Thus, although the trial court found in the course of considering the financial status of the parties that Rabon's income had increased by 112%, it did not apply the guidelines to Eubanks's claim for modification. "[C]hild support guidelines apply not only to initial determinations of child support, but also to modification actions, and'" . . . must be considered by any court setting child support." [Cit.]'" Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439, 440 ( 511 SE2d 167) (1999). The trial court's failure to apply the child support guidelines to Eubanks's counterclaim constitutes another basis for reversal of the judgment below.
We have explained that “[t]he showing of a change in [the parent's] financial status or a change in the needs of the child ... is a threshold requirement” in a modification action. Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439, 439, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999). If the trial court determines that there has been such a change, the court must then enter a “written order specifying the basis for the modification ... and shall include all of the information set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (c) of this Code section,” OCGA § 19–6–15(k)(4), which includes application of the statutory child support guidelines. In addition, OCGA § 19–6–15(c)(1) provides,
This Court routinely exercises its divorce and alimony jurisdiction when actions for modification of child support previously awarded in a divorce decree are brought by a parent pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19. See Jones v. Jones, supra; Moccia v. Moccia, 277 Ga. 571-572 (1) ( 592 SE2d 664) (2004); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ga. 479 ( 512 SE2d 255) (1999); Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 ( 511 SE2d 167) (1999); Robertson v. Robertson, 266 Ga. 516, 518 (1) ( 467 SE2d 556) (1996). Likewise, this Court has repeatedly exercised jurisdiction in cases involving DHR's review pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12 of child support awards originally established in a divorce decree.
]" (Emphasis in original.) Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 ( 511 S.E.2d 167) (1999). Here, the divorce decree established that, as evidenced by Father's earning capacity, rather than his current income, a level of support of $1,000 per month was appropriate.
4. Nor do we find any merit in the mother's claim that the juvenile court erred in refusing to modify the amount of child support she is required to pay. Under OCGA § 19-6-15 (k) (1), a parent is not entitled to a modification of a child support award unless she can first show "a substantial change in either [the] parent's income and financial status or the needs of the child." See also Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 ( 511 SE2d 167) (1999) ("The showing of a change in financial status or a change in the needs of the child . . . is a threshold requirement. [Cit.]") (emphasis in original).
See Ga. L. 2006, p. 583, § 10 (b). See Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 ( 511 SE2d 167) (1999). (Punctuation omitted.)
Id. at 70 (4). See OCGA § 19-6-19 (a); Wingard v. Paris, 270 Ga. 439 ( 511 S.E.2d 167) (1999). In addition to the self-initiated remedy available under § 19-6-19, however, a custodial parent may apply to DHR for child support enforcement services.
"After the trial court finds satisfactory proof of a change in financial status, it must reconsider the amount of child support under the guidelines of OCGA § 19-6-15 (b)." Wingard v. Paris , 270 Ga. 439, 440, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999). See OCGA § 19-6-15 (k) (4).
"After the trial court finds satisfactory proof of a change in financial status, it must reconsider the amount of child support under the guidelines of OCGA § 19-6-15 (b)." Wingard v. Paris , 270 Ga. 439, 440, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999). See also Wetherington , 291 Ga. at 725 (2) (a), 732 S.E.2d 433.
Wetherington v. Wetherington , 291 Ga. 722, 725 (2) (a), 732 S.E.2d 433 (2012). See Wingard v. Paris , 270 Ga. 439, 439, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999) (accord).Appellee’s petition asked that she be awarded "permanent child support in compliance with Georgia Statutory Guidelines."