Withers v. Crenshaw

20 Citing cases

  1. Weatherly v. Jackson

    123 Tex. 213 (Tex. 1934)   Cited 39 times

    App.), 291 S.W. 868; Clem v. Evans (Com. App.), 291 S.W. 871, 51 A. L. R., 1135; Withers v. Crenshaw, 155 S.W. 1189; Newton v. State, 98 Texas Crim. App., 582, 267 S.W. 272; Reitler v. Harris, 223 U.S. 437, 56 L.Ed., 497; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 61 L.Ed., 678; Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1, 66 L.Ed., 431; Minneapolis St. L. R. R. Co. v. Minn., 193 U.S. 53, 48 L.Ed., 614; extended note, 51 A. L. R., 1139, and following. 12 In determining that land applied for was unsurveyed school land and therefore subject to sale under the terms of Article 5323 and in selling it under that law, the Commission was not exercising or attempting to exercise judicial power.

  2. Harris County v. Crooker

    112 Tex. 450 (Tex. 1923)   Cited 31 times
    Applying this rule of statutory construction to hold Harris County District Attorney could retain any fees "earned outside of the criminal district court" because the Legislature placed all limitations on subject of the district attorney's compensation that it desired to be placed thereon by placing a limitation on the amount of compensation or excess fees which the district attorney could retain but confining that limitation to fees arising from the criminal district court

    If the legislature is given authority to legislate upon a subject by a provision of the Constitution other than Section 56, Article III, such authority carries with it the right to enact all provisions which could legitimately be embraced in the bill if Section 56 were not a part of the Constitution. Smith v. Grayson County, 18 Texas Civ. App. 153[ 18 Tex. Civ. App. 153]; City of Dallas v. Western Elec. Co., 83 Tex. 243 [ 83 Tex. 243]; Tex. Sav. Real Est. Ass'n. v. Heirs of Pierre, 31 S.W. 426; 10 Texas Civ. App. 453[ 10 Tex. Civ. App. 453]; State v. Hanscom, 37 S.W. 453; R'y. v. Galveston, 96 Tex. 520; Withers v. Crenshaw, 155 S.W. 1189; Cravens v. State, 57 Texas Crim., 135, 122 S.W. 29, 136 Am. St. Rep., 977; City of Oak Cliff v. State, 77 S.W. 24; Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 187 S.W. 222. The contemporaneous and particular construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect, though not absolutely controlling, is entitled to great weight by the court.

  3. Coalson v. Holmes

    111 Tex. 502 (Tex. 1922)   Cited 94 times
    In Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502, 240 S.W. 896, 898, on certified questions, the Supreme Court stated: "To deprive a defendant of the right of trial in the county of his domicile, the case against him must be within an exception to article 1830 of the Revised Statutes. With the venue challenged, under proper plea, by one sued without his county, as shown by the plaintiff's pleading, or by proof, the burden not only to allege but to prove that the case is within one of the exceptions to the statute rests on the plaintiff."

    If it should be held that venue cannot be raised by special exception, such conclusion could not affect the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in remanding this cause and ordering it transferred to the proper county, for the reason that the record shows that a plea of privilege was filed and acted on by the trial court. As the action of the court in overruling the plea of privilege and in overruling the special exception raising the point clearly appears from the record, no bill of exception was necessary to preserve the point and present it in the appellate court. Vernon Sayles' Statutes, Art. 2062; Withers v. Crenshaw, 155 S.W. 1189; Crowell School District v. Bank, 163 S.W. 339; Western Union Tel. Co., v. Forest, 157 S.W. 204; Gibson v. Pierce, 146 S.W. 983; Harbinson v. Cottle County, 147 S.W. 719; St. L.B. M.R. Co. v. Webber, 210 S.W. 677. When any informality exists in the manner of bringing the case in the Court of Civil Appeals, all parties are required to file their objections by motion within thirty days after the record is filed, and failure to do so would be deemed a waiver of such errors or defects that are not jurisdictional. Rule of Courts of Civil Appeals, 8, 9 and 22, 142 S.W., XI and XII; Tompkins v. Pendleton, 160 S.W. 290; McLane v. Haydon, 178 S.W. 1197; Crawford v. Wellington Ry. Committee, 174 S.W. 1004; Royal Ins. Co. v. Texas G. Ry., 116 S.W. 46; Railway v. Stoker, 102 Tex. 60; Railway v. Waggoner, 102 Tex. 260 [ 102 Tex. 260]; Martin v. Rutherford, 153 S.W. 156.

