Opinion
10-14-00355-CV10-14-00392-CV10-15-00069-CVNo. 10-15-00092-CV
08-03-2016
WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant v. SAM ROUND, Appellee WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant v. SEAN D. FLEMING, Appellee WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Appellant v. KELLIE McDOUGALD, Appellee WILLIAM WINDSOR, Appellant v. JOEYISALITTLEKID, ET AL, Appellee
From the 378th District Court Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court No. 88611
DISSENT TO ORDERS
In these four proceedings the Court again strikes appellant's brief filed in all four appeals. With that I totally agree. The briefs are a gross departure from the rules of appellate procedure.
The simple action of again striking his brief, however, is obviously inadequate to address the overarching problem in that Windsor has exhibited a flagrant disregard for the legislative enactments and the rules of the judicial branch and has at every turn demonstrated a complete disregard for the orderly administration of justice. He has frustrated the judicial process and used it as a tool of oppression against his victims and as a means to delay the ultimate disposition of his proceedings. He has failed to follow explicit orders of this Court and filed unnecessary and frivolous notices of appeal, motions, and new proceedings. In my opinion, it is time, and this Court would be so justified, to dismiss all of his appeals, thus affirming the trial court's orders about which he complains. At the very least, I would not deny the motions of the appellees to dismiss his proceedings at this juncture and would merely strike his briefs, holding in reserve our tools to compel his compliance which I have no doubt we will need.
Windsor has a federal court order rendered against him that enjoins him from filing any proceeding in a state or federal court without the prior approval of a federal judge in the district where the proceeding is to be filed. He argues that we are not bound by this federal injunction. He is right in that we are not bound by it. He is wrong, however, to think that he is not. He is also wrong to think that we cannot act upon his failure. In this regard, he had been advised to seek such approval not only of the proceedings he had filed in Ellis County, but also of the various appeals he has filed in this Court. Eventually, Windsor responded appropriately by requesting and obtaining a hearing before a federal district court to consider the issue. When the date for the hearing approached, he sought to reschedule the hearing so that he could attend telephonically. When the scheduled date for the rescheduled telephonic hearing was near, he unilaterally cancelled the hearing. As the district court found, the proceeding was not dismissed because it was moot, but was dismissed because the filing party asked that it be dismissed; thus leaving Windsor in the position he was in before the proceeding was dismissed, which is without the federal court's approval to file these proceedings.
And when the trial court and this Court were diligently trying to proceed to hear and consider and resolve his complaints, Windsor filed a petition for removal of the proceeding to South Dakota. Of course, the effort to remove his case to a federal court in another state was destined for failure because there is no legal basis for a plaintiff in a state court proceeding that selected the venue in the first instance to then remove it to federal court. Further, removal of a pending Texas state court proceeding to a South Dakota federal court is so unsupported by any legal authority and lacking in any legal basis that it can only have been intended for an improper purpose. Not to mention that by removing the proceeding to a federal district court, he was in direct violation of the previously mentioned federal filing injunction because he was re-entering a federal court by the removal petition and had not obtained the approval of a federal judge to do so.
By these two specific actions, as well as his many others, it is clear that Windsor has no regard for the proper and orderly administration of justice and is using the process to trifle with our patience and our jurisdiction, making a mockery of the judicial process. See Browning v. Ryan, 756 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Humble Exploration Co. v. Browning, 677 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Spence v. State National Bank, 5 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted). Accordingly, I would dismiss all four of these appeals.
While I note my dissent to the Court's order on the forgoing basis as to each appeal, I acknowledge the Court's order evidences that a majority of the justices do not believe we have yet reached the need to take that step as sanctions against Windsor. But Windsor would be well advised to take this as a notice that his actions have drawn the attention of the entire Court to the problems he has created and is, in fact, at least the second formal sanction by this Court that has been imposed against him in each of these proceedings.
Finally, I note that appellate case number 10-15-00092-CV should be dismissed because it was improperly filed as a separate proceeding when Windsor filed an unnecessary and superfluous notice of appeal. This is essentially the same problem Windsor created when he filed a notice of appeal resulting in the creation of a new proceeding which we previously dismissed. See Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, No. 10-15-00199-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7354 (App.—Waco July 16 2015, no pet.) (Appeal dismissed noting Windsor's efforts to mislead the court and the failure of Windsor to follow the court's instructions.)
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice Dissent to order issued and filed August 3, 2016