Undersized lot created prior to enactment of Zoning Regulations. Undersized width of highway created prior to Regulations requires front yard setback."

The obvious examples of such appealable decisions would be the granting or denying of building permits and the issuance of certificates of zoning compliance. See, e.g., Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 626 A.2d 698 (1993); Bishop v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 92 Conn.App. 600, 886 A.2d 470 (2005), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 906, 894 A.2d 986 (2006); Sciortino v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 87 Conn.App. 143, 866 A.2d 645 (2005). This interpretation is consistent with the terms used in relation to “decision” under §§ 8–6 and 8–7—“order” and “requirement”—which similarly import legal effect or consequence.

We have never held that such an administrative error creates a legal hardship, and the owners are unable to point to any case extending the definition of hardship for the purposes of obtaining a variance to such circumstances. Cf. Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 696-97, 626 A.2d 698 (1993) (arbitrary decision by zoning officer is insufficient basis for finding of hardship to grant variance). By arguing that reliance on an improperly granted building permit constitutes a legally cognizable hardship, the owners are merely attempting to bootstrap the principles of equitable estoppel onto the definition of a legally cognizable hardship.

Appeals are often taken from actions of zoning enforcement officers that involve interpretation of regulations, the issuance of cease and desist orders; see, e.g., Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 277 Conn. 645, 894 A.2d 285 (2006); Lawrence v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 509, 264 A.2d 552 (1969); Smith Bros. Woodland Management, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 108 Conn. App. 621, 949 A.2d 1239, cert. granted on other grounds, 289 Conn. 908, 957 A.2d 872 (2008); or the granting or denying of building permits and certificates of zoning compliance. See, e.g., Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 626 A.2d 698 (1993); Bishop v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 92 Conn. App. 600; Sciortino v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 87 Conn. App. 143, 866 A.2d 645 (2005). Unlike the situation in cases involving cease and desist orders or approvals and denials of applications, however, we are left to speculate what legal effect or consequence, if any, Larkin's letter has in the present case.

Our Supreme Court requires that a zoning regulation must virtually destroy the value of property for any use before financial considerations become relevant to an application for a variance. See Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 233 Conn. 210; Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 699, 626 A.2d 698 (1993) (noting "extreme financial hardship" can support granting of variance); see also Horace v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 85 Conn. App. 171. The record does not reveal any evidence of such a drastic impact on M E's property.

In reviewing the actions of a zoning board, we note that local zoning boards are vested with a liberal discretion. Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 695, 626 A.2d 698 (1993). "The burden of proof to demonstrate that the board acted improperly is upon the party seeking to overturn the board's decision."

(Citation omitted.) Wnuk v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 225 Conn. 691, 695-96, 626 A.2d 698 (1993). Additionally, our review of conclusions of law is plenary, and we must decide whether the conclusions are legally and logically correct, and supported by the facts in the record.