Opinion
No. CV 08 5007175 S
November 6, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (104.00)
Prior Proceedings
The plaintiff, Wilton Meadows Limited Partnership, filed a complaint dated April 10, 2008, alleging in a single count that in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-37(b), the defendant, Sally Coratolo is responsible, and liable to the plaintiff, for the care and services provided to her husband, Carmen Coratolo, while he was a resident in the plaintiff's facility.
The plaintiff is a licensed chronic care and convalescent facility which provides its residents with care and services, including but not limited to, convalescent care, assistance with daily living activities, rehabilitation, general nursing care, room and board, meals and administration of prescription medication. The complaint alleges that on or about August 14, 2006, Carmen Coratolo executed a resident admissions agreement through the defendant, Sally Coratolo, as his agent and attorney in fact, in which he became a resident of the plaintiff's facility, and agreed to pay for said care and services. The plaintiff proceeded to provide Carmen Coratolo with care beginning August 14, 2006, and continuing through October 10, 2007. Carmen Coratolo was not granted Medicaid benefits until March 8, 2007, meaning that he did not have insurance coverage or Medicaid benefits between August 14, 2006 and March 7, 2007. Mr. Coratolo died on October 25, 2007.
The plaintiff alleges that Carmen Coratolo failed to pay for his care and defaulted in his obligations under the resident admissions agreement. As a result of the default, it is alleged that the outstanding principal balance due is $60,795.32. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant, as the decedent resident's spouse, had a statutory duty to support her husband according to General Statutes § 45b-37(b) and is liable to the plaintiff under that statute for the care and services that went to support her family.
The defendant answered the complaint on June 17, 2008 and denied she had any obligation to pay the claimed sum. On June 20, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that § 46b-37(b) does not provide spousal liability for nursing home expenses and, thus, the plaintiff cannot recover the cost of care from the decedent resident's spouse. On July 29, 2008, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment, and subsequently the defendant filed a reply memorandum. The parties were heard at oral argument on September 15, 2008.
Standard of Review
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209 (2000). Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751 (1995). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law." Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 209. "A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379 (1969). The trial court, in the context of a summary judgment motion, may not decide issues of material fact, but only determine whether such genuine issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500 (1998).
"Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact [question] . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue." Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 554 (1998). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Appleton v. Board of Education, supra, 254 Conn. 209.
Discussion
The defendant Coratolo contends that General Statutes § 46b-37(b) does not impose an obligation on her to pay her husband's debt to Wilton Meadows. The plaintiff responds that Coratolo's interpretation of the statute is incorrect. Moreover, the plaintiff further contends that summary judgment is improper because there are unresolved material facts and because the defendant has waived her right to attack the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and summary judgment is inappropriate because it does not give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. The court will decide these contentions in the appropriate order.
A. The Absence of Unresolved Material Fact
Wilton Meadows contends that unresolved material facts exist which preclude a grant of summary judgment. In its objection Wilton Meadows specifies the material facts at issue to be (1) whether it provided "care and services" required for Carmen Coratolo's well-being, (2) whether Sally Coratolo would have had to arrange to provide such care and services if the plaintiff had not, (3) whether Sally Coratolo was Carmen's spouse and (4) whether the plaintiff's care and services went to benefit Sally Coratolo or support her family.
The court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact because, if the first three fact issues identified by the plaintiff were found in the plaintiff's favor, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is still warranted. Thus, if it were established by a fact finder that (1) the plaintiff rendered care and services to Carmen, (2) in the absence of such, Sally would have had to provide similar services, and (3) that Sally was Carmen's spouse, the result of this motion would remain the same, and this is because the plaintiff has not correctly interpreted General Statutes § 46-37(b) as discussed below. The fourth "fact" is really a question of law. For the reasons stated in the next section, the types of care and services provided by the plaintiff as set forth in its complaint do not fall within the meaning of articles purchased by Coratolo for which Mrs. Coratolo may be held liable under the statute.
B. The Statute
General Statute § 46b-37(b) is the sole basis for Wilton Meadows' claim in this case. That statute reads in pertinent part: ". . . it shall be the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be liable for: (1) The reasonable and necessary services of a physician or dentist; (2) hospital expenses rendered the husband or wife or minor child while residing in the family of his or her parents; (3) the rental of any dwelling unit actually occupied by the husband and wife as a residence and reasonably necessary to them for that purpose; and (4) any article purchased by either which has in fact gone to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both."
In Yale University School of Medicine v. Collier, 206 Conn. 31 (1988), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that Section 46b-37(b) should be strictly construed and not enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of construction because it is in derogation of the common law and creates liability where formerly none existed. Id., 36-37. Further, "cases that have considered the applicability of § 46b-37(b) have held that the statute must be strictly construed and not expanded any further than what the legislature intended." Bochicchio v. Porzio Law Offices, LLC, Superior Court, Judicial District of Litchfield, CV 06 4004491 (August 2, 2006, Pickard, J.) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 748].
A number of Superior Court decisions have rejected claims made by entities similar to Wilton Meadows under Section 46b-37(b). In Medstar, Inc. v. DiCarlo, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, CV 96 0134469 (September 30, 1996, Vertefeuille, J.) [ 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 638], an action against a husband and wife seeking to collect for ambulance services rendered to the husband, the wife's motion to strike based on the argument that Section 46b-37(b) did not impose liability on the wife for such services was granted on the ground that ambulance services were not included as a recoverable expense under the statute.
In Olympus Healthcare Group, Inc. v. Fazo, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, CV 02 173524 (July 31, 2003, Gallagher, J.) [ 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 249], the court was faced with the question of whether the plaintiff, as a residential nursing facility, could recover from the defendant for the care and services it provided her husband under Section 46b-37(b). The plaintiff argued that nursing home expenses are included within the meaning of "hospital expenses" and, therefore, the defendant was liable under § 46b-37(b). The court rejected the plaintiff's argument and stated that "a review of the statute reveals that the legislature was very specific in identifying the types of doctors, both physicians and dentists, and the type of expenses, in this case hospital expenses, that are covered under § 46b-37 . . . Moreover, a review of other statutory language reveals that the legislature utilizes the terms medical and/or hospital expenses in connection with each other . . . [and] the legislature specifically states only hospital and not medical and/or hospital expenses are covered under § 46b-37(b)." Id.
Recently, a Superior Court has held, applying a narrow interpretation of the statute, that Section 46b-37(b) does not provide that spouses are not liable for the nursing home expenses of the other spouse. Abbott Terrace Health Center Inc. v. Joyce, Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, CV 07 5005081 (May 5, 2008, Roche, J.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 432].
The plaintiff has pointed to the case of Jewish Home for the Aged v. Nuterangelo, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, CV 04 0489608 (December 10, 2004, Devlin, J.) [ 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 408], in support of their contention that Section 46b-37(b)(4) provides a statutory basis for its claim. In that case the court denied a motion to strike a count alleging liability of a wife for services that "have gone to the support of the family." Judge Devlin said "[c]onstrued in favor of the plaintiff, this count states a legally sufficient cause of action under the statute."
In its complaint Wilton Meadows alleges that it provided Carmen Coratolo with "care and services" defined as "assistance with daily living activities, general nursing care, meals, room and board, the administration of medication." Complaint ¶¶ 3, 7. It contends "Sally Coratolo as his wife would have had to make arrangements to provide care for him in their home and elsewhere, and as such, the care and services provided by the plaintiff were necessary for the support of her family." Id., ¶ 8.
In interpreting a statute General Statutes § 1-2z directs first consideration to the text of the statute itself and its relationship with other statutes. In this consideration, if the meaning is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, the statute should be applied in accordance with its language. The court is also mindful of the admonition noted earlier in Yale University School of Medicine v. Collier, supra, that the scope of Section 46b-37(b) should not be enlarged by the "mechanics of construction." 206 Conn. 31, 37.
The court concludes that the language of Section 46b-37(b) is plain and unambiguous and its provisions do not yield unworkable or absurd results. Specifically, Section 46b-37(b)(4), the provision relied on by Wilton Meadows, deals with "articles purchased" by a spouse which have "in fact gone to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both." For the most part the "care and services" supplied by Wilton Meadows were just that, and were not "articles." The assistance with daily living, the nursing care, the room, the administration of medicine do not easily fall within the meaning of "article." Other items included within the plaintiff's definition of care and services such as food and the actual medicine itself, might be considered "articles" but most certainly went only to the support of Carmen Coratolo and not to the support of the Coratolo family or Sally Coratolo. Food and medicines specially prepared for, and ingested by, one individual cannot logically be interpreted as articles which go to the support of, or benefit, another without vastly expanding the meaning of the statute in contravention of the thrust of Yale School of Medicine. The court interprets the types of articles referred to in Section 46b-37(b)(4) to consist of items readily shared or jointly used such as automobiles, home furnishings and the like. The fact that Sally Coratolo or her family may have been spared the expense or difficulty of caring for Carmen Coratolo because of the services provided by Wilton Meadows, is not by itself sufficient to qualify them as liabilities of Sally Coratolo pursuant to the language of Section 46b-37(b)(4).
C. Summary Judgment
Wilton Meadows contends that a grant of summary judgment is improvident in this case because it unfairly prevents it from repleading its cause of action. In Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394 (2005), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that it is appropriate to render judgment when a complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defect cannot be cured by repleading. Id., 401-02. In this case the plaintiff's cause of action is based entirely on Section 46b-37(b), primarily subsection (b)(4). For the reasons stated above, that statute does not support the claim that Sally Coratolo is liable to Wilton Meadow. Therefore, amending or repleading that cause of action is fruitless, and summary judgment is appropriate. There may be other causes of action available, but not the cause of action pleaded here.
Conclusion
The motion for summary judgment is granted.