Opinion
Cause No. 3:01cv0645.
March 21, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court because the Plaintiff, John P. Wirt, appeals the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner), who denied his application for social security disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(I), 423. The Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals of the final decisions of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In accordance with Local Rule 7.3, this matter is deemed to be before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wirt applied for DIB in August of 1999, claiming he became unable to work beginning October 16, 1998 due to bilateral hearing loss. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. Wirt filed a request for a hearing. A hearing was held on July 12, 2000 before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Wirt had counsel present at that hearing. The ALJ heard testimony from Wirt and Christopher Young, a vocational expert. On July 19, 2000, the ALJ issued a decision dening Wirt's claim. The Appeals counsel denied Wirt's claim for review on July 19, 2001 therefore, the ALJ's decision stands as the Commissioner's final decision.
II. RELEVANT FACTS
The claimant was 57 years old at the time of his hearing before the ALJ. He has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a quality control engineer. Wirt has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 16, 1998 when he states his medical condition prevented him from working.
In September of 1998, the claimant saw Stephen Thomas, a hearing instrument consultant, complaining of decreased hearing discrimination. Dr. Thomas performed basic hearing tests and found a mild to profound sensorineural hearing loss bilaterally with poor speech discrimination unilaterally and fair speech discrimination binaurally. Dr. Thomas stated Wirt was having increased difficulty communicating, which affected his ability to work.
In October of 1998, Dr. Brian Saine noted that Wirt had severe bilateral sensorineural hearing loss that had progressed over the years. He stated this hearing loss made it hard for the claimant to understand speech unless in a quiet environment, speaking on a one-to-one basis. Dr. Saine stated hearing aid amplification partially solved the claimant's problems.
On September 20, 1999, Dr, David Sabato examined Wirt at the request of the Administration. Dr. Sabato noted that Wirt complained of hearing loss over the last fifteen years. Dr. Sabato concluded that Wirt would benefit from the use of amplification, which would allow him to function at a maximally productive level.
At the administrative hearing, the claimant testified that he stopped working due to his hearing loss. He had no other aliments besides the hearing loss and he can live independently and is able to complete basic daily activities. Wirt testified that he is apprehensive in social situations because of the difficulty he has following conversations. Wirt is also able to communicate on the telephone, although it is difficult.
A vocational expert, Christopher Young, appeared and testified at the hearing. There was no objection from the Plaintiff or his counsel as to his qualifications to testify. Mr. Young concluded that Wirt, given the limitation of understanding speech only in a quiet one-on-one environment, could perform his past work as it was generally performed in the national economy. Additionally, Young stated there were additional jobs that a hypothetical person with Wirt's functional capacity and vocational profile could perform, including auto assembler, machine tender, and cleaner.
The Plaintiff also saw vocational expert Dr. Samuel Goldstein and the ALJ reviewed reports from Dr. Goldstein at the hearing. Dr. Goldstein also submitted follow-up letters to the ALJ. Dr. Goldstein stated Wirt could not perform his past work as a quality assurance engineer. He opined that Young had confused a quality assurance engineer with a quality assurance technician. Dr. Goldstein stated a engineer would have frequent interactions with other people and Wirt's hearing loss made this impossible for him to do. Dr. Goldstein also commented that the Plaintiff has no skills that are transferable to other employment with out minimal vocational adjustment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act itself provides the appropriate standard of review, stating that "the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ's finding that Wirt is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). A federal court in reviewing the Commissioner's decision is not free to decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its judgement for that of the Commissioner to decide whether a claimant is disabled under the statute. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 2000).
IV. DESCRIPTION OF ALJ'S FINDINGS
Wirt must show that he is "disabled" as defined by the Social Security Act in order to qualify for benefits. The Act defines "disabled" as "the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(D). In determining disability status, the Secretary uses a five-step inquiry set forth in the Social Security regulation guides. Allen v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1992). The Secretary must consider the applicant's claim in the following sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether he has a severe impairment; (3) whether his impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary; (4) whether the claimant can perform his past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national economy. Id.
