The court concluded that the second motion was proper because it was based in part on new grounds that were “nonexistent at the time the first motion was made [and] could not have been asserted or decided at that time.” Id.; see Mjos v. Vill. of Howard Lake, 287 Minn. 427, 435 n. 6, 178 N.W.2d 862, 868 n. 6 (1970) (stating that “to allow a party to make a second motion ... for a new trial following denial of his first motion for such relief” is within the district court's discretion and “granting of the second motion is not an abuse of discretion, especially where the second motion is based upon grounds brought to the court's attention after denial of the first motion” (citing Mitchell, 216 Minn. at 373, 13 N.W.2d at 23 )); see generally Wilson v. Mitchell, 349 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Minn.App.1984) (applying Trickel and holding the appellant's second motion to vacate was appealable). Under the rule announced in Mitchell, the district court in this case had discretion to consider DeLaCruz's amended new-trial motion.