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granting summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to offer facts showing that defendants regarded plaintiffs as substantially limited in a major life activity, rather than simply unable to fulfill the requirements of a particular job
Summary of this case from Lekich v. Municipal Police Officers Educ. Tng. CommOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CV-6547.
March 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Wilson brings this class action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Plaintiffs applied to become troopers in the Pennsylvania State Police Department. They allege that they were discriminated against because of their visual impairments in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.. Before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and to Decertify the Class. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants' Motion to Decertify the Class was made in the alternative to its Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Because the Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment, it need not reach the Motion to Decertify.
I. Background
A. Factual History
The factual basis for Plaintiffs' claims was described in the Court's Memorandum and Order of January 18, 2002 (docket no. 98) and need not be repeated here.
B. Procedural History
On January 3, 2001, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, leaving only Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim remaining. On January 18, 2002, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendants on that claim. On November 7, 2002, the Third Circuit reversed the Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claim, holding that its decision in Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2002) established that "if a state accepts federal funds for a specific department or agency, it voluntarily waives sovereign immunity for Rehabilitation Act claims against the department or agency — but only against that department or agency." Wilson v. Penn. State Police Dept., 2002 WL 31492373, *1 (3d Cir. 2002),citing Koslow, 302 F.3d at 171. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the reinstated Rehabilitation Act claim.
C. Questions Before the Court
Plaintiffs do not argue that they are actually disabled, but rather that "defendant[s regard them] as handicapped, and [discriminate] against them on that basis." Plaintiffs' Combined Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Decertify the Class ("Plaintiffs' Memorandum") at 1, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c); School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (applying ADA analysis to Rehabilitation Act Claim). Specifically, Plaintiffs' theory is that Defendants "regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activities of seeing and running."
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3. Plaintiffs originally averred that they are regarded as substantially limited in "the major life activities of running, seeing, and/or working in a class of jobs or in a broad range of jobs in various classes, among others." Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 42. However, in their Memorandum, Plaintiffs limited their argument to the major life activities of running and seeing, even titling one section "We Don't Claim to Be "Regarded As" Disabled From Working." Plaintiffs Memorandum at 3 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have abandoned their claim that they were regarded as disabled from working and will address only their claims that they were regarded as disabled in the major life activities of running and seeing.
Defendants advance several arguments, including: (1) that Plaintiffs have introduced no proof that Defendants regarded them as significantly impaired in running; (2) that Plaintiff Wilson is not a "qualified individual" under the Rehabilitation Act; (3) that they enforced their application standards out of concern for the safety of the public and individual officers; (4) that the vision standards they employed were not pretexts for discrimination; and (5) that they did not regard Plaintiffs as disabled for any class of jobs, only for the specific job of Pennsylvania State Trooper. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Memorandum") at 2.
Defendants also argue that running is not a major life activity, citing opinions in six different Districts that have held or suggested that running is not a major life activity. Defendants' Memorandum at 18-19. However, because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that they were regarded as substantially impaired at running, it need not reach the question of whether running is a major life activity.
II. Legal Standard — Summary Judgment
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the test is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact' . . . [where the non-moving party's] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [its] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (emphasis added).
III. Legal Standard — Rehabilitation Act
"To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under [the Rehabilitation Act], `the employee bears the burden of demonstrating (1) that he or she has a disability; (2) that he or she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) that he or she was nonetheless terminated or otherwise prevented from performing the job.'" Cade v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 2002 WL 922150, *5 (E.D. Pa. 2002),quoting Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2000) and Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996).
Under the Rehabilitation Act, a "disability" is defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis supplied). "`[S]ubstantially limit[ed]' means `[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform'; or `[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.'" Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-96 (2002), quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001).
"`Major' in the phrase `major life activities' means important. `Major life activities' thus refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (internal citations omitted). With regard to an impairment's effect on major life activities, "the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job."Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-202. In this assessment, the Court must consider a plaintiff's ability to perform relevant tasks with the ability of "the average person in the general population" to perform those same tasks. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1999). The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198,citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001).
For example, with respect to an impairment in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, the Supreme Court examined the impact on plaintiff's ability to bathe herself, brush her teeth, and do household chores. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202.
"[I]f a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures — both positive and negative — must be taken into account when judging whether that person is `substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus `disabled' under the Act." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
The Supreme Court has applied this principle where the major life activity in question is seeing. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66.
In sum, to recover under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiffs must be regarded as having a permanent or long-term impairment that significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which they perform actions central to their daily lives and for which corrective measures cannot compensate.
Some class members have been able to correct their vision using modern surgical techniques. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's [sic] Motion to Decertify the Class at 6 ("[A]t least 108 of the approximately 283 class members who initially failed to meet the vision standards have since had surgery, and are now employed as PSP state troopers"). However, absent surgery, the other Plaintiffs' condition will not resolve with time and is therefore permanent.
IV. Analysis
Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants perceived them as substantially limited at working, but rather at the separate and distinct alleged major life activities of seeing and running.See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
A. Running
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants regarded them as disabled in the "major life activity" of running. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 1. Even assuming, arguendo, that running is a major life activity, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to show that Defendants viewed them as limited in their ability to run. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate with respect to this part of Plaintiffs' claim.
At least six districts have rejected the assertion that running is a major life activity. However, the Court need not reach that issue. See supra n. 3.
B. Seeing
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) they were regarded as having a disability; (2) they were otherwise qualified to be state trooper cadets; and (3) they were prevented from performing the job.See Donahue, 224 F.3d at 229. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs were prevented from becoming state trooper cadets. Thus, the third prong is met. Although Defendants contest that Plaintiffs were otherwise qualified for the position, the Court finds that, for purposes of making out a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiffs must be treated as otherwise qualified. Thus, under Donahue, the only issue remaining is whether Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case that they had or were perceived to have a disability.
The only reason Defendants give that Plaintiffs were unqualified is that Plaintiffs never completed the physical performance tests, the background investigation, and the selection phases of the application process. Defendants' Memorandum at 20. However, Defendants concede that the physical performance tests and background check are contingent upon the results of the vision test and that the selection phase occurs only once an applicant has met all the other requirements. Defendants' Memorandum at 4. It would be unjust to allow Defendants to claim that Plaintiffs were unqualified because they did not pass tests that Defendants refused to give. Accordingly, the Court will treat Plaintiffs as otherwise qualified.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants view them as substantially limited at the major life activity of seeing. When Plaintiffs wear corrective lenses, however, they are able to function normally in all aspects of their lives.
[T]he ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others and to establish physical criteria. An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity. Accordingly, an employer is free to decide . . . that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91. Here, Defendants argue that while they regarded Plaintiffs as unable adequately to fulfill the particular requirements of a particular job — the job of Pennsylvania state trooper cadet — that they nonetheless did not regard Plaintiffs as substantially limited in their other life activities. Defendants assert that trooper cadets might be significantly impaired in "situations where corrective eyewear, including glasses or contact lenses, may be knocked or pulled off or out; fogged up or affected by splashing liquids; shattered, broken, ripped, torn, blurred or obstructed by dirt or eyelashes; exposed to noxious fumes or vapors; otherwise dislodged or rendered ineffective." Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit B to Defendants' Memorandum, at 3 ("Defendants' Ans. to Interrog."). Although some of these conditions might occur in daily life, it cannot be said that they restrict "the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001). It has been shown that they do not regularly impact upon Plaintiffs' ability to get ready for work, cook, drive, view television, see movies, watch sports, or read street signs, posters, calendars, and notices. Wilson Affidavit at 1-4. Rather, these conditions are a significant concern only with respect to the particular job of Pennsylvania state trooper or trooper cadet.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 1, Defendants' Memorandum at 17-18. Plaintiff Wilson reports that, when wearing his glasses, he is able to get ready for work, cook, drive, watch television, movies, and sports, and read street signs, posters, calendars, and notices. Affidavit of Michael Wilson, attached as Exhibit D to Defendants' Memorandum ("Wilson Affidavit") at 1-4. Thus, when wearing glasses or contact lenses, Plaintiff Wilson is as capable of performing sight-related tasks as the average person in the general population. Although without his glasses, Plaintiff Wilson can do none of these things normally, Id., the Court must consider the Plaintiffs' alleged disability in light of the effect of corrective measures upon it. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
See generally supra n. 4 and accompanying text.
The vision standards in question were crafted solely for the purpose of governing entrance into the state trooper cadet program. PSP employs some individuals with glasses in other capacities. See Deposition of Rose A. Polek, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at 7 (witness, the Director of the Employment Services and Systems Division in the Bureau of Human Resources for the state police, stating that she wears glasses at times).
Plaintiffs offer no facts to support the claim that Defendants view them as impaired not only in the exceptional situations described above, where corrective lenses could become dislodged or rendered ineffective, but also in daily life. In fact, they quote Defendants acknowledging that "a person whose uncorrected visual acuity is just short of acceptable may well be able to drive, see, identify people at a distance of over 20 feet, recognize faces in a crowd, read street signs, etc." Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 9-10. This is precisely Defendants' point — they regard Plaintiffs as impaired with respect to a specific job function, but not with respect to a major life activity. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Defendants' concerns about the corrective lenses being rendered ineffective under the aforementioned circumstances extend to daily life. Rather, the record is clear that these conditions were described in an attempt to determine what conditions a trooper was likely to encounter on the job.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' belief is an ill-founded product of myth and stereotype. They note that Defendants have not made any empirical efforts to demonstrate that persons wearing glasses or contact lenses cannot function effectively as state troopers. Defendants' Ans. to Interrog. at 16. Defendants also admit that many current state troopers wear glasses or contact lenses and perform their duties satisfactorily despite that fact. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admissions at 59. Furthermore, Defendants have admitted that they are unaware of even a single incident where a trooper was unable to perform his or her duties because of glasses or contact lenses.
However, it is not this Court's function to analyze the validity of Defendants' standards. Nor is this Court tasked with deciding whether Defendants' standards are well-supported, right-thinking, or the best criteria available. The only question for this Court is whether Defendants view Plaintiffs as substantially limited in their performance of major life activities.
A perceived inability to fulfill a job qualification is not covered by the Rehabilitation Act. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the most they have alleged is that Defendants view them as substantially limited in seeing under certain enumerated circumstances that Defendants rightly do not view as occurring in the regular course of daily life. Defendants view Plaintiffs' vision as disabled in ways that make them less than ideally suited for the particular job of Pennsylvania state trooper. They do not view Plaintiffs' visual impairments as substantially limiting sight under ordinary daily conditions. Because the evidence Plaintiffs have presented is insufficient to support a finding that Defendants were perceived as impaired in seeing during their daily lives, summary judgment is appropriate.
V. Conclusion
Because there is no material issue of fact as to whether Defendants regarded Plaintiffs as substantially limited in a major life activity, Defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted.