Opinion
NO. 02-12-00420-CV
12-21-2012
Glenn Winningham; house of Fearn v. Terry Means, (so-called) Judge, John H. McBryde, (so-called) Judge, Sidney A. Fitzwater, (so-called) Judge, Karen Mitchell, Clerk of the Court, Lynn Tedford, Deputy Clerk, Edmond Dieth, Assistant Manager, United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, David Knox, Attorney, Federal Express Corporation, Gregg Abbott, Texas Attorney General, and Rick Perry, Texas Governor
From the 236th District Court
of Tarrant County (236-261874-12)
Per Curiam
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM
NO. 02-12-00420-CV
GLENN WINNINGHAM; HOUSE OF FEARN APPELLANT
V.
TERRY MEANS, (SO-CALLED) APPELLEES JUDGE, JOHN H. MCBRYDE,
(SO-CALLED) JUDGE, SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, (SO-CALLED) JUDGE, KAREN MITCHELL, CLERK OF THE COURT,
LYNN TEDFORD, DEPUTY CLERK, EDMOND DIETH, ASSISTANT MANAGER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DAVID KNOX, ATTORNEY, FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
GREGG ABBOTT, TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND RICK PERRY, TEXAS GOVERNOR
FROM THE 236TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appellant Glenn Winningham; house of Fearn filed a notice of appeal on October 15, 2012, complaining of the trial court's order sustaining the contest to his petition to proceed in the trial court without the prepayment of fees or costs. We notified Appellant on November 8, 2012, of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the order sustaining the contest to his petition to proceed in the trial court without the prepayment of fees or costs does not appear to be an appealable order, and we stated that his appeal could be dismissed unless he or any party filed within ten days a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Appellant's response does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.
The general rule, with a few exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Interlocutory orders may be appealed only if allowed by statute. The trial court's order sustaining the contest to Appellant's petition to proceed in the trial court without advance payment of fees and costs is an interlocutory order for which there is no right of interlocutory appeal. We thus lack subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001).
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2012); Montgomery v. Matucci, 02-10-00127-CV, 2010 WL 3075597, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
SeeMontgomery, 2010 WL 3075597, at *1; Aguilar v. Tex. La Fiesta Auto Sales LLC, No. 01-08-00653-CV, 2009 WL 1562838, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 4, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.).
See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
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PER CURIAM