See also United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a mailing delay constituted excusable neglect). {23} Employer/Insurer argues that Wilson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 2004-NMCA-051, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, a case in which certiorari was never sought, is controlling, and thus, as occurred in that case, Petitioner's untimely appeal should be dismissed. In Wilson, the Court of Appeals held that the State of Texas's notice of appeal, sent by United Parcel Service second day air overnight package and arriving five days later to the Court, missing the deadline by one day, was untimely because it did not involve unusual circumstances outside of the party's control:

See Waksman v. City of Albuquerque, 102 N.M. 41, 43, 690 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1984); Amoco Prod. Co. v. N.M. Taxation Revenue Dep't, 2003-NMCA-092, ¶ 12, 134 N.M. 162, 74 P.3d 96. {16} In Wilson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 2004-NMCA-051, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, we examined the meaning of "course of business," as used in the New Mexico Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 7-8A-1 to -31 (1997, as amended through 2006). In concluding that the defendant's issuance of certificates as part of a settlement agreement was not in the regular course of business, we held that "course of business" means a "business practice that is routine, regular, usual, or normally done."

Likewise, in this Court we held that "[w]e will not extend the exception to late filing to circumstances . . . where options available to the appellant to ensure timely filing of the notice [of appeal] were not taken." Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 12, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525. With this approach in mind, we now turn to the Subsidiaries' claim of excusable neglect.

OCGA §§ 44-12-193 (all intangible property); 44-12-205 (gift certificates). See Wilson v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 135 N.M. 506, 513 (II) (C) (2) (b) ( 90 P3d 525) (2004) (property is presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed by the apparent owner for five years, otherwise unclaimed property act does not apply); People ex rel. Callahan v. Marshall Field Co., 83 Ill. App.3d 811, 814, 817 (I) ( 404 NE2d 368) (1980) (to be covered under unclaimed property act, property must be unclaimed by owner for specified period; property is not "abandoned" if owner has indicated an interest in it); State ex rel. Mallicoat v. Coe, 254 Ore. 365, 368-369 ( 460 P2d 357) (1969) (funds must remain unclaimed for specified period after they become payable or distributable in order to establish presumption of abandonment); State of Arkansas v. Federated Dept. Stores, 175 BR 924, 933 (IV) (S.D. Ohio 1992) ("States are not creditors with respect to property presumed abandoned post-petition because the Debtors do not have a legal obligation to turn the property over under the States' unclaimed property statutes until the dormancy period expires

{¶5} "Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will uphold the district court's denial of the motion to intervene." Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, overruled on other grounds by Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2010-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259. A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the facts; we review the application of the law de novo to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred.

Further, "[a] court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the facts[,]" and "we review the application of the law de novo to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred." Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, overruled on other grounds by Schultz ex rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2010-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259. However, in this case, because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiff's first case with prejudice, we review dismissal of the second case—which was dismissed based upon the district court's application of the doctrine of claim preclusion—de novo.

" Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. "A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the facts; we review the application of the law de novo to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred." Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525, overruled on other grounds by Schultz el rel. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2010-NMSC-034, 148 N.M. 692, 242 P.3d 259. ARGUMENT

State v. Montes, 2007-NMCA-083, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 221, 164 P.3d 102. A district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies or misapprehends the law. See Rivera-Platte v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 2007-NMCA-158, ¶ 26, 143 N.M. 158, 173 P.3d 765, cert. granted, 2007-NMCERT-011, 143 N.M. 157, 173 P.3d 764; Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525. Discussion

{86} We review the denial of a motion to intervene for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525. A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the law incorrectly.

Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. "A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the facts; we review the application of the law de novo to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred." Wilson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2004-NMCA-051, ¶ 21, 135 N.M. 506, 90 P.3d 525. Timeliness