Opinion
No. CIV S-06-0391 GEB JFM P.
February 27, 2007
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed December 22, 2006, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. On January 3, 2007, plaintiff filed a document styled as an amended complaint. On February 6, 2007, plaintiff filed a request to dismiss two defendants from the action and to proceed only against one defendant named in the amended complaint, Keith Levy. On the same day, plaintiff filed another document styled as an amended complaint. That document supersedes the amended complaint filed January 3, 2007, and will be screened by the court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief.Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor,Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Keith Levy is an administrative law judge who has violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by renewing a so-called Keyhea order for another year of forced medication. Plaintiff seeks money damages.
A permanent injunction in Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526 (1986) sets forth the process which must be followed before psychotropic medication can be involuntarily administrated to an inmate in a California state prison. See California Penal Code § 2600; see also Department of Corrections v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 53 Cal.App.4th 780, 785 (1997).
"Administrative law judges . . . are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as they perform functions similar to judges and prosecutors in a setting like that of a court." Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 9th Cir. 1995) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1978). To qualify for quasi-judicial immunity, an administrative law judge must preside over adversarial hearings from which there is an appeal, and the judge must make factual findings and "perform other adjudicatory functions." Hirsh, at 715.
The Keyhea injunction provides a process whereby a prisoner who is subject to mental health treatment, after being administered involuntary medication for up to 72 hours, may be certified for additional involuntary medication up to 21 days if the prisoner is "as a result of mental disorder, gravely disabled and incompetent to refuse medication for the danger to others, or danger to self." ( Keyhea injunction, supra, § II(A), p. 6.) The prisoner, with the assistance of an attorney or advocate, may contest certification. A certification review hearing is conducted by the court-appointed hearing officer and if at the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer concludes that the prisoner is neither gravely disabled and incompetent nor a danger to others or to self, involuntary medication must be discontinued. ( Id., at § II(I), (M), pp. 11, 13.) A prisoner may not be medicated involuntarily for more than 24 days without an order from the superior court. The order authorizing involuntary medication must find, by clear and convincing evidence, as above, that the prisoner, as a result of mental disorder, is gravely disabled and incompetent to refuse medication or a danger to self. ( Id., § III(F), p. 18.) The injunction also permits emergency involuntary medication under certain specified conditions. ( Id. at § III(J), pp. 20-21.)
Most relevant for purposes of this case, the Keyhea injunction defines "danger to others" "in substantial accord with Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300," and requires essentially the same findings of demonstrated danger and recent dangerousness as in section 5300, discussed above. (Keyhea injunction, supra, § I(4).) A prisoner will be considered a danger to others only if he or she has attempted, inflicted or made a serious threat of "substantial physical harm upon the person of another" either after being taken into custody or as the cause of being taken into custody, as specified in section 5300, and "presents, as a result of mental disorder, demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others." ( Keyhea injunction, supra, § I(4)(b), p. 4.) "Custody" refers to "confinement in an inpatient psychiatric unit." The order is only good for 180 days (or a shorter time if specified by the court) in the case of those determined to be a danger to self or others, with new orders being subject to the same procedural protections as the original orders. (Id., § (III)(I).)In re Qawi, 32 Cal.4th 1, 22 (2004). California state courts view a Keyhea hearing as "`an adversarial judicial hearing and not a perfunctory step in the process.'" Department of Corrections v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 53 Cal.App.4th at 789 (internal citation omitted). By its terms, the Keyhea injunction provides for judicial review of the administrative law judge's decision. (Keyhea v. Rushen, Case No. 67432, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Clarification and Modification of Injunction and Permanent Injunction, filed October 31, 1986, at ¶ IIN.)
The Hirsh court describes another factor derived from Butz: decisions from such hearings should qualify as "controversial enough to stimulate harassing damage actions against the adjudicators." Hirsh, at 715.
A copy of the Keyhea injunction is available online at website of the State of California's Office of Administrative Hearings,http://www.oah.dgs.ca.gov.
The decision of the administrative law judge at a Keyhea hearing is the type of decision that gives rise to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity, as described by the court of appeals in Hirsh. Plaintiff's allegations bring the decision of defendant Levy squarely within the protection of that immunity. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).