Opinion
No. 05-06-00069-CR.
Opinion Filed December 12, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-41226-QY. AFFIRM
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and MAZZANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Demarcus Darrell Wilson appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. After appellant pleaded guilty before the jury, it assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement. In three issues, appellant contends (1) his plea was involuntarily entered, (2) the trial court failed to admonish him regarding the deportation consequences of his plea, and (3) the trial court erred by sustaining the State's objection to certain jury argument. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment. In his first issue, appellant contends his plea was involuntarily entered because he was unaware of the likely consequences of his plea. Appellant maintains that the record supports his claim because "he so openly pursued probation at the expense of seeking a lighter prison sentence." After reviewing the record, we cannot agree. Before entering his plea, appellant acknowledged the range of punishment was "five to 99 years or life, and a fine not to exceed $10,000" and that he was "eligible" for probation. Additionally, appellant's attorney told the jury in his opening statement that appellant was seeking probation but if the jury could not "find it in your heart to give him that, I will have to understand that and [appellant] will have to accept that. But at the same time, if [appellant] serves some time, we're hoping that this jury gives him a shorter period of time to make up for the mistake that he has made." Thus, contrary to appellant's claim, the record shows appellant sought a probated sentence, but was aware he might not receive such a sentence. The mere fact that appellant may have received a higher punishment than he anticipated or hoped does not render his guilty plea involuntary. Thomas v. State, 2 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding appellant's plea, we cannot conclude appellant was unaware of the consequences of his plea or that he was misled into pleading guilty. We overrule appellant's first issue. In his second issue, appellant contends we must reverse his conviction because the trial court failed to admonish him regarding the deportation consequences of his plea. Again, we cannot agree. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court shall admonish a defendant of, among other things, the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2006). A trial court errs if it accepts a defendant's guilty plea without admonishing him regarding the deportation consequences of his plea in accordance with article 26.13. See Carranza v. State, 980 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Here, the records do not show appellant was admonished regarding the possibility of deportation. Thus, the trial court erred. See id. However, when the record conclusively shows that an appellant is a United States citizen, any error in failing to give the deportation admonishment is harmless. Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Splawn v. State, 949 S.W.2d 867, 876 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.). The record in this case contains State's Exhibit four, a fingerprint card from a previous arrest. The fingerprint card lists appellant's place of birth as Texas and citizenship as "U.S." Thus, the record affirmatively shows appellant is a United States citizen, and the trial court's error in failing to admonish appellant of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea is harmless. We overrule appellant's second issue. In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court denied appellant his "right to counsel when it sustained the State's objection to his trial counsel's proper jury argument." Specifically, appellant maintains the trial court should have allowed the following argument: "There has been a lot of talk about [appellant] being raised in a good suburban home and that he was sheltered and everybody tried to do everything they could for him, and I understand that. But at the same time, I will tell you how I was able to make it is because I understood what the streets were because I grew up in them." The trial court sustained the State's objection to "improper argument." Appellant did not in any way complain to the trial court that by sustaining the State's objection, the trial court was denying appellant his right to counsel. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude appellant has preserved error for our review. Cf. Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (appellant preserved his complaint that the trial court violated his right to counsel by objecting after trial court summarily denied appellant's request for closing argument). We overrule appellant's third issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.