β Vorher v. Henriod, 2011 UT App 199, ΒΆ 9, 262 P.3d 42. It noted that this court had applied subsection (1) of 76-3-405 to appeals from justice court βeven though the statutory language is in some ways inconsistent with the justice court appeal process.β Id. ΒΆ 12 n. 4 (citing Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). And it was βnot convinced that the [L]egislature intended to exclude justice court plea agreementsβ from the exception found in subsection (2)(b).
And, section 76-3-405 has been held to govern appeals from the justice court to the district court. See Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("[T]he district court sentences were contrary to section 76-3-405. . . ."); Adkins, 2006 UT App 374, ΒΆ 12, 145 P.3d 1161 ("The Wisden court concluded that Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) applied to justice court defendants."). Thus, Vorher is correct in his assertion that the punishment imposed by the district court following a trial de novo cannot ordinarily exceed that originally imposed by the justice court for an offense or offenses based on the same conduct.
Thus, regardless of whether it is the state or the defendant seeking a trial de novo, the state cannot reprosecute the defendant on a charge for which he has previously been acquitted. ΒΆ 12 Such a result is also necessitated by Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). The Wisden court concluded that Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) applied to justice court defendants. See id. This section states: "Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based upon the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence. . . ."
If a defendant is tried and convicted in justice court and appeals to district court, the district court cannot impose a greater sentence than that of the justice court. See Utah Code Β§ 76-3-405(1) ; Wisden v. Dist. Ct. of Sevier Cnty. , 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (holding that Utah Code section 76-3-405(1) applies to appeals from justice court convictions). However, this limitation "does not apply when: ... a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction."
ΒΆ 26 Second, unlike the Kentucky system in Colten, the result of a trial de novo under the Utah system is tied to the justice court proceedings below. In Wisden v. District Court, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984) (per curiam), this court held that a defendant convicted in justice court proceedings cannot receive a harsher penalty if subsequently convicted in a trial de novo. Id. at 605-06.
The attorney's belief was incorrect. Utah Code Ann. Β§ 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence.Wisden v. District Ct. of Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984); State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180-81 (Utah 1981); Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980). See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) (penalty phase of a capital proceeding is a trial on the issue of punishment and double jeopardy considerations apply; therefore imposition of a life sentence by a jury in a first trial precludes subsequent imposition of a death penalty following retrial).
He was retried and reconvicted on October 9, 1984. Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in November 1984; we granted a resentencing under the writ. See Wisden v. District Court of Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984). Defendant filed a premature appeal, raising issues concerning his trial in the district court on October 3, 1984. Defendant again filed an appeal after the district court had reached a final judgment.
Thus, "[b]ecause a justice of the peace court in this state is not a court of record, an appeal from that court is by way of a trial de novo in the district court, rather than a review of the justice's rulings." Wisden v. District Ct., 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984). ΒΆ 19 Because it acts "as if there had been no trial in the first instance," Black's Law Dictionary 1512 (7th ed. deluxe 1999), a district court conducting a trial de novo "is not confined to the record before the justice court and need not defer to the justice court's findings and determinations.
Kvenvold has not demonstrated that Utah's two-tier system violates the Double Jeopardy Clause and, specifically, has not demonstrated that the justice court's judgment must be vacated pending appeal. A defendant appealing a justice court conviction has an absolute right to a trial de novo. See Wisden v. District Court 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984). Kvenvold has not demonstrated that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges.
Lang has not demonstrated that Utah's two-tier system violates the Double Jeopardy Clause and, specifically, has not demonstrated that the justice court's judgment must be vacated pending appeal. A defendant appealing a justice court conviction has an absolute right to a trial de novo. See Wisden v. District Court 694 P.2d 605, 606 (Utah 1984). Lang has not demonstrated that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges.