"It, therefore, goes without saying that a trial before a biased or prejudiced fact finder is a denial of due process." Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 819-20 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994). Moreover, public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded if litigants were forced to have their cases heard by someone other than an impartial fact-finder.
Further, "[b]ias or prejudice in the disqualifying sense must stem from an extrajudicial source and not from what the judge hears or sees during the trial." Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)).Vannucci v. Memphis Obstetrics & Gynecological Ass'n, P.C., No. W2005-00725-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 1896379, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2006).
Indeed, "it goes without saying that a trial before a biased or prejudiced fact finder is a denial of due process." Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, judges must conduct themselves "at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" and "shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism."
In fact, "`it goes without saying that a trial before a biased or prejudiced fact finder is a denial of due process.'" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998)). Judges must always act "`in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary' and `shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.'"
If the rule were otherwise, recusal would be required as a matter of course since trial courts necessarily rule against parties and witnesses in every case, and litigants could manipulate the impartially issue for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon.Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 565 (emphasis added); seeWilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) ("Bias or prejudice in the disqualifying sense must stem from an extrajudicial source and not from what the judge hears or sees during the trial.") (citations omitted). Husband asserts that the following remarks — ones that were made by the Chancellor in his opinion from the bench — were inappropriate and justified his recusal:
(emphasis added). Mrs. Hogue relies heavily on Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) to argue that the rule applicable to domestic restraining orders affords trial judges broad discretion as to specificity and, therefore, the restraining order is enforceable. In Wilson the mother, Dr. Oakley, was restrained from attempting to alienate the affections of the child to the father in any manner.
A trial before a biased or prejudiced fact finder is considered a denial of due process. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). Rule 10, Canon 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court requires a judge to recuse himself or herself "in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . ."
Id. See also Eldridge v. Eldridge, No. W2000-00730-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1838145, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug 8, 2002) (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998)). This Court will not allow parties to gain procedural advantage by silently preserving a prejudicial event as an "ace-in-the-hole" to be used in the event of an adverse decision.
The "objective view" of a judge's conduct is characterized by two important limitations. Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). In order to disqualify a judge, the bias or prejudice must come from an extrajudicial source and not result from the judge's impressions during trial.
This Court has interpreted the above-quoted language in Rule 65.07 as permitting wide discretion by a Trial Court when issuing temporary restraining orders in domestic relations cases. In Wilson v. Wilson, 987 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998), we observed: After laying down rules about restraining orders and temporary injunctions and providing certain procedural safeguards, Rule 65, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. then provides that the procedural safeguards may be ignored in domestic relations cases if the trial court deems it just and proper to do so.