Opinion
C.A. No. 98C-08-124-RRC.
Submitted: August 13, 1999.
Decided: November 10, 1999.
Upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Brian J. Winward's pro se "Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic]." GRANTED.
Upon Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. DENIED.
Upon Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint. DENIED.
Brian J. Winward, SBI No. 121588 Unit C, Delaware Correctional Center, P.O. Box 500, Smyrna, Delaware 19977.
John A. Eberly, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 820 N. French Street, 6th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
Dear Counsel:
Pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Brian J. Winward's "Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic]." The motion is based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth in this letter opinion, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
In his Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic], Plaintiff alleges that Stanley Taylor of the Department of Corrections, Dr. Carol A. Tavani, the Board of Pardons, the Board of Parole, Attorney General Deputy Robert O'Neill and Attorney General Jane M. Brady [sic] (collectively Respondents) have contributed to a violation of various of his rights in proceedings before the Board of Pardons of the State of Delaware. Plaintiff's allegations are set forth in toto.
Plaintiff alleges that Stanley Taylor is the Commissioner (or Director) of the Delaware Correctional Center.
Plaintiff alleges that Carol A. Tavani is a medical care practitioner contracted by the Department of Corrections.
Plaintiff alleges that the Board of Pardons is the Governor's appointed panel to address inmate commutation of sentence applications.
Plaintiff alleges that the Board of Parole is the advisory panel to the Board of Pardons in matters of inmate commutation of sentence applications.
Plaintiff alleges that Robert O'Neill is the States' legal representative in matters of inmate commutation of sentence applications.
Plaintiff alleges that Jane M. Brady [sic] is the supervisor of Mr. O'Neill and of the chief legal representative of the Department of Corrections and Board of Parole (and perhaps the Board of Pardons).
a) Respondents Department of Corrections and Respondent Carol A. Tavani did not provide [Plaintiff] the statutorily and regulatory (Administrative Rule) "adequate psychological examination and studies for the period "not less than 30 days". [sic]
b) Respondents Board of Parole, Board of Pardons and Attorney General Deputy did not rely upon the required "adequate psychological examination and studies" for the period "not less than 30 days" as statute and Administrative Rule(s) demand for all commutation of sentence applicants.
c) Respondents Board of Parole and Attorney General Deputy did not correlate their efforts with Respondent Department of Corrections to ascertain that [Plaintiff] received said statutory and Administrative Rule(s) required "adequate psychological examination and studies" for the period "not less than 30 days". [sic]
d) Respondents individually and collectively violated [Plaintiff's] statutory rights, Administrative Rule(s) rights; and, U.S. Constitutional and Delaware Constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process of law and equal treatment of law; and,
e) [Plaintiff's] review before the Board of Parole and Board of Pardons was (is) statutorily, regulatory (Administrative Rules); and, Constitutionally tainted and, thus, invalid.
Plaintiff's Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic] at 8.
The basis for Plaintiff's petition is that he did not receive an allegedly statutorily mandated psychiatric examination. Plaintiff contends that 11 Del. C. § 4362(b) requires that"all applicants for a commutation of sentence shall have an `adequate psychological examination and studies' by a psychiatrist for a period of `not less than 30 days' preceding appearance before the Board of Pardons."
Plaintiff's Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic] at 3.
The Delaware Declaratory Judgment Act, as amended, is found at 10 Del. C. Ch. 65. Title 10 Del. C. § 6512 defines the purpose and construction of the chapter. It states that the Act is remedial and that its purpose is to "settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered." The Act has been said to ". . . exist to provide a method for resolving a controversy where no other remedy exists." The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to enable the courts to adjudicate a controversy prior to the time when a remedy is traditionally available. "[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial in character and . . . the term `actual controversy' should be liberally interpreted to give wide scope to the provisions of the act within the purposes thereof" In order for the requisite "actual controversy" to be present there must be
Mason v. Board of Pension Trustees, Del. Super., 468 A.2d 298 (1983) (citing Hampson v. State, Del. Supr., 233 A.2d 155 (1976)).
Rollins International, Inc., v. International Hydraulics Corp., Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 660, 662 (1973).
Id.
(1) a controversy involving the rights or other legal relations of the party seeking declaratory relief; (2) a controversy in which the claim of right or other legal interest is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting the claim; (3) the controversy must be between parties whose interests are real and adverse; (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination.
Id. at 662-663.
When a complaint for declaratory judgement fails to state a cause of action . . . it is not necessary to determine the court's actual basis for dismissing the complaint. Dismissal is proper where such a failure exists even where the grounds relied upon by the court were not valid grounds.
Burris v. Cross, Del. Super., 583 A.2d 1364, 1376 (1990) (citing Gagne v. Village of LaGrange, 345 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Ill.App. 1976)).
Id.
This Court finds that Plaintiff's attempt to use a declaratory judgement action is inappropriate and fails to state a claim for such relief because the statute cited by Plaintiff is inapplicable. The intended beneficiary of the statute's provisions is the public, not the prisoner and therefore the statute has afforded Plaintiff no rights which have been violated. It is necessary to consider the full text of 11 Del. C. § 4362(b) in order to accurately interpret its meaning. The pertinent language not cited in Plaintiff's complaint is the beginning of § 4362(b) which states that "[p]rior to consideration and recommendation for release by means of a pardon or commutation of sentence . . ." (emphasis added). Although chapter 43 of Title 11 does not define the term "release," both the terms "conditional release" and parole" make reference to the release of offenders, and in both cases, according to 11 Del. C. § 4302(5) and 4302(11), such release is meant to be to the community. Since the release sought by Plaintiff was not into the community, but only that Respondents consider a reduction of sentence, the statute relied upon by Plaintiff does not apply and the Petition fails to state a claim.
State v. Sullivan, Del. Super., ID No. 92K00055DI, Ridgely, P.J. (Sep. 20, 1999) (Mem. Op.).
Additionally, Plaintiff has not met the requisite factors of an "actual controversy." Specifically, the controversy has already been resolved and is no longer ripe because Plaintiff has already appeared before the Board of Pardons and the Board has already reached its decision. Furthermore, the relief sought by Plaintiff, that the Board reconsider a commutation of sentence after Plaintiff has been subjected to a statutorily mandated psychiatric examination, is injunctive in nature and an action for declaratory judgment is inappropriate. Therefore this Court finds that Plaintiff's Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and is dismissed.
See Kwality Kidz Society, et al., v. Environ Tech Water Company, D. Del., C.A. No. 98-128, Farnan, C.J. (April 14, 1999) (denying a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' claim that they were unconstitutionally deprived of their right to meaningful rehabilitation and an adequate thirty day psychiatric evaluation prior to commutation of sentence).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's "Petition for a Declaratory Judgement" is GRANTED.
Pending also before this Court are also Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motions are DENIED.
On June 7, 1999 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and simultaneously filed an "Amended Complaint."
In the Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Plaintiff contends that "[p]ursuant to Super. Ct. Rules, and all other authority, the [Plaintiff] requests that this court appoint counsel to represent him in this matter." Plaintiff argues that an appointment of counsel is proper in a Delaware state court and raises issues that would grant an appointment of counsel in a United States court by attempting to apply federal statutes to a state court proceeding. Plaintiff's motion is based on inapplicable federal precedents interpreting a federal statute.
Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 1.
This Court finds that Plaintiff's arguments are without merit. Plaintiff has no right to appointment of counsel in this civil proceeding. "The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a tight to counsel has not been extended to civil proceedings." For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.
Bouleware v. Battaglia, D. Del., 34 F. Supp. 889, 903 (1972), aff'd, CA3, 478 F.2d 1398 (1973).
Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint pursuant Super Ct. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to add requests for injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive monetary damages. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to be released from custody and be compensated $1.85 million dollars.
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is denied. Even if permitted to amend his complaint, the complaint would still be dismissed. Plaintiff bases his amended complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and immediate release on the lack of a thirty day psychological evaluation. This Court addressed that issue above in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff also asserts that he is entitled to damages against the "Department of Corrections (Stanley Taylor) and Dr. Carol A. Tavani" without providing any reasoning for that relief. This Court finds that Plaintiff has no basis for an amended complaint aside from what has been stated in his "Petition for a Declaratory Judgement [sic]." For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Leave to Amend the Complaint is DENIED.
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint at 2.
IT IS SO ORDERED.