Opinion
2005-584 RIC.
Decided February 27, 2006.
Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Kathy J. King, J.), entered December 23, 2004. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against defendant S S Improvements, Inc., dismissed the complaint as against S S Improvements, Inc., and awarded summary judgment in favor of plaintiff as against defendants Alec Adler and Heather Adler in the sum of $5,418.75 only, plus interest from October 8, 1998, plus costs and disbursements.
Order, insofar as appealed from, modified, complaint reinstated as against S S Improvements, Inc., motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant S S Improvements, Inc. granted on the issue of liability, matter remanded to the court below for an assessment of damages as against S S Improvements, Inc. and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against defendants Alec Adler and Heather Adler granted in the sum of $5,928 plus interest from October 8, 1998; as so modified, affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON and BELEN, JJ
In the case at bar, there is no dispute as to the following facts: defendant S S Improvements, Inc. (S S), a home improvement contractor, ordered various windows together with other material from plaintiff in October, 1998, to be installed on defendants Adlers' residence. The materials were in fact delivered without defect and used for the purpose intended. The agreed upon price of the materials including delivery was $7,128.01, less a deposit of $1,200, leaving a balance due of $5,928.01. Plaintiff, having not received payment, placed a mechanic's lien on the Adlers' residence. Prior to the instant action, S S commenced an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County, against the Adlers for nonpayment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Adlers counterclaimed, inter alia, for breach of contract. The court (Leonard B. Austin, J.) resolved the matter by dismissing S S's complaint and awarding judgment in favor of the Adlers in the sum of $28,665.53, plus interest from March 19, 2002, the date of the judgment. In his decision, Justice Austin indicated that S S was obligated, pursuant to its contract with the Adlers, to supply windows to the Adlers and thus the judgment would include the sum of $7,720.96 (which included interest from October 8, 1998 in the sum of $1,792.96) as a result of the mechanic's lien that had been placed on the Adler's property due to the unpaid windows. The court deemed the failure to pay for the windows a breach of the contract by S S. The judgment was satisfied and the parties executed mutual releases.
The equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel is grounded in the facts and reality of a particular litigation, rather than rigid rules. Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity ( Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500). The policies underlying its application are avoiding relitigation of a decided issue and the possibility of an inconsistent result ( D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 NY2d 659, 664).
Two requirements must be met before collateral estoppel can be invoked. There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling ( see Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291). The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party, or one in privity with a party. The party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination ( see Buechel v. Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304).
The doctrine, however, is a flexible one, and the enumeration of these elements is intended merely as a framework, not a substitute, for a case by case analysis of the facts and realities ( Buechel v. Bain, 97 NY2d at 304). "In the end, the fundamental inquiry is whether relitigation should be permitted in a particular case in light of . . . fairness to the parties, conservation of the resources of the court and the litigants, and the societal interests in consistent and accurate results. No rigid rules are possible, because even these factors may vary in relative importance depending on the nature of the proceedings . . ." ( Staatsburg Water Co. v. Staatsburg Fire Dist., 72 NY2d 147, 153 [citations omitted]).
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, judgment determined the rights and obligations relative to the home improvement contract entered into between S S and the Adlers, including the windows and related building materials that form the basis of the instant litigation. S S is thereby collaterally estopped from claiming, as it does, that it ordered the windows from plaintiff (which it concedes it did) merely as an agent of the Adlers since the prior litigation conclusively established that S S was bound by contract to the Adlers to supply the windows and, thus, in any contract S S entered into to purchase windows, it was doing so as principal, not an agent, notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary. Accordingly, S S was obligated to pay plaintiff for the balance owed on the windows and its failure to do so renders it liable to plaintiff therefor. Since collateral estoppel can be invoked, either offensively or defensively by a non-party to the litigation, providing that the requirements for collateral estoppel (identity of issues and a full and fair opportunity to litigate) are met as to the party sought to be precluded ( see B.R. DeWitt v. Hall, 19 NY2d 141, 147-148), plaintiff's lack of privity with the Adlers does not preclude it from invoking the doctrine in support of its position that S S, in accordance with its contract with the Adlers, acted as a principal in the procurement of the windows. Although the Supreme Court judgment included in its award to the Adlers sufficient money to satisfy S S's obligation to the plaintiff herein, S S's obligation to Windowizards Inc. was not extinguished thereby. While we have concluded that S S is responsible to plaintiff for the cost of the materials, there remain issues of fact as to whether S S was made aware of, and agreed to, the terms set forth on the back of plaintiff's invoice as to nonpayment and, therefore, is chargeable with interest and attorney's fees under those terms.
As to the Adlers, who did not oppose plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, it is clear, as plaintiff contends on appeal, that the court made a computational error as to the balance due. Thus, the order as to the Adlers should be modified by providing that summary judgment be granted in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $5,928.