A minority of members of an unincorporated association who carry on the association's program are entitled to the association's property as against a majority who withdraw and organize a new, rival organization. Winnetka Trust Savings Bank v. Practical Refrigerating Engineers Ass'n, 322 Ill. App. 154, 54 N.E.2d 253; McFadden v. Murphy, 149 Mass. 341, 21 N.E. 868; Maria Konopnicka Society v. Maria Konopnicka Society, 331 Mass. 565, 120 N.E.2d 769; Medical Society v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321. A resulting trust arises by implication of law from the acts and conduct of the parties and cannot grow out of any contract between them. Johnson v. Johnson, 259 Ala. 550, 67 So.2d 841. An oral trust is suspect and must be alleged in detail. Westcott v. Sharp, 256 Ala. 418, 54 So.2d 758. Equity will not enjoin proceedings at law, to protect an interest in personal property where there is an adequate remedy at law for damages. Skates v. Hartsfield, 216 Ala. 618, 114 So. 10. Adequate damages can be assessed for the personal property which is the subject of this suit.
Detchard v. State, 57 S.W. 813; 22 C.J.S., p. 283, sec. 185 (K); 22 C.J.S., pp. 284, 286; State v. Smith, 162 Iowa 336; Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283. (2) The honorable judges in Division No. 2 in this court in its opinion held that although the evidence shows that the checks in question were cashed by depositing the same to the account of Henry B. Schiller Realty Co. or to the account of S.J. Mandell with the Delmar Bank, University City, Mo., that the title to said checks did not pass to the Delmar Bank, but that said Delmar Bank was acting as agent for this appellant in transmitting the same to the Tower Grove Bank Trust Co. in St. Louis, and for that reason the venue was in the City of St. Louis; such holding in the divisional opinion is erroneous and is contrary to the rulings in the following cases: Kavanaugh v. Farmers Bank, 59 Mo. App. 540; Mudd v. Merchants Bank of Hunneywell, 162 S.W. 314, 175 Mo. App. 398; Ayres v. Bank, 79 Mo. 421; Flannery v. Coates, 80 Mo. 445; Bank v. Refrigerating Co., 236 Mo. 407, 139 S.W. 545; Haas v. Kings County Fruit Co., 183 S.W. 676; American Bank of DeSoto v. Peoples Bank of DeSoto, 255 S.W. 193; National City Bank of St. Louis v. Macon Creamery Co., 46 S.W.2d 127, 329 Mo. 639; Mattes v. Cantley, Comr. of Finance, 39 S.W.2d 412; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank, 42 S.W.2d 27; State ex rel. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, Assessor, 9 S.W.2d 621, 320 Mo. 901; State v. Smith, 162 Iowa 336; Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283. (3) There is no provision in Section 3953, R.S. 1939 for the filing of an amended substitute information in lieu of an indictment. Sec. 3953, R.S. 1939. (4) If it can be said that Section 3953, R.S. 1939 permits the filing of more than one substitute information in lieu of an indictment, then as a prerequisite of the filing of an amended substitute information there should and must be a ruling by the trial court that the substitute information was insufficient as to form and substance; absent such ruling, no amended substitute to the su
arion Robertson for respondent. (1) An official bond is incidental to the office of collector of revenue: 46 C.J. 961, sec. 88; Secs. 11056, 11058, R.S. 1939; State to the use of Buchanan County v. Smith, 26 Mo. 226; Holt v. Rea, 330 Mo. 1237. (2) The bond premiums for which this suit was brought were for a reindemnifying bond for $50,000 that the plaintiff gave his personal sureties; and the premiums were not for a bond as required by statute to protect Saline County or on any surety bond that the county approved, consented to or agreed to pay, and payment of these premiums would be without statutory authority, if paid by the county. Compensation of a public office is a matter of statutes and not of contract; it does not depend upon the amount or value of the services performed, but is incidental to the office: Sec. 11056, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. Evans v. Gordon, 245 Mo. 12; Andrew County v. Maxwell, 146 S.W.2d 621; Jackson County v. Stone, 168 Mo. 581; State v. Brown, 146 Mo. 406; Bank v. Refrigerating Co., 236 Mo. 414. (3) Plaintiff is only entitled to compensation provided by statute. The official bond is incidental to his office; and he cannot take office until he makes an official bond. There is no duty on the county's part to furnish a surety bond, but the plaintiff must perform his duties regardless of what the remuneration is: Secs. 11056, 11106, R.S. 1939; Holt v. Rea, 330 Mo. 1237; State ex rel. v. McCracken, 60 Mo. App. 657; State ex inf. v. Herring, 208 Mo. 708. (4) Statutes must be strictly construed as against the officer and an implication must be fair and clear; and plaintiff is not entitled to any additional compensation of payments on any surety bond unless specifically provided by statute.
We have no reason to disturb this finding. Moreover, if Suburban did disaffiliate from MSTA, MSTA had no right to prevent Suburban's disaffiliation. Plaintiffs' claim that MSTA has controlling rights as a parent is based on Winnetka Trust Savings Bank v. Practical Refrigerating Engineer's Association, 322 Ill.App. 154, 54 N.E.2d 253 (1944). There, the court applied the rules governing religious societies to the association before it and held the minority of members who continued to operate as an affiliate of the National Association were entitled to all the property owned by the group.
The court said that by this contract the members "had agreed and were obligated to be and continue an association, bound by all the terms and parts of that agreement, and bound by state statutes relative to associations; . . . . It would seem elemental that this contract could not be changed without the consent of all the members, unless there were some provision in the contract, or in the law of this state, providing for such change upon less than the consent of all, and under certain procedure and conditions." The case principally relied on by plaintiff is Winnetka Trust Savings Bank v. Practical Refrigerating Engineers Ass'n, 322 Ill. App. 154. The question there involved the right of the majority of an unincorporated association to withdraw from the "parent organization" and take with them the funds and property accumulated by the "subordinate body" and intended to be used by it in furthering the purposes of the parent organization.