Opinion
21015.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 15, 1960.
DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 1960.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Andrews. June 22, 1960.
Wm. T. Brooks, for plaintiff in error.
Paul Webb, Solicitor-General, John W. Walton, Eugene L. Tiller, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Rubye G. Jackson, Assistant Attorney-General, contra.
The verdict was authorized by the evidence, and no error is shown in the denial of the motion for new trial as amended.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 15, 1960 — DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 1960.
Oscar James Wimis was convicted of murder without a recommendation of mercy. His motion for new trial on the general grounds, which was amended by the addition of three special grounds, was denied, and the exception is to this judgment.
The deceased was a storekeeper, and his death was caused by multiple head injuries. The defendant was identified by two persons, who testified that they saw him come out of the store of the deceased on the morning of the homicide. A police officer testified that the defendant in his presence admitted the homicide, such admission containing no circumstances of justification. This officer testified that a written statement giving a similar account of the homicide was read to the defendant (who could not read), and was acknowledged by him to be true; and this statement was read in evidence. Certain circumstantial evidence was introduced, connecting the defendant with the homicide.
In his statement to the jury, the defendant said that he went into the store to pay the deceased a part of $5 that he owed him; that the deceased told him that he would not get out get out of there alive, and the deceased put his hand on his apron; that he did not know what the deceased had, and he hit the deceased.
1. The first special ground of the motion for new trial contends that it was error to admit the testimony of J. W. Moore, offered by the State as an expert witness for the purpose of comparison of finger prints of the defendant with those found on a broken bottle, over the objection that this witness was not qualified as an expert to compare fingerprints.
This witness was thoroughly examined as to his qualifications, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the witness to testify as an expert on the subject of the comparison of fingerprints. See Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717 (9) ( 59 S.E. 816); Carter v. Marble Products, 179 Ga. 122, 124 ( 175 S.E. 480).
2. Ground 2 asserts that the following evidence was illegally admitted to the jury: "A certain brown bag and its contents identified as State's Exhibit No. 18." The objection to this evidence was that it had not been connected up by competent witnesses, and the contents of the bag were unknown.
This ground is without merit, since the record discloses that the paper sack introduced in evidence as Exhibit No. 18 contained pieces of a pair of glasses and several pieces of a broken Coca-Cola bottle, and that these pieces were found under and near the body of the deceased on the investigation of the homicide.
3. In ground 3, it is contended that the court erred in admitting the testimony of H. N. Shelton to identify stains on an exhibit offered by the State to determine whether the stains were blood. The objection to this testimony was that this witness had not qualified as an expert.
An examination of the testimony of this witness shows that he did not attempt to give a scientific opinion that the stains appearing on a piece of wood found at the scene of the homicide were blood, but merely gave his opinion from observing the object, and a nonexpert witness may give such an opinion. Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460 (4).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.