Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co.

2 Citing cases

  1. John Thurmond Associates v. Kennedy

    284 Ga. 469 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that, in a negligence case, the plaintiff may choose its method of measuring damages and the burden shifts to the defendant to present contradictory evidence

    ]" (Emphasis omitted.) Wise v. Tidal Constr. Co., 270 Ga. App. 725, 729 (1) ( 608 SE2d 11) (2004). Thus, if the cost of repair is reasonable when compared to the diminishment in the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach, the defect is deemed remedial and the general measure of damages applies.

  2. Considine v. Waterbury

    279 Conn. 830 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 196 times
    Finding statute was an attempt to codify municipal common-law tort liability

    easonably dangerous); Brown v. Cedar Rapids Iowa City Railways Co., 650 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting trend in federal and state court to admit advisory safety codes promulgated by government agencies, as well as industry, voluntary, or private safety codes as evidence of standard of care); Boston Maine Railroad v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 290 (1st Cir. 1966) (evidence of nonauthoritative, nationally recognized standards concerning highway and railroad crossing design properly was admissible because it was "one more piece of evidence upon which the jury could decide whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances of this case"); cf. Landsiedel v. Buffalo Properties, LLC, 112 P.3d 610, 616-17 (Wyo. 2005) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct that nonapplicable building code or industry standards constituted minimum standard of care, but trial court did allow plaintiff to present evidence of code and standards); but see Wise v. Tidal Construction Co., 270 Ga. App. 725, 729, 608 S.E.2d 11 (2004) (trial court did not improperly exclude evidence of inapplicable, national building codes to illustrate standard of care). Some authorities take the contrary view to Curtis and do not allow such building codes to be considered as some evidence of the standard of care because they generally are concerned that a jury would likely misuse this evidence by treating any violation of such a code as negligence per se. See Curtis v. District of Columbia, supra, 363 F.2d 977-78 (Prettyman, J., dissenting) (concluding that evidence of regulation, which was inapplicable due to its adoption after construction of defendant's premises, should not be considered by jury because it would likely treat any violation of regulation as negligence per se, despite court's instruction to contrary); see also Coleman v. Hall, 161 N.W.2d 329, 330-31 (Iowa 1968) (determining that building code, which was not made retroactive, cannot be considered as standard of care with regard to building constructed before cod