Opinion
Civil Action No. AW-99-3202.
February 23, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed an opposition, and the motion is ripe for resolution. No hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.). Upon careful consideration of the parties' arguments, for the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Wilson was hired to work as a Sales Representative of Schuco Homecraft, L.P. ("Schuco"). Defendants requested that Plaintiff provide a social security number ("SSN") as a condition of employment. Plaintiff refused to provide such information, and in a "Statement of Citizenship and Residence" notified Defendants that there was no legal or statutory requirement that Defendants demand a social security number, but only that they were required to ask employees for one. According to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he was terminated "on or about February 3, 1999." Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at ¶ 2. By letter, Defendants notified Wilson that he would not be allowed to continue as a Sales Representative because all new hires must provide their social security number. On April 5, 1999, Plaintiff sent a letter to General Manager John Cherubim which identified his reasons for noncompliance as "religious or other reasons." See Exhibit D of Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff asserts that his termination amounts to discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq ("Title VII").
Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him when they terminated his employment because he refused to provide and maintain a social security number. Plaintiff claims that his religious beliefs prevent him from obtaining a social security number. He believes that the social security number is the "mark of the beast as delineated in `Bible Sripture' [sic] the `Book of Revelations.'" See Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Defendants with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC issued a right to sue letter dated July 23, 1999. Plaintiff filed the instant action with this Court on October 22, 1999. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges one claim for religious discrimination under Title VII against Schuco, Dr. Klaus Hoffman, John Cherubim, and Claire McCarthy. Before the Court is a motion by Defendants for the dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as against all defendants.
DISCUSSION I. Standard for Motion to Dismiss
It is well established that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In determining whether to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must view the well-pleaded material allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. See Flood v. New Hanover County, 125 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1997), citing Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994); Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996); J.C. Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Court, however, is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981). Nor is the Court "bound to accept [Plaintiff's] conclusory allegations regarding the legal effect of the facts alleged." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1977). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to provide a defendant with a mechanism for testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not the facts that support it. See Neitzeke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) ; Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994); United Mine Workers, 609 F.2d at 1085 (4th Cir. 1979). Thus, a complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if it lacks a cognizable legal theory, or it alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.08 at 2271 (2d ed. 1982)).
The Court does, however, take notice that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, which at times can place district judges in a difficult predicament. "On the one hand, [pro se submissions] represent the work of an untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude. On the other, they may present obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). As such, the Court has read the Plaintiff's opposition in as liberal a fashion as possible so as to not allow his inartful filing to defeat the vindication of any rights which Plaintiff alleges to have been infringed.
II. Plaintiff's Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff claims that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his religious beliefs in violation of Title VII. See generally Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Presumably, the Plaintiff considers the social security number requirement and the resulting termination to infringe upon his religious beliefs. Defendants contends that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to properly plead a claim upon which relief can be granted, namely that Plaintiff has improperly asserted a Title VII claim against individual Defendants, and the facial allegations of the complaint do not fulfill the prima facie elements for a religious discrimination claim to lie. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title VII as to any of the Defendants.
As a threshold matter, the Court must address the Title VII claims brought against individual Defendants in this case. Title VII is designed to address discriminatory conduct by employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . religion . . . .") (emphasis added). Plaintiff has named three individuals as Defendants in his complaint. Wilson cannot proceed against these individuals under Title VII legal theory. It is well-established Fourth Circuit precedent that individuals cannot be held liable in their supervisory/individual capacities for Title VII violations. See Lissau v. Southern Food Service, 159 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1998); Francis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Baltimore, 32 F. Supp.2d 316, 319 n. 1 (D.Md. 1999). As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claim against the individually named Defendants, Klaus Hoffman, John Cherubim, and Claire McCarthy.
To allege a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII against the employer, Schuco, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) he holds a sincere religious belief which conflicts with an employment requirement, (2) he informed his employer of the conflict, and (3) he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986); Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996); Dachman v. Shalala, 46 F. Supp.2d 419, 439 (D.Md. 1999); EEOC v. Allendale Nursing Centre d/b/a CCG, 996 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D.Mich. 1998) ( citing EEOC v. Arlington Transit Mix, Inc., 957 F.2d 219, 221 (6th Cir. 1991)); Cary v. Carmichael, 908 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D.Va. 1995), aff'd, 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship in the conduct of its business. Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019.
Under the first prong of a prima facie case for religious discrimination under Title VII, plaintiff must allege that the religious belief at issue is sincere. Courts are generally reluctant to scrutinize an individual's religious beliefs, declining to require that they be based on recognized or organized teachings of a particular sect. See Allendale, 996 F. Supp. 712, 714 (W.D.Mich. 1998); Shpargel v. Stage Co., 914 F. Supp. 1468 (E.D.Mich. 1996); Lambert v. Condor Manufacturing, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600 (E.D.Mich. 1991). Plaintiff has indicated that his belief is based on his understanding of biblical teachings, and such a claim has been recognized as a sincere belief by other courts. See e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683-86 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the same conviction as a sincerely held religious belief under the First Amendment). The Court having nothing before it to suggest that the belief is insincere, finds that Plaintiff has alleged a sincere religious belief.
