In the light of this testimony, our quaere is: Could reasonable minds differ in resolving the factual issues (1) whether Mr. Wetzler exercised ordinary care under the circumstances, and (2) whether the risk of injuring another which Mr. Wetzler assumed in playing baseball with the children was an unreasonable risk under the circumstances, or (3) could injury to another have been reasonably anticipated. [7] In Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 387, 171 P.2d 251 (1946), quoting with approval from 1 Shearman Redfield, Negligence § 24, at 50, we said: "Foresight, not retrospect, is the standard of diligence. It is nearly always easy, after an accident has happened, to see how it could have been avoided.
In other factual situations where the risk of someone coming into a position of danger from the backward operation of a motor vehicle was relatively slight, and the truck driver was not aware of the plaintiff's presence in close quarters, recovery has been denied on the theory that the truck driver was entitled to proceed upon the assumption that others in the vicinity would exercise proper care for their own safety. Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wash.2d 383, 171 P.2d 251; Gloshinsky v. Bergen Milk Transp. Co., 279 N.Y. 54, 17 N.E.2d 766; Nelson v. Mitten, 218 Iowa 914, 255 N.W. 662. Since defendant's driver, in the exercise of ordinary care, had no duty under the circumstances of this case to anticipate the reasonable probability of danger to plaintiff, defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained.
Not only must there be a risk of harm to another which is unreasonable, but the actor should recognize that his conduct involves such a risk. See Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 171 P.2d 251 (1946), quoting with approval 2 Restatement, Torts, §§ 289, 291; Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wn.2d 376, 165 P.2d 95 (1946); 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 1a (6). Or, as we expressed this thought in Burr v. Clark, 30 Wn.2d 149, 155, 190 P.2d 769 (1948): "The duty to use care is based upon the knowledge of danger, and the care which must be used in any particular situation is in proportion to the actor's knowledge, actual or imputed, of the danger to another in the act to be performed. 38 Am. Jur. 678, Negligence, § 32; 45 C.J. 651, 653, Negligence, §§ 25, 27."
" The following cases are to the same effect: Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 171 P.2d 251; Everest v. Riecken, 26 Wn.2d 542, 174 P.2d 762. [13] In the case at bar, the jury were justified in finding, from the evidence, that appellants' logging truck, forty-three feet in length, having an over-all width of ten feet, was being driven by appellant Simms at a speed of approximately eighteen miles an hour, at least three feet of the truck being to the driver's left of the center of the road, which, at the point on the curve where the collision occurred, was no more than eighteen feet six inches in width, and that the driver of the truck had given no horn signal of his approach around the curve; that respondents' Ford, five feet nine inches in width, coming from the opposite direction, was proceeding on its right side of the road, at a speed of approximately twenty miles an hour; that the curve in the road, together with the high bank on respondents' right, completely obstructed respondents' view, and that respondent driver could not and did not see appellants' logging truck un
It is always a question of what reasonably prudent men under the same circumstances would or should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have anticipated." Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 387, 171 P.2d 251 (1946)).
. 46 Wn. App. at 489, quoting Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 387, 171 P.2d 251 (1946), and Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wn.2d 376, 388, 165 P.2d 95 (1946). While the instruction is a correct statement of the law, based on Vasquez, the use of the negative in the phrase "not to be judged in light of any after-acquired knowledge in relation to the case" creates an unnecessary risk of misapplication.
In Washington negligence is not a matter to be judged after the occurrence; thus, "'[f]oresight, not retrospect, is the standard of diligence." Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 387, 171 P.2d 251 (1946) (quoting Peterson v. Betts, 24 Wn.2d 376, 388, 165 P.2d 95 (1946)). Accord, Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wn. App. 571, 579, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976).
Instruction No. 9 is a correct statement of the law. Peacock v. Piper, 81 Wn.2d 731, 504 P.2d 1124 (1973); Winsor v. Smart's Auto Freight Co., 25 Wn.2d 383, 171 P.2d 251 (1946). We think it was particularly apt in view of Dr. Sobul's reliance on texts and authorities published after 1970, in testifying what he thought the treatment should have been.