Opinion
No. 2-588 / 01-1783
Filed July 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L. Stigler, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's ruling granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Peterzalek of Gallagher, Langlas Gallagher, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant James Winder.
Michael Buckner of Ball, Kirk Holm, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant Todd Kerr.
Jason Walke of Gunderson, Sharp Rhein, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
The plaintiffs, James Winder and Todd Kerr, appeal from the district court's ruling granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Barbara Franck, as administrator of the estate of Everett Franck, and Barbara Franck individually, in this personal injury action. The plaintiffs contend the court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact remains as to (1) whether a sudden emergency, legal excuse, or an act of God was foreseeable, and (2) whether Everett Franck's heart attack while driving was foreseeable. We affirm.
The two plaintiffs in this case each filed petitions at law, resistances to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and appellate briefs. For the sake of clarity, and because the plaintiffs' claims and appellate arguments are essentially identical, we will refer to them as one entity for the sake of this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS.
Everett Franck had a family history of heart disease. He suffered his first heart attack in June 1998. After this attack, his doctors recommended he exercise, lose weight, lower his blood pressure, and lower his cholesterol. Everett complied with his doctors' recommendations, and he took medication to help control his risk factors for another heart attack. He indicated to his doctors on follow-up visits that he was symptom-free. His wife confirmed this. His doctors gave him medical clearance to drive. According to his two doctors, they were unaware of any forewarning Everett received that he would suffer another heart attack. They believed his later heart attack, which occurred on February 9, 1999, was an unpredictable event.
Everett was driving a vehicle on February 9, 1999 when he suffered another heart attack. He crossed the centerline of the highway a few minutes after noon and struck a vehicle being driven by Winder. Kerr was a passenger in Winder's vehicle. They were both injured. According to an autopsy report, Everett died from the heart attack prior to the accident. The report states that Everett's demise was "cardiac in nature." A medical examiner's report states that the probable cause of death was "[a]cute myocardial infarction," due to "[a]cute coronary occlusion." The medical examiner concluded Everett "was dead when the car swerved before the collision occurred." There is no substantial evidence suggesting his death occurred as a result of the collision, or occurred as a result of anything other than a sudden heart attack which caused him to lose control and swerve into oncoming traffic.
Winder and Kerr sued the defendants for negligence, claiming that Everett was negligent in several ways in the operation of his vehicle. They also alleged Everett was negligent in operating his vehicle when he knew or should have known doing so posed a danger to the motoring public, including the plaintiffs. The defendants filed an answer, alleging the affirmative defenses of legal excuse, sudden emergency, and an act of God.
The plaintiffs alleged both statutory and common-law negligence.
The defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging there was no evidence tending to show that the accident was caused by Everett's negligence. The district court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
We review a summary judgment ruling for the correction of errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; Hameed v. Brown, 530 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.981(3). On appeal, our task is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1995). We review the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa 2002).
III. MERITS.
A. Act of God.
The plaintiffs contend there is a genuine issue of material fact "as to whether a sudden emergency, legal excuse, or an act of God was foreseeable" by Everett. We note as a preliminary matter that the district court's ruling sustaining the defendants' motion for summary judgment does not indicate which one or more of the defenses the district court relied on. "[A]n act of God, as the term is known to the law, is such an unusual and extraordinary manifestation of the forces of nature that it could not under normal conditions have been anticipated or expected." Oakes v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 258 Iowa 447, 454, 138 N.W.2d 93, 98 (1965) (quoting 1 Am. Jur.2d, Act of God, § 3, at 678). We conclude the act of God defense has no application to the facts in this case. However, for the reasons that follow we conclude the district court nevertheless did not err in granting summary judgment.
B. Sudden Emergency and Legal Excuse.
The plaintiffs argue that the determination of whether a sudden emergency occurred should be submitted to the jury. They maintain a sudden emergency was not in fact created, asserting that if Franck had any warning and failed to act in a reasonable manner, or had even ten or fifteen seconds to react, a sudden emergency did not exist.
The sudden emergency doctrine excuses a defendant's failure to obey statutory law when confronted with an emergency not of the defendant's own making. Foster v. Ankrum, 636 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2001). The doctrine has independent significance in common law claims. Id. Sudden emergency has been defined as
(1) an unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action; (2) a perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances; (3) a sudden or unexpected occasion for action, exigency, pressing necessity.