As a second part of the first prong, Plaintiff must allege that having a social security number is an employment requirement of the Defendant's. The Court finds that while it is a condition of employment at Schuco, it is ultimately a requirement by the IRS, not Schuco. Courts have addressed similar claims of religious discrimination and concluded that such a claim is a grievance against the IRS, not the employer. See Allendale, 996 F. Supp. at 717 ("If [plaintiff] believes the legal requirement that an individual in [his] situation must obtain a SSN is unconstitutional, [he] should challenge the constitutionality of the law in a suit against the IRS."); Weber, 5 F. Supp.2d at 1222 ("[T]he requirement that an employee have a social security number is a requirement imposed by law, not a requirement imposed by defendant."), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, Plaintiff has not sufficiently plead the first prong of a prima facie case.
With respect to the second prong, a plaintiff must show that he informed the employer of the religious belief which conflicted with an employment requirement. This prong of the prima facie analysis requires Plaintiff to present sufficient allegations that he informed Defendant that the SSN requirement conflicted with his religious beliefs. Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the employer knew of the conflict of the policy with his religious beliefs. Although Plaintiff asserts that he notified Schuco of the conflict in his "Statement of Citizenship and Residence," (attached to the Complaint), upon careful review, the Court has not found such a statement of notification. Plaintiff points to another exhibit, his complaint letter dated April 5, 1999. While this letter does state that he "chose not to use a social security number for religious reasons and other reasons" provided in the Statement of Citizenship and Residence, such statement does not fulfill the second prong of a prima facie case. Plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory action occurred at the time of termination, February 3, 1999. The letter which identifies his reasons as religious was dated April 5, 1999, approximately two months later. Plaintiff admits in his opposition brief that the letter was not received by the Defendants until April 8 and April 12. See Plaintiff's Opposition Brief, at 6. Thus, Schuco did not have the requisite knowledge of Wilson's religious beliefs at the time of the employment decision. As to the third prong, Plaintiff has alleged in a conclusory fashion that he was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. While he has claimed that he was discharged because of his refusal to comply with the SSN requirement, he cannot plead that it is an employment requirement imposed by the employer. Rather, it is an IRS requirement. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination.
Even if Plaintiff had been able to allege a prima facie case of religious discrimination, Defendant Schuco can demonstrate that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship. Plaintiff has concluded that he is not required to have a social security number in order for Schuco to comply with federal regulations. Plaintiff claims that his statement of citizenship alone suffices to fulfill the identification requirements for taxing purposes. Defendant maintains that it is required to submit the SSN as a tax identification number. The Court finds that Plaintiff's legal conclusion is not supported by the tax regulations. According to the regulations, "an individual required to furnish a taxpayer identifying number must use a social security number." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6109-1(a)(1)(ii)(A). The regulations applicable to plaintiff further provide that "[i]ndividuals who are ineligible for or do not wish to participate in the benefits of the social security program shall nevertheless obtain a social security number. . . ." Id. at § 301.6109-1(d)(1). To qualify for an exception to the SSN requirement, Wilson would have to be an employer, sole proprietor, or an individual who is not a citizen or national of the United States. See id. The record indicates that Wilson is a United States citizen, and Plaintiff does not allege that he is an employer or sole proprietor. As such, he does not qualify for the exceptions. Thus, the only taxpayer identification number that he may submit is a SSN. See Allendale, 996 F. Supp. at 716 (noting that Plaintiff was a citizen of the United States, and thus was not eligible for exception which would allow her to submit other tax identification numbers besides the SSN). Plaintiff's written statement of citizenship and residence is only that — a statement that Plaintiff is a citizen or resident of the United States. The requirement for a SSN is not alleviated by such a statement. Furthermore, Plaintiff misinterprets the requirement as it applies to United States citizens. The regulations provide that United States citizens provide a social security number unless they qualify for one of the exceptions discussed above. Plaintiff does not qualify for either of the exceptions.
Cases involving facts similar to those in Wilson's case directly support this Court's findings. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII claim where accommodation would require employer to violate federal tax and immigration law); Casebolt v. Covenant Care, Inc., 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (rejecting identical Title VII claim and holding that the IRS requires the reporting of social security numbers and to demand that defendant do otherwise is an unreasonable accommodation); Weber v. Leaseway Dedicated Logistics, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 1219 (D.Kan. 1998) (rejecting a Title VII claim identical to Wilson's and holding that a waiver of the SSN requirement is not a reasonable accommodation of a Plaintiff's religious beliefs), aff'd 166 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 1999); Defendant Schuco is required by law to furnish the IRS with employees' social security numbers, and it could be subject to penalties if it fails to comply with these requirements. See 26 U.S.C. § 6723. Despite Plaintiff's argument that the regulations relieve Schuco from liability for failure secure an employee's social security number, the Court find that requiring Schuco to violate federal regulations in order to accommodate the Plaintiff's religious preferences is unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plead sufficient factual allegations necessary to satisfy the pleading requirements for a Title VII religious discrimination claim. The requirement of providing a social security number is imposed by the IRS, not Schuco, which attempts to simply comply with the federal regulations. Plaintiff merely alleges conclusory legal allegations that are not supported by sufficient factual allegations. Having examined the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in the Complaint, for the reasons set forth, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to all defendants. As no other claims remain, this case will be closed. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.