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Wilson v. Martin

United States District Court, E.D. California
May 16, 2008
Case No. 2: 06-cv-00830 ALA (P) (E.D. Cal. May. 16, 2008)

Opinion

Case No. 2: 06-cv-00830 ALA (P).

Action Filed: 4/18/2006

May 16, 2008

EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Attorney General of the State of California, THOMAS D. MCCRACKIN, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, JOHN PADRICK, Deputy Attorney General, State Bar No. 155123, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Defendants Martin, Villalva and Austin.


ORDER


On April 24, 2008, this Court ordered Plaintiff Melvin Wilson to file a response to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 45). Plaintiff subsequently filed a response informing this Court that he did not receive Defendants' Opposition.

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of this Court serve Plaintiff with a copy of Defendants' Opposition (Doc. 32); and

2. Plaintiff file a response to Defendants' Opposition on or before June 13, 2008.

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION

Melvin Wilson, a pro se inmate, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendant Correctional Officers H.L. Martin and E. Villalva and Sergeant J.E. Austin. Mr. Wilson alleges that he was being transported to UCD Medical Center to have a medical test and just as they arrived at the medical center, the chase car, being driven by defendant C.O. Martin, struck the rear of the vehicle in which plaintiff was being transported. Plaintiff further alleges that thereafter Martin refused to allow plaintiff to be seen at UCD Medical Center, and instead returned him to Mule Creek State Prison. (See generally Complaint.)

Plaintiff's motion fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, to the extent that he has not submitted any admissible evidence, and LR 56-260(a), for his failure to provide a Statement of Undisputed Facts. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion should be denied in its entirety

II. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Summary Judgment Standards Under Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id.

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See, Id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).

2. Plaintiff Failed to Offer Evidence Demonstrating the Absence of a Genuine Issue of Material Fact.

The motion is based on a series of statements in support of what plaintiff "believes" he can prove. Beliefs are neither facts nor the type of evidence required by Rule 56. As plaintiff has not submitted any evidence at all, he cannot establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact.

The four facts plaintiff offers are not supported by "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which plaintiff believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and a general objection is made on that basis. Alone, plaintiff's assertions are inadmissible. As plaintiff has this burden initially, and has not met it, the motion must be denied.

3. Even if Plaintiff Had Offered Evidence in Support of his Facts, No Eighth Amendment Violation Can be Shown.

The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962), prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court acknowledged that the provision could be applied to some deprivations that were not specifically part of the sentence but were suffered during imprisonment, and accompanied by a sufficiently culpable state of mind for those individuals who created the deprivation.

The culpable state of mind requirement has both objective and subjective components. Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence on either component, let alone evidence showing that defendants engaged in "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" that violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 346.

The Constitution, "does not mandate comfortable prisons," Id. at 349, and only those deprivations denying "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," Id. at 347, are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Ultimately, the holding in Rhodes turned on the objective component, i.e., was the deprivation sufficiently serious? When applied to this case, there is no evidence that the condition rises to this level, solely because plaintiff was in a car that was involved in a minor rear end collision on the way to treatment.

Another case, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) clarifies the need to consider the subjective component, i.e., did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind? In Whitley an inmate shot by a guard during an attempt to quell a prison disturbance contended that he had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The court held:

"After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock." Id. at 319

These cases mandate inquiry into a prison official's state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989). The source of the intent requirement is the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify. As Judge Posner has observed:

"The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century. . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985." Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (CA7 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
See also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032, ("The thread common to all [Eighth Amendment prison cases] is that `punishment' has been deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose.).

Nor is there any indication that, as a general matter, the actions of prison officials with respect to these nonmedical conditions are taken under materially different constraints than their actions with respect to medical conditions. Thus, as retired Justice Powell has concluded: "Whether one characterizes the treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the "deliberate indifference" standard articulated in Estelle." LaFaut, 834 F.2d, at 391-392. See also Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 492 (CA4 1990); Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1234 (CA8 1990); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, [ 501 U.S. 294, 304] 558 (CA1), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 263 U.S. App. D.C. 69, 77-78, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-1058 (1987).

Viewing the "facts" offered by plaintiff, there is no evidence that any defendant could be said to have acted with more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety, which is not actionable under § 1983. It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith that must be proven. Plaintiff has offered no facts or legal argument concerning these essential elements of his claim.

III. CONCLUSION

The motion should be denied without prejudice, and judgment should be entered in favor of defendants based on plaintiff's failure to submit any admissible evidence showing the absence of triable issues of material fact.

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL

Wilson, Melvin v. C.O. Martin, et al. 2:06-CV-0830 ALA (PC) Case Name: No.: I declare:

I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day in the ordinary course of business.

On December 26, 2007 , I served the attached

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 1300 I Street, Suite 125, P.O. Box 944255, Sacramento, CA 94244-2550, addressed as follows: Plaintiff, Pro per

Melvin Lee Wilson 980 14th Street Oroville, CA 95965 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on December 26, 2007 , at Sacramento, California. /s/L. Goodwin L. Goodwin _____________________________ _____________________________ Declarant Signature


Summaries of

Wilson v. Martin

United States District Court, E.D. California
May 16, 2008
Case No. 2: 06-cv-00830 ALA (P) (E.D. Cal. May. 16, 2008)
Case details for

Wilson v. Martin

Case Details

Full title:MELVIN L. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. C/O MARTIN, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: May 16, 2008

Citations

Case No. 2: 06-cv-00830 ALA (P) (E.D. Cal. May. 16, 2008)