According to Palmer, he preserved this issue by expressing a reservation of objections at the charge conference, but this reservation could not encompass objections to the charge as subsequently given. See Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58(6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471(1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997). At the conclusion of the jury instructions, the trial court affirmatively inquired whether Palmer had any objections to the charges "at this time."

In any event, the detective did not comment on defendant's right to remain silent; he merely related the substance of a conversation he had with defendant's mother. See Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 57 (4) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Thomas v. State, 257 Ga. 24, 25 (3) ( 354 S.E.2d 148) (1987). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Even assuming that counsel's objection at the charge conference did not otherwise preserve the matter for appellate review, we find the error in the charge to be substantial and harmful as a matter of law. Compare Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58 (6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989) Dooley v. State, 221 Ga. App. 245, 246 (3) ( 470 S.E.2d 803) (1996). O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24 (c).

The second enumeration is that the trial court erred in denying Bright's motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's opening statement in which he alluded to the child molestation charges. Not only was no objection made by Bright at the time of this allusion, leaving this claimed error not properly preserved for our review, Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 57(4) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989), but Bright also repeatedly referred to the child molestation charges. We do not recognize induced error.

So the possible issue was not preserved for appellate review. Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 57 (4) ( 376 S.E.2d 676)(1989); Brewer v. State, 219 Ga. App. 16, 19 (4) ( 463 S.E.2d 906)(1995). The trial court is not required to take action sua sponte when such evidence emerges. Newton v. State, 226 Ga. App. 501, 502 (1) ( 486 S.E.2d 715) (1997).

Brown v. Sims, 174 Ga. App. 243, 244 (2) ( 329 S.E.2d 523) (1985); Mack v. Barnes, 128 Ga. App. 328, 329-330 (2) ( 196 S.E.2d 684) (1973); see Rice v. Rumph, 171 Ga. App. 301 ( 319 S.E.2d 125) (1984). In order to preserve the issue, the Smiths were required to renew their objection to the court's refusal to give the requested charge after the court instructed the jury, but they did not. See Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58 (6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Whelchel v. Thomas Ford Tractor, 190 Ga. App. 156 ( 378 S.E.2d 510) (1989). Accordingly, the objection was not preserved for our review.

The circumstantial evidence charge under OCGA § 24-4-6 was not given. However, appellant expressly waived the right to raise this issue on appeal by failing to object to the charges and in not expressly reserving the right to raise objections later, even though the trial court specifically solicited objections from trial counsel following the jury instructions; defense counsel responded "No, your Honor," notwithstanding that his request on circumstantial evidence had been denied. Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58 (6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 298 (7) ( 298 S.E.2d 10) (1982); Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459, 460 ( 271 S.E.2d 855) (1980). Therefore, appellant's allegations regarding the jury charge on circumstantial evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-6 will not be considered.

The rule has been applied where, as here, the court rejects requests to charge. Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58 (6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Seidel v. State, 197 Ga. App. 14, 15 (2) ( 397 S.E.2d 480) (1990); Spivey v. State, 193 Ga. App. 127, 131 (3) ( 386 S.E.2d 868) (1989). That stands to reason because, after a request is rejected without exception and after the whole charge is actually given and counsel affirmatively indicates no objection to it, there is nothing to preserve the point.

Moreover, the interest protected is the right of an accused to remain silent and not have that silence used against him at trial. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290-292 ( 106 SC 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623) (1986); see Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 57-58 (4) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989). Since appellant did not choose to remain silent, but instead gave a statement to police, we find no reversible error in the admission of the testimony at issue, especially given that no objection was made below, Wilson, supra at 58 (4), and that the prosecution did not use appellant's conduct or statements regarding counsel against him. Compare Wainwright, supra at 286-287.