On appeal, the State correctly argues that a long line of cases hold that an allegation of the specific amount of money taken is not required because property value is not an element of the crime charged, but applies only to sentencing. See Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 131 (3) ( 475 S.E.2d 637) (1996); Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 699) (1980); Mack v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 86, 87 ( 222 S.E.2d 337) (1976). See also Hight v. State, 221 Ga. App. 574, 575 (2) ( 472 S.E.2d 113) (1996) ("[v]alue is not an element of theft by taking as proscribed by OCGA § 16-8-2").

When Simpson pled guilty, he admitted these facts, and because these facts constitute the crime of incest, Simpson's plea to that crime is not void. Accordingly, we reverse the habeas court's ruling to the contrary. See Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 ( 272 SE2d 699) (1980); Howard v. State, 252 Ga. App. 487 ( 555 SE2d 884) (2001).Wilson, 246 Ga. at 743; Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 55 ( 464 SE2d 198) (1995).

By pleading guilty, Loyd admitted the facts set forth in the charging document. See Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 (1) ( 272 SE2d 699) (1980). In Georgia, "'the penetration of the female sexual organ by the sexual organ of the male, which is necessary to constitute rape, need be only slight; it is not necessary that the vagina shall be entered . . . , but an entering of the anterior of the organ, known as the vulva or labia, is sufficient.' [Cits.

Id. at 540 (1). Martin maintains that, similarly, he had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Wright, because a witness for the State at a sentencing trial "simply provides information concerning the impact the crime has had on her life" and because the "focus" of a sentencing trial is determining what sentence a defendant should receive, not whether the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the offenses alleged in the indictment against him. Moreover, Martin argues that he had no reason to cross-examine Ms. Wright regarding issues of his culpability or Ms. Wright's credibility, because his guilt was not at issue at his sentencing trial. See Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 (1) ( 272 SE2d 699) (1980) (noting that a plea of guilty admits the facts set forth in an indictment). However, as this Court has repeatedly noted, evidence relating to guilt or innocence is relevant to sentence and, thus, admissible, in a sentencing trial,

Indeed, they are not; while a defendant who pleads guilty admits committing a crime, a convicted defendant has not done so. Reed v. Hannigan, 295 F3d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir. 2002) (fact that defendant who pleads guilty is treated differently than one who is convicted after trial does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the defendants are not similarly situated); see Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 375-376 ( 418 SE2d 27) (1992) (equal protection provisions of federal and Georgia constitutions are coextensive). See also Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 ( 272 SE2d 699) (1980) ("plea of guilty admits the facts set forth in an accusation or indictment"). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

However, a guilty plea does not waive the defendant's right to assert that the indictment fails to charge all of the essential elements of a crime. Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 699) (1980). Thus, the fact that the hearing on Wright's guilty plea supports a finding that the murder took place in Carroll County would not prevent him from challenging the sufficiency of the written indictment charging him with the commission of such an offense in that jurisdiction.

Under these circumstances, "the standard for a reviewing court should not be based solely upon whether the offense pled to is a lesser included offense as a matter of law." Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743, 744 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 699) (1980). "[R]ather the reviewing court should look to `the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the substance of the charge, as opposed to its technical elements, was conveyed to the accused.' [Cit.

However, value is not an element of the crime of theft by taking. Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 699) (1980). Thus, the allegation "concerning the `value' of the automobile was mere surplusage and need not have been proven.

In the case now before us, the record fails to show that the elements of the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty were explained to him. In Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 ( 272 S.E.2d 699) (1980), the defendant was indicted for burglary (unlawful entry with intent to commit a theft) and pleaded guilty to theft by taking. We found his guilty plea to be valid because the record showed that the defendant admitted taking the property, albeit the property was taken from the yard rather than from inside the house.

Accordingly, Neslein's sentence was not void or illegal on this ground.Wilson v. Reed, 246 Ga. 743 (1) ( 272 SE2d 699) (1980). See Robertson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 271 (2) ( 651 SE2d 198) (2007).