Opinion
24-CV-2875 (LTS)
05-28-2024
TESHA L. WINDLEY/EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. NYC DEPT. OF EDUCATON; SUSAN BARNES; ANDREA TUCCI, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed this complaint alleging that she was denied her “human right to work as a school counselor.” (ECF 1.) By order dated April 19, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Named as Defendants in this action are: (1) the New York City Department of Education; and (2) Susan Barnes and Andrea Tucci, who appear to be the principal and vice-principal of P.S. 112X, a public school in the Bronx where Plaintiff works as a teacher. (ECF 1.) Following are the factual allegations in Plaintiff's two-page complaint, regarding events occurring in September 2017 and September 2022. Plaintiff, who has a master's degree in school counseling, twice applied for open school counselor positions at P.S.112X; both times she was not hired, and individuals who did not already work at the school were hired. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her “human rights by denying [her] employment from a teacher to a school counselor,” and that human rights “are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex or religion or any other status.” Plaintiff does not assert any causes of action, and she does not specify the nature of the relief she seeks.
DISCUSSION
Federal antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), which may include the individual's race, color, sex, age, religion, or disability. Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against her, and (2) a protected trait, such as her race, color, sex, age, religion, or disability was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). As to the second element, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must also allege “that the relevant protected trait ‘was the ‘but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action.'” Mazzeo v. Mnuchin, 751 Fed.Appx. 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination,” which give rise to a “plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87.
Plaintiff alleges that, although she possessed all the qualifications to be hired as a school counselor, Defendants twice declined to hire her to work in that capacity. While not being hired may constitute an adverse employment action, Plaintiff does not provide facts showing that Defendants impermissibly discriminated against her on the basis of a protected characteristic such as her race, sex, age, religion, or disability. She also makes no allegations suggesting that she was not hired, or that she suffered some other type of adverse employment decision, because of a protected characteristic. Accordingly, the facts alleged do not comply with Rule 8 or give rise to a plausible claim of employment discrimination under any of the federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Hedges v. Town of Madison, 456 Fed.Appx. 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the plausibility standard to employment discrimination complaints and suggesting that “at a minimum, employment discrimination claims must meet the standard of pleading set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, even if pleading a prima facie case is not required”).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability' in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid employment discrimination complaint, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to provide more facts about her claims.In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
Attached to this order is an Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form, which contains information about the federal antidiscrimination statutes.
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
A plaintiff proceeding under Title VII or the ADA must commence a civil action within ninety days of receipt of notice of dismissal or termination of proceedings by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149 (1984). The law requires that individuals making an employment discrimination claim must exhaust their administrative remedies with the EEOC by filing a charge of discrimination within 300 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, 192 F.3d 322, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1999). The filing of a timely charge with the EEOC and the issuance of a “right to sue” letter or notice by the EEOC are conditions precedent to the filing of a civil action in federal court. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). Although Plaintiff is not required to plead and prove that she has met these requirements, see Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep't, 879 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that administrative exhaustion under Title VII is an affirmative defense and not a pleading requirement), a defendant may raise failure to exhaust as a defense that precludes relief on a complaint that states an otherwise viable federal discrimination claim. Plaintiff should provide information in the amended complaint about any steps she has taken to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-2875 (LTS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, this action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff may receive court documents by email by completing the attached form, Consent to Electronic Service.
If Plaintiff consents to receive documents by email, Plaintiff will no longer receive court documents by regular mail.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SERVICE
I hereby consent to receive electronic service of notices and documents in my case(s) listed below. I affirm that:
1. I have regular access to my e-mail account and to the internet and will check regularly for Notices of Electronic Filing;
2. I have established a PACER account;
3. I understand that electronic service is service under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 5.2 of the Local Civil Rules, and that I will no longer receive paper copies of case filings, including motions, decisions, orders, and other documents;
4. I will promptly notify the Court if there is any change in my personal data, such as name, address, or e-mail address, or if I wish to cancel this consent to electronic service;
5. I understand that I must regularly review the docket sheet of my case so that I do not miss a filing; and
6. I understand that this consent applies only to the cases listed below and that if I file additional cases in which I would like to receive electronic service of notices of documents, I must file consent forms for those cases.
Civil case(s) filed in the Southern District of New York:
ORDER
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