Bangs v. Keifer, 174 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Iowa 1970). A sudden emergency requires an instantaneous response, or something fairly close. Foster, 636 N.W.2d at 106. A sudden heart attack may create a sudden emergency such that negligence resulting therefrom is excused. See Weiss v. Bal, 501 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Iowa 1993) (holding that the defense of sudden emergency should not have been submitted because the case did not involve a sudden emergency such as, among other things, a sudden heart attack). The burden to prove sudden emergency is upon the defendant. Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680, 685-86 (Iowa 1978).
We recognize that it is generally a question for the jury to decide whether a party was faced with a sudden emergency. Weiss, 501 N.W.2d at 481. However, in this case we determine the district court correctly concluded the defendants have shown there is no genuine issue of material fact on this defense, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, we affirm the district court on this issue.
Everett suffered a heart attack on February 9, 1999, which caused the accident injuring the plaintiffs. There is no evidence whatsoever that Everett's heart attack was foreseeable or that it was not sudden. He had been a symptomatic since his prior heart attack eight months earlier. He had followed his doctors' instructions to reduce his risk factors, and he had taken medication as directed. His doctors allowed him to drive.
Everett was seen before noon on February 9, 1999, at the county courthouse. The attendant who served him stated he was not in any distress, he was fully coherent and seemed fine, he did not say he felt poorly nor did he act like he felt poorly, and he left no impression that he was not well.
Furthermore, a passenger in a vehicle behind the plaintiffs at the time of the accident saw Everett. This witness stated, "Maroon car swerved quickly into the white van and hit it head on. It looked like the driver of the maroon car [Everett] either fell asleep or became incapacitated in some way."
The plaintiffs have argued that the accident occurred on the route to Everett's doctor's office. When Everett suffered his first heart attack, he had chest pain, and his wife took him to his doctor's office. Everett was then transferred to a hospital. The plaintiffs contend this evidence shows that Everett suffered symptoms prior to the second heart attack and he was on his way to his doctor's office. However, we note that Everett's wife indicated the accident occurred near their home, and to her understanding he was on his way home when the accident happened. The last person to see Everett alive, the attendant at the county courthouse, stated that Everett told her he was going home after he was done at the courthouse.
We note that the inference the plaintiffs want us to deduce from the evidence, that Everett was suffering a heart attack and knew it while operating his vehicle, is based on mere speculation and conjecture. We recognize that the court must also consider on behalf of the nonmoving party every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record. Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 717-18 (Iowa 2001). An inference is legitimate if it is "rational, reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law." Id. (quoting Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994)). On the other hand, an inference is not legitimate if it is "based upon speculation or conjecture." Id. The inferences the plaintiffs suggest from the evidence in this record are based on speculation and conjecture, and are thus not legitimate.
We conclude there is no genuine issue of material fact on the record presented herein concerning the fact that Everett suffered a sudden heart attack which caused him to cross the centerline of the highway and resulted in the accident. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the arguments by the plaintiffs concerning the affirmative defense of legal excuse. We affirm the trial court on this issue.
IV. NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiffs contend as a separate matter that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Everett's heart attack was foreseeable, and thus whether he acted reasonably in operating a motor vehicle on the day of the accident.
It is well-established that in order to prove a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed him or her a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty, defendant's breach was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Walls v. Jacob North Printing Co., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Iowa 2000). Negligence is matter of the relation between the parties which must be founded upon the foresee ability of harm to the injured person. Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (NY 1928)). Negligence cases, which are customarily fact driven, are seldom capable of summary adjudication. Walls, 618 N.W.2d at 284.
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Everett's February 9 heart attack was foreseeable or whether he acted reasonably in driving on that date. We refer to the unrefuted evidence discussed above, namely that Everett had not only been a symptomatic since his June 1998 heart attack, but also that as of his February 9, 1999 heart attack he had in all respects fully complied with his doctors' orders to reduce risk factors, his doctors had months earlier cleared him to drive, and his doctors believed his February 9 heart attack was unpredictable. Everett did not act unreasonably in driving, nor was his heart attack foreseeable. We affirm the trial court on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We conclude the trial court correctly ruled in the defendants' favor that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning the defense of sudden emergency or concerning whether Everett was negligent by driving on February 9, 1999. We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.