The claimant has the burden of proving a disability under steps One through Four. Once the claimant has satisfied Steps One and Two, he will automatically be found disabled if he suffers from a listed impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform his past work, the burden shifts to the Agency to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Roderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). To meet this burden, the agency will have to establish that the claimant has the "residual functional capacity" to perform other work available in the national economy. Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640(7th Cir. 1987).
Applying this five-step analysis to Wirt's claim, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on October 16, 1998, the date the claimant stated he became unable to work, and has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to remain insured through at least December 31, 2003.
2. The claimant has not engaged in disqualifying substantial gainful activity since October 16, 1998.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has bilateral hearing loss, an impairment which is severe but which does not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The claimant's subjective complaints are consistent with the medical evidence of record.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the physical exertional and non-exertional requirements of work except for only understanding speech on a one-to-one basis, ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545).
6. The claimant is able to perform his past relevant work as a quality control engineer as it is usually performed in the national economy. Consequently, he is "not disabled" ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e)).
7. The claimant's non-exertional limitations significantly narrow the range of work he is now capable of performing.
8. The claimant is 57 years old, an individual of "advanced age."
9. The claimant has a high school education.
10. Considering the claimant's age, educational background, and residual functional capacity, and work experience, Section 404.1569 and Rule 204.00, Table No. 3, appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 would direct a conclusion of "not disabled."
11. Although the claimant's non-exertional limitations do not allow him to perform the full range of work activity, using the above-cited Rule as a framework for decisionmaking, there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy which he could perform. Representative examples of such jobs are: auto assembler, machine tender and cleaner, of which there exist significant numbers in the region in which the claimant resides.
12. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this decision.
(Admin. R. at 15-16). In so finding, the agency (through its designate, the ALJ) renders Wirt ineligible to receive benefits under the Act.
V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW
Wirt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that supported the ALJ's finding of him not being disabled. Specifically, Wirt claims the ALJ should have given reports from Dr. Goldstein, the Plaintiff's vocational expert, more weight than the testimony of Mr. Young, and the ALJ erred in concluded Wirt will be able to perform other employment if he cannot perform his past work.
VI. DISCUSSION
Wirt claims the vocational expert, Christopher Young, erred in describing his past work experience as a quality assurance engineer with that of a quality assurance technician. Wirt bases this claim on the reports of Dr. Goldstein, an additional vocational expert who saw the Plaintiff. It should be noted that the Plaintiff did not make any objections at the hearing to Mr. Young's qualifications as a vocational expert. The ALJ heard the testimony of Mr. Young and reviewed the reports of Dr. Goldstein.
The ALJ concluded that Wirt could perform his past work experience, not as Wirt had performed it, but based on how the work was generally performed in the national economy. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987).
Although Dr. Goldstein determined the Plaintiff could not perform his past work at all, Mr. Young determined that the Plaintiff could perform his past work in other areas with much less verbal consultation. The ALJ determined that Mr. Young's testimony was more persuasive.
In reviewing this decision, this Court must only inquire if it was supported by substantial evidence or evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. Additionally, when conflicting evidence is present, it is within the exclusive domain of the ALJ to resolve the conflicts. Ehrhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 541 (7th Cir. 1992). With this standard in mind, this Court finds that the ALJ's determination that the Plaintiff could perform his past work as it is generally performed in the national economy is reasonable.
Additionally, even if Wirt is not able to perform his past work, the ALJ found that he could perform a significant number of jobs within the local economy. At the hearing, the vocational expert testified that a person with the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity and vocational profile could perform a number of jobs in the local economy. These included unskilled jobs such as auto assembler (700 local jobs), machine tender (1,200 jobs), and cleaner (400 jobs). Dr. Goldstein did not contradict this finding. The Plaintiff only argued that he has no skills that could be transferred to these types of work. However, these positions are for unskilled work, therefore transferability did not need to be addressed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(1). Therefore, this Court finds the ALJ's determination that the Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the local economy reasonable.
Wirt also stated that the ALJ erred when he stated Wirt was able to understand speech in the disability hearing. A review of the record of the hearing finds a few times on the record where Wirt had to ask the ALJ to repeat himself. However, for the most part, the ALJ's statement seems to be accurate and reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ALJ's decision was reasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Plaintiff's request for a rehearing is DENIED. The Agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.