No. 05-09-00540-CR
Opinion Filed April 1, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-52200-UI.
Before Justices O'NEILL, LANG, and MYERS.
Opinion By Justice MYERS.
Frederick Jerome Wines appeals following the revocation of his community supervision. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision, and the written judgment fails to accurately reflect the conditions of probation appellant was found to have violated. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
Background
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, probated for four years. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging appellant violated eight conditions of his community supervision. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded true to six allegations and not true to two allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment. Abuse of Discretion
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision because the State failed to prove two of the alleged violations and provided insufficient proof of two other violations, and appellant provided a reasonable explanation about why he had not yet complied with some of the conditions of his community supervision. Appellant asserts the trial court should have continued his community supervision rather than revoking it and imposing a maximum term of imprisonment. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision because there was sufficient evidence to support the revocation. Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of community supervision. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all of the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). In its amended motion to revoke, the State alleged appellant violated eight conditions of community supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to two of the allegations and pleaded true to six of the allegations, including failing to register as a sex offender and failing to participate in counseling through an approved registered sex offender treatment provider, as directed. A plea of true to any violation, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Appellant testified that when he was placed on community supervision, he understood all of the conditions of his community supervision, and he did not register as a sex offender, as directed. Because appellant entered a plea of true, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64; Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. Modify Judgment
In his second issue, appellant contends the case should be remanded to the trial court for specific findings because the written judgment recites revocation was based upon the original motion to revoke, which did not allege the failure to register allegation. Alternatively, appellant asks us to modify the trial court's written judgment to reflect the conditions of community supervision he was found to have violated. The State concedes the written judgment should be modified to reflect the trial court proceeded on the amended motion to revoke. It is clear from the record that all of the parties proceeded on the State's amended motion to revoke community supervision during the revocation hearing. Appellant testified about all of the allegations contained in the amended motion to revoke. The trial court's written judgment incorrectly recites appellant violated the conditions of community supervision "as set out in the State's original motion to revoke." We sustain appellant's second issue. We modify the trial court's judgment to show appellant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision "as set out in the State's amended motion to revoke community supervision." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). Appellant was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a) (Vernon 2006). The trial court's judgment, however, recites the statute for the offense is "62.10 Penal Code." Thus, the written judgment is incorrect. We modify the trial court's judgment to show the statute for the offense is "62.102(a) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." See id. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment.