Similar "implied consent" statutes have "almost uniformly withstood various constitutional attacks." State v. Moore, 483 P.2d 630, 632 (Wash. 1971) (en banc); see e.g., Kellum v. Thorneycroft ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't Motor Vehicle Div., 649 P.2d 994, 995-96 (Ariz.App. 1982); Spurlock v. Dep't Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal.App.3d 821, 830 (1969); People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); Morrow v. State, 303 A.2d 633, 635 (Del. 1973); People v. Farr, 347 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ill. 1976); Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Ky. 1972); State v. Manley, 202 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Neb. 1972); Anderson v. MacDuff, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (N.Y.Sup. 1955); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 675, 678-80 (Ohio 1970); Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968, 969 (Okla. 1975); Haag v. Commonwealth, 443 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. 1982); State v. Brean, 385 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Vt. 1978).

Similar "implied consent" statutes have "almost uniformly withstood various constitutional attacks." State v. Moore, 483 P.2d 630, 632 (Wash. 1971) (en banc); see e.g., Kellum v. Thorneycroft ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't Motor Vehicle Div., 649 P.2d 994, 995-96 (Ariz.App. 1982); Spurlock v. Dep't Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal.App.3d 821, 830 (1969); People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); Morrow v. State, 303 A.2d 633, 635 (Del. 1973); People v. Farr, 347 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ill. 1976); Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Ky. 1972); State v. Manley, 202 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Neb. 1972); Anderson v. MacDuff, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (N.Y.Sup. 1955); State v. Starnes, 254 N.E.2d 675, 678-80 (Ohio 1970); Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968, 969 (Okla. 1975); Haag v. Commonwealth, 443 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. 1982); State v. Brean, 385 A.2d 1085, 1088 (Vt. 1978).

The court reasoned that, the revocation being mandatory, all who refuse to submit to a chemical test are treated in the same manner. Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1975), likewise holds the disparate treatment presents no equal protection problem, since the driving under the influence statute, under which the appellant's license had been suspended, treated all drivers equally. The court rejected appellant's argument that the statute prevented him from earning a living, since he was a truckdriver with no other skills.

Insofar as this pronouncement is in conflict with extant case law, our former expressions to the contrary stand withdrawn. See In re Metcalf, supra note 1; Winter v. Mayberry, Okla., 533 P.2d 968 [1975]; Wade v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, Okla., 645 P.2d 510 [1982]. Because we find no textually demonstrable authority, either explicit or implicit, for the appellant's argument that the legislature intended economic hardship to serve as a basis for judicial vacation of a driver's license suspension imposed for licensee's accumulation of excessive points, we hold that no such power resides in the district court.

"The trial court erred in the present case in admitting evidence concerning hardship which might result, in the future, from the suspension of Metcalf's driver's license. It follows that this court may not consider that evidence." Metcalf was followed in Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1975) wherein Winter's drivers license was suspended under the mandatory revocation statutory proceeding of 47 O.S. 1971 § 6-205[ 47-6-205](2). We held that neither this court nor the trial court could consider hardship as a ground to vacate or modify a suspension order of the Department of Public Safety in a statutory proceeding.

1983); Gableman v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 379, 383 (N.D. 1974); Pepin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal.App.2d 9, 11, 79 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659 (1969). See also Porter v. Jensen, 223 Neb. 438, 390 N.W.2d 511 (1986); Murray v. Thorneycroft ex rel. State, 131 Ariz. 156, 639 P.2d 346 (1981); Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1975); Heer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 252 Or. 455, 450 P.2d 533 (1969). We do likewise.

The fact that the suspension of Appellant's driver's license will prevent him from earning a living, since he is a truck driver and has no other training or skills, may not be considered by this Court. Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968, 969 (Okla. 1975). (Emphasis added.)

The basic thrust of the Department's argument on appeal is that the district court was without authority to modify the revocation on the basis of hardship under 47 O.S. 1971 § 6-211[ 47-6-211]. In support of that argument, it relies on the decision in Winter v. Mayberry, 533 P.2d 968. In that case Winter's driver's license had been revoked for six months under 47 O.S. 1971 § 6-205[ 47-6-205](2), following a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.