Opinion
C/A 6:20-cv-02087-MGL-JDA
02-09-2022
Mattie Sarah Elizabeth Wilson, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Telco Bank Federal Credit Union, Chad Oliver, Teresa Valaye, Syvanna, and Kate Patterson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Mattie Sarah Elizabeth Wilson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action against the above-named Defendants, purportedly based on federal question jurisdiction. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C. Having reviewed the pleadings filed in this matter in accordance with applicable law, the Court finds this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified herein.
The undersigned notes that, in her original Complaint, Plaintiff identified a single Defendant, South Carolina Telco Bank Credit Union (the “Bank”). [Doc. 1 at 2.] In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the following service specialists employed by the Bank as additional Defendants: Chad Oliver, Teresa Valaye, Syvanna, and Kate Patterson. [Doc. 26 at 2-3.] Plaintiff makes no allegations against the individual Bank employees. The Court refers to all Defendants, from the original Complaint and Amended Complaint, collectively as “Defendants.”
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on June 1, 2020. [Doc. 1.] The undersigned reviewed the pro se Complaint and, by Order dated June 17, 2020, notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified in the Court's Order. [Doc. 10.] The Court, however, noted that Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies of her Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend the Complaint. [Id. at 10.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.[Id.] By Orders dated July 27, 2020, the undersigned granted Plaintiff additional time within which to file an amended complaint and bring the case into proper form. [Docs. 21; 23.] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 21, 2020. [Doc. 26.] Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a motion for extension of time, though it is unclear to the Court what Plaintiff is seeking in her motion. [Doc. 28.]
As explained below, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to cure the deficiencies of her original Complaint. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will consider the allegations from both the original Complaint and the Amended Complaint in its review of this action.
The undersigned notes that, ordinarily, an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2017) (“A pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a) supersedes the pleading it modifies and remains in effect throughout the action unless it subsequently is modified. Once an amended pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case . . . .”).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in her original Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff alleges that someone “went into [her] account” at South Carolina Telco Bank (the “Bank”) and paid off a loan she had with the Bank “without [her] permission or consent.” [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff asserts that the Bank “misused and abused [her] income” by spending her money without asking or notifying her. [Id. at 3.] She alleges that, after she secured a loan with the Bank, the Bank went into her account and took her money. [Id.] Plaintiff contends the Bank caused her to believe that her daughter took her money. [Id.] Plaintiff reported the Bank's conduct to the police, but an officer told her to address her claim with the Bank because it was a civil matter. [Id. at 4.] According to Plaintiff, the person who took the money from her account was an employee of the Bank. [Id. at 5.] However, the Bank refused to return her money. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the Bank approved her for a $1,000 loan. [Id. at 6.] Then, the Bank added $179.92, which was taken from her account. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges she should be compensated for the Bank's defaming her character, embezzling her money, misusing and misplacing her money, and violating her constitutional rights. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff seeks an award of $100,000 to $1,000,000. [Id.]
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that certain corporate and service specialists at the bank “play[ed] a roll in entangling part of my income, they service[d] me on the phone after and in person, the time of my money missing out of my account . . ., withholding information regarding my money that was mishandled and stolen.” [Doc. 26 at 5.] Plaintiff seeks to be compensated in the amount of $1,000,000 for her trouble, the misuse of her money, bank employees not giving proper attention to their mistakes, and bank employees being uncooperative and failing to answer her questions. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, this Court would possess the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint were not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307S08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review a complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in her pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings, McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). As such, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]”
Generally, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases, referred to as (1) federal question cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) diversity cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1331 provides that the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists ‘only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.'” Burbage v. Richburg, 417 F.Supp.2d 746, 749 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The parties are completely diverse only if no party on one side is a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint is difficult to decipher, and it is unclear what specific causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert. It is likewise difficult for the Court to determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's unspecified claims because she has failed to affirmatively plead facts showing that this Court has either federal question or diversity jurisdiction over her claims.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies the basis for this Court's jurisdiction as federal question jurisdiction. However, she has not identified any statutory or constitutional basis for her claims. And, the Court is unable to glean any basis for federal question jurisdiction from the allegations in either the original Complaint or the Amended Complaint. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has attached a document to her Amended Complaint in which she appears to allege that Defendants violated the Fourth, Seventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 26-2.] However, as explained below, any such claim fails because Defendants are not state or federal actors for the purposes of any constitutional claim. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing this Court has diversity jurisdiction, and the Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendant appear to be citizens of South Carolina for purposes of the diversity statute. As such, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief. It is unclear to the Court what specific causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert in her pleadings. As noted, Plaintiff alleges that an employee of the Bank took money out of her account, without her permission, to pay off her loan. [Doc. 1 at 3, 5.] In her original Complaint, Plaintiff contends the Bank defamed her character, embezzled her money, misused and misplaced her money, and violated her constitutional rights. [Id. at 7.] Based on these allegations and liberally construing the pleadings, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may be asserting state law claims for conversion, defamation, and breach of contract in addition to a constitutional violation claim. Nevertheless, this action is subject to summary dismissal because the allegations in the Complaint and Amended Complaint fail to state a claim for relief. The Court will address each claim in turn.
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff appears to assert a federal law claim against Defendants for violating her constitutional rights. However, based on the pleadings presently before the Court, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support any cause of action arising under the United States Constitution or federal law. Importantly, although Plaintiff alleges that the Bank violated her constitutional rights, she has not alleged facts showing Defendants violated any constitutional provisions, and the Court is unable to discern any constitutional violation from the allegations in the pleadings. Further, Plaintiff's purported constitutional claims fail because “most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments” and not against infringement by private persons. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). When private persons are sued for constitutional violations, courts require “as a prerequisite to liability ‘that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State.'” Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); see also DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999) (identifying four circumstances where such attribution is appropriate). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts constituting any circumstance in which Defendants can be treated as a state or federal actors subject to suit for a constitutional violation or that Defendants' conduct can be fairly attributable to the state. See, e.g., Nix v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, 200 F.Supp.3d 578, 588 (D. Md. 2016) (noting that “federal credit unions are private actors unbound by relevant constitutional restrictions”). Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to identify any relevant federal statute to support a cause of action against Defendants, and she has failed to allege facts to support any such claim. Simply put, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief for a violation of the Constitution or a federal statute. Therefore, Plaintiff's purported federal law claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible state law claim for conversion, defamation, or breach of contract. Under South Carolina law, conversion is defined as the “unauthorized assumption and exercise of the rights of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or to the exclusion of the rights of the owner.” Mullis v. Trident Emergency Physicians, 570 S.E.2d 549, 550 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); see Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 220 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 1975) (explaining that conversion may arise by the illegal detention of another's property). “There can be no conversion of money unless there is an obligation on the defendant to deliver a specific, identifiable fund to the plaintiff.” Richardson's Rests., Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of S.C., 403 S.E.2d 669, 672 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991). Money, however, may be the subject of conversion if “it is capable of being identified and there may be conversion of determinate sums even though the specific coins and bills are not identified.” SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 392 S.E.2d 789, 792 (S.C. 1990). To establish conversion, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) an interest by the plaintiff in the thing converted; (2) the defendant converted the property to his or her own use; and (3) the use was without the plaintiff's permission.” Builders Source Direct v. Cosco Logistics (Americas) Inc., No. 2:07-cv-531-PMD, 2008 WL 11349731, at *11 (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2008). Here, although Plaintiff alleges that an employee of the Bank took money out of her account, she has failed to allege facts establishing a determinate sum of money or that the Bank employee converted the money to his or her own use. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conversion.
In the absence of any cognizable federal law claim premised on federal question jurisdiction, as discussed below, this Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims even if Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim for relief on those state law claims. See Hayduk v. Cannon, No. 6:19-cv-03355-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 2308697, at *11 (D.S.C. Apr. 14, 2020) (explaining that federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 2308283 (D.S.C. May 8, 2020).
“‘The elements of defamation include: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.'” McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 743 S.E.2d 843, 848 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)). To plead a defamation claim, a plaintiff should allege “‘with specificity the time, place, medium, and listener of the alleged defamatory statements.'” Pope v. Barnwell Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 19, No. 1:16-cv-01627-JMC, 2017 WL 1148741, at *11 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Doe v. Cannon, No. 2:16-cv-00530-RMG, 2017 WL 591121, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017)). Here, although Plaintiff contends the Bank defamed her character, she provides no facts to establish any of the elements noted above. Indeed, Plaintiff has not identified any defamatory statement made by the Bank or its employees. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for defamation.
To state a claim for a breach of contract under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract, (2) its breach, and (3) damages caused by such breach. Fuller v. E. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 124 S.E.2d 602, 610 (S.C. 1962); Branche Builders, Inc. v. Coggins, 686 S.E.2d 200, 202 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “The general rule is that for a breach of contract the defendant is liable for whatever damages follow as a natural consequence and a proximate result of such breach.” Fuller, 124 S.E.2d at 610. “In a breach of contract action, damages serve to place the nonbreaching party in the position he would have enjoyed had the contract been performed.” S.C. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Thornton-Crosby Dev. Co., 399 S.E.2d 8, 10 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990). Here, Plaintiff's allegations fail to set forth facts to plausibly establish any element for a breach of contract claim. Indeed, it is unclear from the confusing allegations in the pleadings whether Plaintiff even believes that a contract existed between the parties. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's pleadings are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. The undersigned notes that Plaintiff may have intended to assert other causes of action not addressed above. However, Plaintiff has not identified any such causes of action, and she has failed to allege facts from which the Court can discern a cognizable claim against Defendants in this action.
Motion for Extension of Time
Plaintiff has filed a document which is construed as a motion for extension of time. [Doc. 28.] In her motion, Plaintiff appears to seek additional time because she wishes to review further legal authorities. [Id.] However, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's motion should be denied as she has had multiple opportunities to correct her pleading deficiencies and has failed to state a claim or to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, this action should be dismissed without issuance and service of process for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff's motion for extension of time should be denied.
Because Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to amend her pleadings to correct the deficiencies in her original Complaint, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss this action without further leave to amend. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015); Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page. Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).