Opinion
C. A. 3:21-1495-JFA-KDW
06-16-2021
Alexander Bernard Wilson, Jr., Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAYMANI D. WEST FLORENCE, SOUTH CAROLINA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Alexander Bernard Wilson, Jr (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is an inmate incarcerated at Kirkland Correctional Institution. He filed this action against the State of South Carolina seeking monetary damages alleging he is falsely imprisoned on a double-murder conviction. Compl., ECF No. 1-3. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by citizens against non-consenting states brought either in state or federal court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Such immunity extends to arms of the state, including a state's agencies, instrumentalities, and employees. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment also bars this court from granting injunctive relief against the state or its agencies. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Seminole Tribe of Flo., 517 U.S. at 58. While sovereign immunity does not bar suit where a state has given consent to be sued, or where Congress abrogates the sovereign immunity of a state, neither of those exceptions applies in the instant case. As the State of South Carolina is immune from Plaintiff's claim for damages, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Complaint be summarily dismissed.
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979) (holding that Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (stating that South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court).
2. Heck bars Plaintiff's claims related to his conviction and sentence
Plaintiff's claims concerning his alleged false imprisonment are barred by the holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87. In addressing a damages claim, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). The preclusive rule in Heck likewise bars declaratory and injunctive relief if a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (Heck bars declaratory judgment action challenging validity of state criminal conviction); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying Heck to claims for injunctive relief), abrogated on other grounds by Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 12981300 (2011).
Judgment in Plaintiff's favor on his false imprisonment claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his murder conviction. Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate or allege he has successfully challenged his conviction, Heck bars his claim. The undersigned recommends these claims be summarily dismissed.
3. Futility
The undersigned finds Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in his Complaint by amendment. Plaintiff has not shown he has successfully challenged his conviction, accordingly, any amendment would be futile.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).