Opinion
24A-DR-1285
12-13-2024
Amanda L. Wilson, Appellant-Petitioner v. Elizabeth A. Wilson, Appellee-Respondent
APPELLANT PRO SE Amanda Wilson.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court The Honorable Dakota VanLeeuwen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 55D01-1507-DR-001246.
APPELLANT PRO SE Amanda Wilson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Eight years after Amanda and Elizabeth Wilson divorced, Elizabeth filed a motion to set aside their divorce decree in an effort to add E.W. (the "Child") as a child of the marriage. The Child was born during the marriage and was approximately four years old when the marriage ended; however, the parties did not include the Child as a child of the marriage in any of the divorce paperwork. After a hearing, the trial court granted Elizabeth's motion and modified the divorce decree to determine that the Child is a child of both Amanda and Elizabeth. Amanda now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by granting Elizabeth's motion.
[¶2] Because Amanda's significant noncompliance with the Indiana Appellate Rules substantially impedes our review of her claim, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In September 2008, the parties married in California before returning home to Indiana. In October 2010, Amanda gave birth to the Child. Amanda, Elizabeth, and the Child resided together as a family in Indiana until Amanda and Elizabeth separated in February 2015. On July 17, 2015, Amanda filed for divorce. On September 23, 2015, the parties signed a property settlement agreement, and two days later, the trial court issued a divorce decree. The Child was not listed as a child of the marriage in the petition, the settlement agreement, or the decree.
[¶4] From September 2015 until the fall of 2023, the parties financially supported, co-parented, and shared responsibilities for the Child. In the fall of 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services removed the Child from Amanda's care and placed her in Elizabeth's care. During this process, Elizabeth learned that she had not "preserve[d] her parental rights in regard to [the Child]" when the Child was not included in the divorce decree, Appellant's App. Vol. II at 8, so on October 3, 2023, she filed a motion pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8)seeking to amend the divorce decree to establish the Child as a child of the marriage. After a hearing, the trial court granted Elizabeth's motion and ordered that the Child is the child of both Amanda and Elizabeth. This appeal ensued.
This opinion should not in any way be read to establish the accuracy of this legal conclusion. The issue of whether a parent forfeits one's rights by not including a child in a settlement agreement or divorce decree is not ripe for our review here and we do not address it on its merits.
"On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . for . . . any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment ...."
Amanda fails to include in the appendix the chronological case summary for Cause 55D01-1507-DR-001246, Elizabeth's Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion, and other documents that would likely be necessary for resolution of the merits of the issue presented on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A).
Discussion and Decision
Amanda Has Waived Appellate Review of Her Claim by Failing to Substantially Comply with the Appellate Rules
[¶5] Amanda argues the trial court erred by granting Elizabeth's Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion. However, we cannot address this claim due to Amanda's significant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is "sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised," we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).
Amanda's decision to proceed pro se does not loosen the requirements of Appellate Rule 46. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (citing In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014)) ("A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being selfrepresented.").
[¶6] The purpose of our appellate rules-especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs-"is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case." Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021)). For instance, statements of fact in the Statement of Case, Statement of Facts, and Argument must be supported by citations to the record. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), (6)(a), (8)(a). The party's argument must also be supported by cogent reasoning. Id. 46(A)(8)(a). "We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, 'nor will we address arguments' that are 'too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.'" Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).
[¶7] Amanda fails to support nearly all the statements of fact in her brief with citations to the record, and she fails to support her argument with cogent reasoning. In fact, the substance of Amanda's argument is just five sentences:
In the case at bar, the trial court found that [Elizabeth] should have parental rights due to the arrangement that [Amanda] and [Elizabeth] had to allow [the Child] to have relationship with [Elizabeth]. This was a casual relationship in which [Amanda] preserved the relationship between [Elizabeth] and [the Child] to provide additional love and support to the child. [Amanda] simply allowed their child to have relationships with other adults that love them.
[Elizabeth] made no attempts to secure their position as a legal parent, but rather, was content to serve as a support to the child and openly enjoyed the relationship they shared as an adult loving a child not biologically or legally related to them.Appellant's Br. at 8-9. Not only is this argument not sufficiently cogent to challenge the trial court's decision, but it also amounts to an improper request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we could not do even if we considered the merits here, see Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011)).
[¶8] We recognize the importance to the parties of the trial court's decision to grant Elizabeth's Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion. We also recognize the trial court's order presents significant legal questions, both substantively and procedurally. However, because of the deficient briefing in this case, we cannot rule on any of the myriad potential issues without identifying those issues ourselves and becoming advocates for the parties. We therefore conclude that Amanda has waived appellate review of her claim and affirm the trial court.
[¶9] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.