Wlodarczyk v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. KIDD v. STATE

    937 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    (c) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the court may impose a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation in any felony case including those in which the statute violated specifically provides for a sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), this Court discussed the resentencing options which are available to a district court after a criminal defendant's probation has been revoked. The district court's authority to resentence is determined by the nature of the original sentence.

  2. Daugherty v. State

    2002 WY 52 (Wyo. 2002)   Cited 16 times
    Identifying "straight probation," "probation with suspended imposition of sentence," and "probation with suspended sentence" as the types of probationary sentences available under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-302

    In that regard, there are two particular cases of interest. In 1992, we decided Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992). Raymond Wlodarczyk had been convicted of aggravated assault.

  3. Gailey v. State

    882 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1994)   Cited 23 times

    Minchew, 685 P.2d at 32 ( quoting State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Wyo. 1971)). See also, Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1992) and Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293-94 (Wyo. 1992). Probation revocation procedures are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and by Wyoming statutory and case law.

  4. Hewitt v. State

    835 P.2d 348 (Wyo. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    I. Whether the directive by the trial court judge requiring officers of the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole to report and seek revocation for every violation of the court's probation order violates the separation of powers doctrine of Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. A comprehensive analysis of the Wyoming law of parole and probation revocation has recently been provided in this court's decision in Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992). Judicial revocation was utilized for the court decision under W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39, effective March 24, 1992).

  5. Jackson v. State

    2009 WY 82 (Wyo. 2009)   Cited 15 times
    In Jackson, we held that the time spent in custody awaiting disposition of probation revocation proceedings must be credited against the probationer's underlying sentence if the incarceration is directly attributable to the underlying criminal conviction, overruling Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45 (Wyo. 2000) (denying credit on the grounds that pre-revocation confinement is due solely to acts or omissions constituting the violation of the conditions of probation and can never be directly attributable to the underlying offense).

    A defendant's sentence may not be increased as a result of events that occur after the initial sentencing and the revocation of probation. See Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1990); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, ¶ 26, 44 P.3d 28, 37 (Wyo. 2002). Mr. Jackson was sentenced to the maximum sentence of five years.

  6. Hamill v. Ferguson

    937 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Wyo. 1996)   Cited 9 times

    The power to revoke parole, unlike the power to revoke probation, is not a judicial function. Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 289 (Wyo. 1992) ("Structurally, there are two revocation processes: (1) judicial revocation for probation; and (2) administrative revocation for parole under the executive agency, Department of Probation and Parole, and the adjudicatory Board of Parole."); Hewitt v. State, 835 P.2d 348, 349 (Wyo. 1992) ("[P]arole is an executive agency function, incident to confinement following sentence. Probation is a judicial function within which the probation and parole agents provide supervisory assistance to the judiciary."); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1035-38 (Wyo. 1979); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("The granting and revocation of parole are matters traditionally handled by administrative officers.").

  7. Doney v. State

    2002 WY 182 (Wyo. 2002)   Cited 2 times
    Finding credit for time served an appropriate remedy for the 48 day and 18 day violations of the time limit set forth in W.R.Cr.P. 39 rather than issuing a dismissal with prejudice

    Id. at 355. [¶ 13] The 1991 revision, and subsequent amendments, apparently incorporated procedures designed to meet the federal due process requirements established by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), as well as other requirements established under Wyoming law. See, e.g., Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 2000) (right to counsel, state constitution); Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1996) (due process requirements); Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1994) (probation revocation procedure and due process requirements); Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1993) (right to a speedy hearing, state constitution); Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1992) (due process rights requirements); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002) (due process requirements and judicial function); Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991) (due process requirements generally and preliminary hearing requirement satisfied by probable cause determination in issuing arrest warrant); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981) (due process requirements); Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979) (due process requirements generally and preliminary hearing); and Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978). Application of W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2)

  8. Shaw v. State

    998 P.2d 965 (Wyo. 2000)   Cited 6 times
    Ruling that the failure to serve defendant with the petition to revoke probation amounted to plain error

    In Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 31 (Wyo. 1984) we again acknowledged that one of the minimum requirements of due process includes written notice of the claimed violations of probation. More recently, in Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293 (Wyo. 1992) and Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1994), we reiterated that written notice of the nature and content of the allegations is among the many safeguards which our law affords the probationer. The procedures for revocation of probation are governed by statute and by court rule.

  9. Pearl v. State

    996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 2000)   Cited 11 times
    Finding that "revocation proceedings in Wyoming are fundamentally different than the administrative process upon which [ Scarpelli] is based" and holding that under Wyoming's judicial revocation procedure, the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent probationers

    Proceedings for revocation of probation shall be initiated by a petition for revocation filed by the attorney for the state, setting forth the conditions of probation which are alleged to have been violated by the probationer and the facts establishing the violation. Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293 (Wyo. 1992). We have also made it clear that the constitutional due process rights found in Gagnon and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), must be afforded in judicial revocation proceedings.

  10. Meerscheidt v. State

    931 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1997)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 226 (Wyo.1997), the injured party was allowed to recover the cost of replacing a dining room set even though only the table top was damaged.

    In that regard, this condition was not any different than the other conditions of his probation which forbade him from using or possessing alcohol and from having any contact with the victims. See, e.g., Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 286, 294 (Wyo. 1992) (probation condition forbade the appellant from consuming alcohol); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 955-56 (Wyo. 1996) (probation condition forbade the appellant from having any contact with the victim). Meerscheidt also argues that the probation condition was not reasonably related to his crime.