Wilson v. State

Full title: MINOR LEE WILSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jul 11, 2006

Nos. 05-05-01100-CR, 05-05-01101-CR, 05-05-01102-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 11, 2006)

Opinion

Nos. 05-05-01100-CR, 05-05-01101-CR, 05-05-01102-CR

Opinion Filed July 11, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-41618-V, F04-40487-V, F04-40492-V. Affirmed.

Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and LANG.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice MOSELEY.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Minor Lee Wilson pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. He also pled not guilty to two counts of robbery, alleged to have occurred on October 30, 2003 and November 19, 2003. He was convicted on the robbery counts after a bench trial. The trial court then sentenced Wilson to twenty years' confinement in the aggravated robbery case,¹ and ten years' confinement in the two robbery cases. Wilson appeals, asserting three issues. In his first two issues, he complains the trial court erred in admitting his written confession in the robbery cases because it was involuntary. In his third issue, he contends his guilty plea in the aggravated robbery case was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm.

II. Motion to Suppress the Confession A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence by giving almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and reviewing de novo the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, we assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the record that buttress its conclusion, and we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. at 327-28 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole and exclusive trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). If an appellant's statement was involuntarily obtained, it is error to admit either the statement or evidence obtained from it at trial. Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).

B. Discussion

In his first and second issues, Wilson alleges his motion to suppress his written confession was improperly denied because it was involuntary and therefore, a violation of due process. In order for a confession to be properly admitted, it must be voluntary. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (en banc). The inquiry under the voluntariness standard to determine whether or not due process is violated must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 2. Once the defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the State carries the burden of proving the confession was given voluntarily. Griffin, 765 S.W.2d at 430. Voluntariness may be established by the preponderance of evidence. Id. at 429. There is evidence in the record that Wilson voluntarily spoke to Officer Henley about the robbery offenses. He was not intoxicated or under the influence of any drugs and was properly read his Miranda rights. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005). Wilson gave an oral confession, and at Henley's request, a written confession; the written confession was entered into evidence at trial. Wilson now contends that this confession was involuntary because Henley failed to correctly write out his confession and coerced him into signing it. At trial, Henley stated he wrote the confession word-for-word as dictated by Wilson. After taking down his confession, Henley read the statement back to Wilson to allow him the opportunity to change or add to his written confession. Wilson availed himself of this opportunity by initialing changes in the written statement. Wilson finally signed the written statement and wrote "Inv [sic] Hanley read this to me and there is nothing else I wish to add." Henley testified that Wilson signed the statement "freely and voluntarily." After all the relevant testimony was presented regarding Wilson's motion to suppress, the trial court ruled:

All right, I find that the defendant was in custody, that this was custodial interrogation. The Court finds that the Miranda warnings were read by the detective to the defendant and the defendant did understand his rights, that he freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, that it's a valid custodial interrogation. After the defendant was properly given his Miranda warnings, he properly waived them, and that the statement is admissible.

Wilson asserts that (1) he trusted Henley to correctly write down his statement, (2) Henley failed to do so, and (3) Wilson failed to read the written confession. However, the record indicates Wilson signed the written confession, wrote a brief statement at the end of his written confession, and initialed changes to the written confession. Furthermore, upon appellate review, "[t]he trial judge is the trier of fact at a hearing on the voluntariness of a confession. He is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be afforded their testimony." Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). We find that the record amply supports the trial court's ruling to admit the written confession, and thus we resolve Wilson's first and second issues against him.

III. Appellant's Guilty Plea

Wilson's third issue contends his plea of guilty to the aggravated robbery charge was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to his lack of understanding the nature of the charge against him. More specifically, Wilson argues his testimony at the punishment hearing indicates he did not understand the "deadly weapon" element of an aggravated robbery charge, thereby putting into question the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Several weeks after the trial court accepted his guilty plea, Wilson testified at the punishment hearing that he had a small rock instead of a brick as alleged in the indictment, but that whatever it was it was a weapon and that made it aggravated robbery. Wilson, however, did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea; instead, he affirmed his guilt, "Whatever it is, its aggravated robbery. And I know that I'm guilty of it so that's why I plead guilty." He did not file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, or object to proceeding on the guilty plea. Nor did he file a motion for new trial challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Wilson raises his complaint about the voluntariness of his guilty plea for the first time on appeal. Except for two relatively small categories of errors, a timely and specific objection, motion, or complaint and a ruling by the trial court are required to preserve a complaint for appellate review. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a); Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (only violations of "rights which are waivable only" and denials of "absolute systemic requirements" may be raised for first time on appeal). In similar cases where evidence raising a defense or inconsistent with guilt has been admitted following a guilty plea, the court of criminal appeals has concluded that complaints about the proceedings could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350; Aldrich, 104 S.W.3d at 895. The court concluded a trial court has no duty to conduct some special proceeding or to sua sponte withdraw a guilty plea when evidence inconsistent with guilt is introduced. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350; Aldrich, 104 S.W.3d at 895. Like the appellant in Mendez, Wilson does not argue there was error in the proceedings leading up to, and including, his guilty plea. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350. He was admonished of his constitutional and statutory rights both in writing and orally by the trial court at the plea hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 2005). This was a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the burden shifted to Wilson to show that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea, such that he suffered harm. Mallet v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet ref'd). Although Wilson does not argue the trial court should have sua sponte withdrawn his guilty plea or conducted some other proceeding, his claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary based on his testimony at the punishment hearing may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350 ("It is reasonable to put on such a defendant the requirement of timely seeking, in one way or another, to withdraw the plea of guilty."). Moreover, Wilson waived his right to a jury trial and the trial court after hearing the punishment evidence found him guilty as he pleaded. Thus the trial court fulfilled its role of deciding based on the evidence "that a guilty-pleading defendant was guilty as he pleaded, guilty of a lesser included offense, or not guilty." Aldrich, 104 S.W.3d at 894. We resolve Wilson's third issue against him.

Conclusion

We conclude the trial court properly admitted Wilson's written confession. We also conclude that Wilson's complaint about his guilty plea may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus we affirm the trial court's judgments.