Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2007-14T2
12-30-2015
ARTHUR M. WISEHART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAMIANO TATTOLI, NEWARK STREET PROPERTIES LLC, SPECTOR & DIMIN, P.A., WILLIAM N. DIMIN, and STEPHEN R. SPECTOR, Defendants-Respondents.
Arthur M. Wisehart, appellant pro se. Respondents have not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Espinosa and Rothstadt. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-3465-14. Arthur M. Wisehart, appellant pro se. Respondents have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
In this action arising from a commercial-tenancy dispute, plaintiff Arthur M. Wisehart, the principal of the corporate tenant, appeals from the Law Division's orders denying his motion to enter default judgment against defendants Damiano Tattoli, Newark Street Properties LLC, Spector & Dimin, P.A., William N. Dimin, and Stephen R. Spector, granting defendants' motion to vacate an entry of default and dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
Plaintiff's complaint for damages arose from his company's alleged wrongful eviction, and represented his second attempt to pursue a claim against defendants for the same relief. In his first action, the court gave plaintiff numerous chances to amend his complaint in response to motions filed by defendants for its dismissal. When plaintiff did not comply, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on July 25, 2014. Plaintiff did not appeal or seek reconsideration of that dismissal.
The tenant was dispossessed on April 4, 2013, pursuant to a warrant of removal filed in the action of Newark Street Properties LLC v Troutco Inc., Docket No. LT-2444-13.
Wisehart v. Spector, Docket No. L-246-13, was filed on January 11, 2013, and the complaint was amended on October 15, 2013.
Plaintiff then filed this action on August 6, 2014. When defendants did not initially respond, the court entered default on September 30, 2014. On the same day, however, defendants filed a motion to vacate the default and dismiss the complaint. The court granted the motion, essentially finding the two actions were identical, with the exception of plaintiff adding new parties he could have named in the earlier action. The court concluded that, because the complaint "arises from the same transaction, alleges substantially similar and most of the same [c]auses of [a]ctions against the same defendants who were and could have been named in the [first action], [the current action is] barred by res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine."
Contrary to the requirements of Rule 2:6-1(a)(1)(I), plaintiff did not include copies of the motion to vacate and dismiss or supporting certifications filed by defendants. According to the motion judge at oral argument, the matter she was considering was the motion to vacate and to dismiss.
The court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Its order stated the motion was denied because plaintiff failed "to set forth any rational basis that the [c]ourt's decision . . . was based on plainly incorrect reasoning; or that the [c]ourt failed to consider evidence; or that there is new evidence justifying reconsideration."
The order also noted that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was filed without the court's permission, as required by its earlier order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. We do not address this aspect of the court's decision because we agree with the cited reasoning.
In support of his ensuing appeal, plaintiff filed a brief and appendix, which we were forced to "scour" to glean the arguments he advanced, as the submissions did not comply with the court's rules' requirements. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(A), (I); R. 2:6-1(a)(2) (setting forth a prohibition against unnecessary duplication); see also N.J. Citizens Underwriting Reciprocal Exch. v. Kieran Collins, D.C., LLC, 399 N.J. Super. 40, 50 (App. Div.) (stating that arguments "not precisely raised [in] a separate point heading contrary to R[ule] 2:6-2(a)(5) [are] not properly before us"), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 344 (2008); Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n v. Soc'y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. Super. 163, 177 (App. Div. 2002) ("A party on appeal is obliged to provide the court with 'such other parts of the record . . . as are essential to the proper consideration[] of the issues.'" (first alteration in original) (quoting R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I))); R. 2:6-2(a)(4), (5).
We have repeatedly stated that parties cannot "ignore the fact that it is their responsibility to refer us to specific parts of the record to support their argument. They may not discharge that duty by inviting us to search through the record ourselves." Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super. 465, 474-75 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 197 N.J. 476 (2009). The same rationale applies to arguments in a brief, in order to prevent us from not properly identifying a legitimate argument being advanced on appeal. See R. 2:6-2(a)(5) (requiring that an appellant's legal arguments be "divided[] under appropriate point headings").
Pro se litigants are expected to follow the Court Rules. See, e.g., Trocki Plastic Surgery Ctr. v. Bartkowski, 344 N.J. Super. 399, 405 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that "pro se parties are regarded as lawyers for purposes of" frivolous litigation under Rule 1:4-8(f)), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 338 (2002); Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997) (noting that a "plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant in no way relieves her of her obligation to comply with the court rules"); City of Clifton v. Cresthaven Cemetery Ass'n, 17 N.J. Super. 362, 364, (App. Div. 1952) (observing that compliance with a particular court rule should not be dispensed with when a non-lawyer appears pro se). --------
From our review, it appears that plaintiff contends the court "violated [his] substantive rights" by "granting the untimely motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (emphasis removed). He also contends the trial judge made "arbitrary and capricious rulings and orders depriv[ing] plaintiff of his rights to due process of law[] and discovery." In addition, plaintiff asserts that, because a default had been entered against defendants, he was entitled to present his claims to a jury. Finally, he contends the motion judge misunderstood the meaning of orders entered in the first action.
We have considered plaintiff's arguments and find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the motion judge in her oral decision. We only observe that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in vacating the default, see R. 4:43-3; properly determined that to allow the action to continue would violate the requirement that "the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court[, with] all parties involved in a litigation . . . at the very least present[ing] in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy," Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015) (citation omitted); and properly denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See R. 4:49-2; see also State v. Fitzsimmons, 286 N.J. Super. 141, 147 (App. Div. 1995) (stating the proper object of such a motion is to correct a court's error or oversight, and not to "re-argue [a] motion that has already been heard for the purpose of taking the proverbial second bite of the apple"), certif. granted, remanded on other grounds, 143 N.J. 482 (1996).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION