They no longer lived in Clairton but their whereabouts was known and their depositions might have been taken. Under the circumstances it is a fair inference that their testimony if taken would not be helpful to the respondent in her defense to this action. Cf. Wise v. Wise, 157 Pa. Super. 599, 43 A.2d 368. Moreover, the respondent has never looked to her husband for support since the separation on June 15, 1926. With some help from a brother she has been obliged to earn her own living.

Not only was the respondent far from proving that she left her husband because of his ill-treatment of her, but by her own admissions it is shown that she left because he would not divide his assets with her. Her claim of perversion by her husband is entirely unsupported, but according to the evidence was never the subject of any complaint by her to her physician, to his physician, or apparently to her two sisters who testified in her behalf. Since her leaving was for the unjustifiable reason that he would not divide his assets with her, it follows that the libellant had no duty to invite her back or to attempt reconciliation: Wise v. Wise, 157 Pa. Super. 599, 43 A.2d 368. The separation being without a legal cause and not consentable, it was malicious, and when persisted in for two years entitled the libellant to a divorce. Finally, we have made a careful and independent examination of the testimony, and have come to the same conclusion as did the court below.

A decree in divorce may be granted on the testimony of the libellant alone if it is convincing, but when denied and there are circumstances not warranting the disregard of the contradictory testimony, the divorce will not be granted. The burden was on this libellant to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence that she was entitled to have the marriage contract annulled (Rinoldo v. Rinoldo, 125 Pa. Super. 323, 189 A. 566; Wise v. Wise, 157 Pa. Super. 599, 43 A.2d 368; Bozarth v. Bozarth, 159 Pa. Super. 509, 49 A.2d 198), and this she has failed to do. The parties were married November 21, 1936, and lived together until sometime in November 1944. They were both well educated.

The wife denied that the libellant had ever asked her to come to Pottsville and that on the contrary testified that she wanted to go and many times requested the libellant to take her and their two children to live with him there. She was corroborated by the 15-year-old daughter. A decree may be supported by the testimony of the complainant alone but if this testimony be contradicted and shaken by the respondent and there be no convincing circumstances warranting a disregard of the contradictory evidence, a case has not been made out. Kurtz v. Kurtz, 124 Pa. Super. 588, 189 A. 569; Wisev. Wise, 157 Pa. Super. 599, 43 A.2d 368. In this case not only are there "no convincing circumstances" but the following facts are undisputed: (1) the house in Northfield, N.J., in which the respondent and the children reside is owned by the libellant; (2) respondent had requested libellant's permission to move from Egg Harbor to Northfield and he had given this permission; (3) libellant moved his wife and children from Egg Harbor to Northfield; (4) he visited his family many times there; (5) he has paid all the upkeep of the household and has contributed regularly to his wife.