Opinion
CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00774-MJS (PC)
08-22-2017
MYOHO WINSTON, Plaintiff, v. I. MARTINEZ, Defendant.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 1)
THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 6, 2017. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this case. (ECF No. 9). No other parties have appeared.
I. Screening Requirement
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Pleading Standard
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences," Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
III. Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California. However he complains of acts that occurred at the California State Prison, Corcoran in Corcoran, California ("CSP—COR"). Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant I. Martinez, a correctional officer at CSP—COR.
Plaintiff's allegations can be summarized essentially as follows: On May 18, 2016, he filed a grievance about a television having been confiscated from his cell on May 3, 2016. During a July 11, 2016, hearing on the grievance Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by filing a false Rules Violation Report ("RVR") accusing Plaintiff of having stolen the television from another inmate. Defendant did so to prevent Plaintiff from filing a second grievance. Plaintiff's fear of Defendant kept him from filing a second grievance.
Plaintiff alleges this retaliation violated his rights under the First Amendment.
IV. Discussion
Section 1983 provides for a cause of action against prison officials who retaliate against inmates for exercising their constitutionally protected rights. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[R]etaliatory actions by prison officials are cognizable under § 1983.") Within the prison context, a viable claim of retaliation entails five basic elements: "(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his constitutional rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d at 1114-15; Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).
The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271. A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a "'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind the defendant's conduct." Id. (quoting Sorrano's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials' retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 ("timing can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent").
In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a complaint or grievance is constitutionally protected. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989).
With respect to the fourth prong, the correct inquiry is to determine whether an official's acts "could chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity[]." Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).
With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively allege that "'the prison authorities' retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals." Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d at 532.
Here, the connection between Plaintiff's grievance and Defendant's actions is not clear. The Court cannot determine if Plaintiff feels Defendant issued a false RVR in retaliation for the May 18, 2016 grievance or to dissuade Plaintiff from filing a second grievance. The distinction is significant because Plaintiff must allege how Defendant knew of whichever event is at the core of the retaliation and how Plaintiff knows or believes Defendant's actions were in retaliation for either or both events. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend. If he chooses to do so, he must demonstrate a causal link between his protected activity and Defendant's retaliation for it.
V. Conclusion
Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading," Local Rule 220.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;IT IS SO ORDERED.
3. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a copy of the complaint filed June 6, 2017;
4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or a notice of voluntary dismissal;
5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute and failure to obey a court order.
Dated: August 22, 2017
/s/ Michael J . Seng
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE