Opinion
Case No. 01-1100-JTM.
October 5, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on the motions to dismiss filed separately by each defendant. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for determination. The court notes that plaintiff filed a secondary response and secondary reply to defendants' motions and that by its September 21, 2001 Order, the court denied entry of those responses as improper surreplies. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' motions. The court also notes that plaintiff, on October 1, 2001, filed a motion to amend his amended complaint. Defendants have not yet responded to said motion, but the court has considered the motion to amend and, for the reasons set forth below, is prepared to deny the motion without the assistance of further briefing from defendants.
In his pro se Amended Complaint filed on July 10, 2001, plaintiff alleges that the actions of Judge Bruce Brown in the administration of the time to pay docket in Wichita Municipal Court denied his Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983. In response to defendants' motions, plaintiff correctly concedes that the court should dismiss any claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in that plaintiff did not allege any discrimination based on his race or ethnic background.
Among several asserted grounds for dismissal, defendant Municipal Court of the City of Wichita ("Municipal Court") argues that it is not a legal entity subject to suit. The court agrees. It is a well-settled principle of law that a subunit of city government is not itself a governmental entity subject to suit. See Whayne v. State of Kansas, 980 F. Supp. 387, 391 (Kan. 1997) (Topeka Police Department is a subunit of the City of Topeka and is not itself an entity subject to suit); Wright v. Wyandotte County Sheriffs Dep't, 963 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (Kan. 1997) ("The Sheriffs department is merely an agency of the county, and is not itself capable of being sued."). Absent a specific statute or ordinance authorizing suit against the Municipal Court, it is simply a subunit of the City of Wichita and is not itself an entity subject to suit. Plaintiff concedes this point by stating "[w]hile the Municipal Court of the City of Wichita is not a valid entity to be sued, it is because the city itself is liable for the actions of its subunits, and thereby it is a valid complaint against the City of Wichita." Plaintiff's Response to Municipal Court's Motion to Dismiss, at 2. Plaintiff correctly states that the City of Wichita can, in certain circumstances, be liable for the actions of its agents or subunits. However, potential liability of the City does not obviate the need for properly naming the City as a party to the suit. In this case, plaintiff did not name the City of Wichita in his Amended Complaint. And the court cannot construe plaintiff's claim against the Municipal Court to constitute a claim against the City of Wichita. Because the Municipal Court is not subject to direct suit, the court dismisses it from this action.
Defendant Judge Bruce Brown ("Judge Brown") asserts his entitlement to judicial immunity in his role as an administrative hearing officer for the time to pay docket of the Wichita Municipal Court. City of Wichita ordinances vest an administrative hearing officer, in the present context, with the same power and authority as a municipal judge. It is well-established that judges are absolutely immune from civil damage liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978). Judicial immunity applies even if these acts are in excess of a judge's authority or done maliciously or corruptly.Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. A judge is subject to liability for judicial acts only when he or she has acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. The United States Supreme Court has articulated two factors to determine whether an act by a judge is a judicial act. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. These factors are whether the act is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in the judge's judicial capacity. Id.
Here, plaintiff concedes that, in allegedly committing the complained of constitutional violations, Judge Brown was performing a judicial function. Plaintiff further concedes that he dealt with Judge Brown only in the judge's judicial capacity. To that end, plaintiff states that "[w]hile Judge Brown's actions are taken under judicial immunity, that is to say Judge Brown is not financially liable, the court hold's [sic] the related government responsible for his actions, and thereby it is a valid complaint against the City of Wichita." Plaintiff's Response to Judge Brown's Motion to Dismiss, at 2. Plaintiff's argument again fails because the City of Wichita is not a party to this action. Even if the City of Wichita could be liable for Judge Brown's actions, the court has jurisdiction only over named defendants who have received proper notice and service of process. Because Judge Brown is entitled to judicial immunity from any individual liability, the court dismisses plaintiff's claims against him.
Finally, the court denies plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint. The amendment primarily seeks to add the City of Wichita as a defendant in this action. According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, the Court shall freely give plaintiff leave to amend "when justice so requires." Motions to amend are matters of discretion for the trial court, see Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 934 F.2d 1452, 1462 (10th Cir. 1991), and a refusal to grant leave to amend should normally be justified by factors such as futility, undue delay, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or bad faith of the moving party. See Frank v. U.S. West. Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). A district court may deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss or otherwise fails to state a claim. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992); Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir. 1990)).
In this case, plaintiff's motion to amend would be futile in that the putative amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss. The proposed amendment alleges that the City of Wichita denied his due process by issuing to him a notice to appear before the traffic court on an invalid date, specifically 11/034/98. Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Brown acted unconstitutionally by threatening to throw plaintiff in jail for inability to pay a fine. As noted above, Judge Brown is not subject to liability. However, plaintiff claims that the City of Wichita is liable for his actions in that he is an employee of the City.
Plaintiff's proposed amendment fails to allege a proper basis for the City's liability. A municipality or other governmental entity may be subjected to liability under § 1983 where the action alleged to be unconstitutional executes or implements a governmental policy or custom. Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). According to Monell, a municipality is not subject to liability under section 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior. 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. A municipality will only be liable for the actions of its employees when they act "pursuant to official policy of some nature. . . ." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. Judge Brown's actions thus cannot be imputed to the City unless plaintiff alleges that Judge Brown was acting pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Plaintiff's proposed amendment does not allege the existence of any policy or custom and thus fails to state a claim pursuant to § 1983. Moreover, plaintiff's allegation relative to the invalid notice of appearance only recites one instance of the City's allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Monell requires that even direct actions of the city must arise out of a policy or custom in order to subject the governmental entity to § 1983 liability. Here, plaintiff's proposed amendment alleges only a single act and does not claim an unconstitutional custom or policy. The court thus denies the motion to amend as futile.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 5th day of October, 2001 that defendant Municipal Court of the City of Wichita's motion to dismiss (dkt. no. 7) is granted and defendant Municipal Court Judge Bruce Brown's motion to dismiss (dkt. no. 9) is granted and plaintiff's motion to amend complaint (dkt. no. 20) is denied.