Opinion
Argued February 9
Decided February 21, 1871
Hooper C. Van Vorst, for the defendant and appellant. John L. Hill, for the plaintiff and respondent.
The facts found by the referee showed beyond question that the defendant was a common carrier, and responsible, as such, for property delivered to it for transportation. This finding was warranted by the evidence. It was engaged in transacting a general express business. It is insisted by the counsel for the defendant that its liability was restricted by the contract, proved by the receipt given by the Adams Express Company to the plaintiff, upon the receipt of the money from him by it at Hart's Island. From this receipt, it appears that the latter company undertook to forward the package to its agent nearest to its destination, there to deliver it to other parties to complete the transportation, such delivery to terminate all liability of that company for its passage. There is nothing in this or any other restriction at all affecting the liability of the defendant as a common carrier; all the restrictions found in the receipt are by the language limited to the liability of the Adams company. Indeed, were they applicable to the defendant, they would not affect the liability of the defendant in the action, as they do not include the cause of the loss, unless they relieve the carrier from the duty of delivery to the consignee. The first inquiry is, whether it was the duty of the carrier so to deliver the package in the absence of any restriction. Carriers by land are bound to deliver or tender the goods to the consignee at his residence or place of business, and until this is done they are not relieved from responsibility as carriers. (2 Kent's Com., 605; Angel on Carriers, § 295; Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend., 305; Fisk v. Newton, 1 Den., 45.) But when goods are safely conveyed to the place of destination, and the consignee cannot, after reasonable effort, be found, the carrier may discharge himself from further responsibility by depositing the property in a suitable place for the owner. ( Fisk v. Newton, supra.) Carriers by vessels, boats and railways are exempt from the duty of personal delivery. (Redfield on Railways, § 127; Thomas v. Boston R.R. Co., 10 Metcalf, 472.) Such carriers discharge themselves from responsibility, as such, by transporting the goods to their nearest business station to the residence or place of business of the consignee, and notifying the consignee of their readiness to deliver the goods at such station, after the lapse of a reasonable time for him to receive them. But this exemption does not extend to express companies, although availing themselves of carriage by rail. (Redfield on Railways, § 127.) These were established for the purpose of extending to the public the advantages of personal delivery enjoyed in all cases of land carriage prior to the introduction of transportation by rail.
It appeared in the present case that the defendant had its vehicles by which they carried articles to the consignees in the city of Schenectady, which had arrived there by rail under contracts with the company for the transportation. This is the usual course of transacting business by such companies; were it otherwise, the business done by these companies would be greatly diminished, as it would be equally advantageous in many cases to have the property transported by the railroad company. When the defendant received the package from the Adams Company at New York, consigned to Martin Witbeck, Schenectady, it became liable as carrier for its carriage to Schenectady and its delivery to Witbeck there, if with reasonable diligence he could be found. The performance of this entire service was contracted for by its receipt so addressed, and had the defendant received it from the plaintiff at New York and given him a receipt for its transportation, the obligation to make personal delivery at Schenectady, would have been incurred. The only remaining question arises upon the exception taken to the finding by the referee, as a fact, that the defendant did not make due effort, nor use due diligence to find said Martin Witbeck, the consignee of said package. It is insisted by the counsel for the appellant, that the question, what is reasonable diligence, is one of law. That may be so, when there is no conflict in the evidence, or controversy as to the facts to be inferred therefrom. But that is not this case, nor will most cases of this class be of that description. In most, if not all, the questions will be mixed, both of fact and law. In the present case the finding of the referee was clearly correct. The diligence, which the law required of the defendant, was such as a prudent man would have used in an important business affair of his own. The evidence shows that the defendant was so inattentive as to mistake the surname of the consignee. Although the package was addressed to Witbeck, all its inquiries were made for Whitbeck. This may have prevented their finding him. It further appeared that its inquiries were confined to a few persons in the vicinity of its place of business, and that by these it obtained information of other persons of a like surname, one of whom was the father of the consignee. Surely inquiry should have been made of these persons, and had it been so made delivery would have been made and the loss would never have occurred. There is nothing in the point that the negligence of the plaintiff in not giving further information as to the residence of the consignee contributed to the loss. The defendant accepted the package, addressed as it was, and failed in the performance of the duty imposed thereby. For such failure it is responsible, irrespective of the right of the plaintiff to give additional information. I have examined the various exceptions taken by the appellant to the rulings of the referee as to the competency of evidence. The question whether the consignee was well known in Schenectady was proper. The plaintiffs had the right to prove this fact if he could. But the testimony given in answer was not material. None of the testimony excepted to could have prejudiced the defendant. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.
All the judges concurring judgment affirmed.