(c) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the court may impose a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation in any felony case including those in which the statute violated specifically provides for a sentence of imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), this Court discussed the resentencing options which are available to a district court after a criminal defendant's probation has been revoked. The district court's authority to resentence is determined by the nature of the original sentence.

In that regard, there are two particular cases of interest. In 1992, we decided Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992). Raymond Wlodarczyk had been convicted of aggravated assault.

Minchew, 685 P.2d at 32 ( quoting State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Wyo. 1971)). See also, Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 1992) and Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293-94 (Wyo. 1992). Probation revocation procedures are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and by Wyoming statutory and case law.

I. Whether the directive by the trial court judge requiring officers of the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole to report and seek revocation for every violation of the court's probation order violates the separation of powers doctrine of Article 2, Section 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. A comprehensive analysis of the Wyoming law of parole and probation revocation has recently been provided in this court's decision in Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992). Judicial revocation was utilized for the court decision under W.R.Cr.P. 33 (now W.R.Cr.P. 39, effective March 24, 1992).

A defendant's sentence may not be increased as a result of events that occur after the initial sentencing and the revocation of probation. See Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1990); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, ¶ 26, 44 P.3d 28, 37 (Wyo. 2002). Mr. Jackson was sentenced to the maximum sentence of five years.

The power to revoke parole, unlike the power to revoke probation, is not a judicial function. Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 289 (Wyo. 1992) ("Structurally, there are two revocation processes: (1) judicial revocation for probation; and (2) administrative revocation for parole under the executive agency, Department of Probation and Parole, and the adjudicatory Board of Parole."); Hewitt v. State, 835 P.2d 348, 349 (Wyo. 1992) ("[P]arole is an executive agency function, incident to confinement following sentence. Probation is a judicial function within which the probation and parole agents provide supervisory assistance to the judiciary."); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1035-38 (Wyo. 1979); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ("The granting and revocation of parole are matters traditionally handled by administrative officers.").

Id. at 355. [¶ 13] The 1991 revision, and subsequent amendments, apparently incorporated procedures designed to meet the federal due process requirements established by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), as well as other requirements established under Wyoming law. See, e.g., Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 2000) (right to counsel, state constitution); Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1996) (due process requirements); Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1994) (probation revocation procedure and due process requirements); Reese v. State, 866 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1993) (right to a speedy hearing, state constitution); Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1992) (due process rights requirements); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002) (due process requirements and judicial function); Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991) (due process requirements generally and preliminary hearing requirement satisfied by probable cause determination in issuing arrest warrant); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981) (due process requirements); Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979) (due process requirements generally and preliminary hearing); and Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978). Application of W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2)

In Minchew v. State, 685 P.2d 30, 31 (Wyo. 1984) we again acknowledged that one of the minimum requirements of due process includes written notice of the claimed violations of probation. More recently, in Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293 (Wyo. 1992) and Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888, 891 (Wyo. 1994), we reiterated that written notice of the nature and content of the allegations is among the many safeguards which our law affords the probationer. The procedures for revocation of probation are governed by statute and by court rule.

Proceedings for revocation of probation shall be initiated by a petition for revocation filed by the attorney for the state, setting forth the conditions of probation which are alleged to have been violated by the probationer and the facts establishing the violation. Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 293 (Wyo. 1992). We have also made it clear that the constitutional due process rights found in Gagnon and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), must be afforded in judicial revocation proceedings.

In that regard, this condition was not any different than the other conditions of his probation which forbade him from using or possessing alcohol and from having any contact with the victims. See, e.g., Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279, 286, 294 (Wyo. 1992) (probation condition forbade the appellant from consuming alcohol); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 955-56 (Wyo. 1996) (probation condition forbade the appellant from having any contact with the victim). Meerscheidt also argues that the probation condition was not reasonably related to his crime.