  4. Lerer v. Raines

    27 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)   Cited 3 times

    Assignments of error numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 all are directed to the court's action in overruling special exceptions to appellee's petition. The courts of our state have uniformly held that rulings of the trial court on exceptions, in order to be reviewed by the appellate court, must be preserved in a recorded judgment entered thereon, and that same cannot be preserved by a bill of exceptions. I. G. N. Ry. Co. v. Straub (Tex.Civ.App.) 7 S.W.2d 112; National Bank of Hopewell v. Marshall (Tex.Civ.App.) 2 S.W.2d 471; Southern Casualty Co. v. Welch Motor Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 291 S.W. 272; Cohen v. Hill (Tex.Civ.App.) 286 S.W. 661; Hall v. Williams Ellis (Tex.Civ.App.) 267 S.W. 520; Ilseng v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 1163; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189; Bishop v. Mount (Tex.Civ.App.) 152 S.W. 442; Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 469, 471 (writ of error denied). We find bills of exceptions setting forth the action of the court in overruling these exceptions, but have failed to find in the transcript any judgment thereon.

  5. Epting v. Nees

    25 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)   Cited 10 times

    Upon the same theory the courts have repeatedly refused to review rulings upon special exceptions where the ruling was shown only by bill of exception. Some of the cases so holding are as follows: Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 469; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189; Ilseng v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 1163; King-Collie Co. v. Wichita Falls, etc. (Tex.Civ.App.) 205 S.W. 748, and cases there cited. Wichita Falls, R. F. W. Ry. Co. v. Mendoza (Tex.Civ.App.) 240 S.W. 570; Gardner v. Goodner, etc., Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 247 S.W. 291; Finklea v. Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 247 S.W. 320; Simmons v. Simmons (Tex.Civ.App.) 256 S.W. 314, and cases cited.

  6. Briley v. Hay

    13 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)   Cited 12 times

    District court rule 53 (142 S.W. xxi); Jackson v. E. L. Rice Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 295 S.W. 352; Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 469; Ilseng v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 1163; King-Collie Co. v. Wichita Falls Warehouse Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 105 S.W. 748; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189; Southern Casualty Co. v. Morgan (Tex.Civ.App.) 299 S.W. 476; Alsabrook v. Bishop (Tex.Civ.App.) 295 S.W. 646. We doubt, however, if appellee's petition is sufficient to state a cause of action under either of the two theories mentioned. If so, an error of a fundamental nature is involved which requires our notice, even in the absence of an assignment.

  7. Jackson v. E. L. Rice Co.

    295 S.W. 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)   Cited 4 times

    A proposition asserts error on the part of the court in sustaining a general demurrer and special exceptions to that part of defendant's defense in which he set up a breach of warranty and failure of consideration. Rulings upon demurrers must be shown by judgment entry and not by bill of exception, as is here attempted to be done. District court rule 53; Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 469; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189; Ilseng v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 1163; King-Collie Co. v. Wichita Falls Warehouse Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 205 S.W. 748, and cases cited. Furthermore, it is impossible to tell from the bill what exceptions, if any, were sustained. It purports to relate to some "ruling" made by the court. It does not seem to refer to any action upon demurrers.

  8. Cohen v. Hill

    286 S.W. 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)   Cited 13 times
    In Cohen v. Hill (Tex.Civ.App.) 286 S.W. 661, 665, where the sufficiency of the pleadings to permit the introduction of testimony of a particular injury was under consideration, the court stated the rule to be that whether specifically alleged injuries in a petition require the exclusion of evidence relating to other injuries depended upon the construction of the pleader's language rather than on the rule that the inclusion of certain injuries excluded all others.

    Ilseng v. Carter (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 1163; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189 (writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction); Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 471 (writ of error denied); Alvord National Bank v. Waples-Platter Gro. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 118 S.W. 232; Dobson v. Zimmerman, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 394, 118 S.W. 236; Bishop v. Mount (Tex.Civ.App.) 152 S.W. 442. It follows, therefore, that the special exceptions to plaintiff's petition must be considered as having been waived by the defendants, and the assignments of error based thereon are accordingly overruled.

  9. Massie v. City of Fort Worth

    262 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)   Cited 8 times

    The recitals in the certificate under the charter were prima facie evidence of the truth of them. Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189. The third assignment of error is overruled.

  10. Willis v. Graf

    257 S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)   Cited 9 times

    Rulings upon demurrers and exceptions are judgments which form a part of the record, to be thus entered under the direction of the trial judge. Daniel v. Daniel (Tex.Civ.App.) 128 S.W. 469; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Forest (Tex.Civ.App.) 157 S.W. 204; Withers v. Crenshaw (Tex.Civ.App.) 155 S.W. 1189; Alvord National Bank v. Waples-Platter Gro. Co., 54 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 118 S.W. 232; Owens v. Ry. Co., 67 Tex. 679, 4 S.W. 593. If the trial court renders a judgment or makes an order which should be entered on the record, and then refuses to have it properly entered, he can be compelled to do so by mandamus from an appellate court. That rule, of course, applies only where the act to be done is purely ministerial and involves no judicial discretion.